GPI’s other research on decision theory and cluelessness (deep uncertainty, Knightian uncertainty), offering and analyzing alternatives and adjustments to Bayesian expected value maximization, which is usually assumed in EA. I think they’re aiming for a more epistemically justified approach, and based on this paper and this paper, it seems like there aren’t any very satisfactory approaches.
And there are of course critiques of EA, especially by leftists, by animal rights advocates (for our welfarism) and for neglecting large scale systemic change.
On how risk- and uncertainty-aversion should arguably affect EA decisions, this was also this talk hosted by GPI, by Lara Buchak.
(I’m mentioning that because it seems relevant, not necessarily because I agreed with the talk or with the basic idea that we should take intrinsic risk- or uncertainty-aversion seriously.)
Thanks for this list! I appreciate the Effective Justice paper because it: (1) articulates a deontological version of effective altruism and (2) shows how one could integrate the ideas of EA and justice. I’ve been trying to do the second thing for a while, although as a pure consequentialist I focus more on distributive justice, so this paper is inspiring for me.
Some other works and authors exploring other views and their relationship to EA or EA concepts:
Teruji Thomas, ‘The Asymmetry, Uncertainty, and the Long Term’ (EA Forum post)
Phil Torres (overview of focus, publications, popular media writing, EA Forum account), who works on x-risks, but I think believe in virtue ethics, and is critical of total utilitarianism, longtermism and EA’s neglect of social justice.
Roger Crisp and Theron Pummer, ‘Effective Justice’, discussing “Effective Justice, a possible social movement that would encourage promoting justice most effectively, given limited resources”
Open Phil works on causes that don’t receive that much attention within the rest of EA.
Johann Frick, ‘On the Survival of Humanity’ (pdf), discussing the “final value of humanity”, separate from the (aggregate) value of individuals.
Hilary Greaves, William MacAskill, ‘The case for strong longtermism’ (discusses risk-aversion in 4.2)
GPI’s other research on decision theory and cluelessness (deep uncertainty, Knightian uncertainty), offering and analyzing alternatives and adjustments to Bayesian expected value maximization, which is usually assumed in EA. I think they’re aiming for a more epistemically justified approach, and based on this paper and this paper, it seems like there aren’t any very satisfactory approaches.
Some less formal writing:
John Halstead, ‘The asymmetry and the far future’
Gregory Lewis, ‘The person-affecting value of existential risk reduction’
Alex HT, ‘If you value future people, why do you consider near term effects?’, and the discussion there
And there are of course critiques of EA, especially by leftists, by animal rights advocates (for our welfarism) and for neglecting large scale systemic change.
On how risk- and uncertainty-aversion should arguably affect EA decisions, this was also this talk hosted by GPI, by Lara Buchak.
(I’m mentioning that because it seems relevant, not necessarily because I agreed with the talk or with the basic idea that we should take intrinsic risk- or uncertainty-aversion seriously.)
Thanks for this list! I appreciate the Effective Justice paper because it: (1) articulates a deontological version of effective altruism and (2) shows how one could integrate the ideas of EA and justice. I’ve been trying to do the second thing for a while, although as a pure consequentialist I focus more on distributive justice, so this paper is inspiring for me.