Accepting VRC would be required by CU, in this hypothetical. So, assuming CU, rejecting VRC would need justification.
Yep, this is what I was getting at, sorry that I wasn’t clear. I meant “defense of CU against this case.”
On the other hand, as Vinding also writes (ibid, 5.6; 8.10), the qualitative difference between extreme suffering and suffering that could be extreme if we push a bit further may be still be huge.
Yeah, I don’t object to the possibility of this in principle, just noting that it’s not without its counterintuitive consequences. Neither is pure NU, or any sensible moral theory in my opinion.
Yep, this is what I was getting at, sorry that I wasn’t clear. I meant “defense of CU against this case.”
Yeah, I don’t object to the possibility of this in principle, just noting that it’s not without its counterintuitive consequences. Neither is pure NU, or any sensible moral theory in my opinion.