I’d also add the Very Repugnant Conclusion as a case for which I haven’t heard a satisfying CU defense.
A defense of accepting or rejecting the Very Repugnant Conclusion (VRC) [for those who don’t know, here’s a full text (PDF) which defines both Conclusions in the introduction]? Accepting VRC would be required by CU, in this hypothetical. So, assuming CU, rejecting VRC would need justification.
it’s quite hard to reject the idea that between (a) 1 million people experiencing a form of pain just slightly weaker than the threshold of “extreme” suffering, and (b) 1 person experiencing pain just slightly stronger than that threshold, (b) is the lesser evil.
Perhaps so. On the other hand, as Vinding also writes (ibid, 5.6; 8.10), the qualitative difference between extreme suffering and suffering that could be extreme if we push a bit further may be still be huge. So, “slightly weaker” would not apply to the severity of suffering.
Also, irrespective of whether the above point is true, one (as Taurek did as I mention in the text) argue that (a) is still less bad than (b), for no one in (a) suffers a much as the one in (b).
… in general I think aggregation in axiology is much more defensible than classical utilitarianism wholesale.
Here we might at least agree that some forms of aggregating are more plausible than others, at least in practice: e.g. intrapersonal vs interpersonal aggregating.
The utility monster as well seems asymmetric in how repugnant it is when you formulate it in terms of happiness versus suffering.
… the converse scenario in which we have a _dis_utility monster whose suffering increases as more pleasure is experienced by beings who are already well-off, it seems quite plausible to say that the disutility monster, and others, are justified in preventing these well-off beings from having such non-essential, suffering-producing pleasures. In other words, while it does not seem permissible to impose suffering on others (against their will) to create happiness, it does seem justified to prevent beings who are well-off from experiencing pleasure (even against their will) if their pleasure causes suffering.
Accepting VRC would be required by CU, in this hypothetical. So, assuming CU, rejecting VRC would need justification.
Yep, this is what I was getting at, sorry that I wasn’t clear. I meant “defense of CU against this case.”
On the other hand, as Vinding also writes (ibid, 5.6; 8.10), the qualitative difference between extreme suffering and suffering that could be extreme if we push a bit further may be still be huge.
Yeah, I don’t object to the possibility of this in principle, just noting that it’s not without its counterintuitive consequences. Neither is pure NU, or any sensible moral theory in my opinion.
A defense of accepting or rejecting the Very Repugnant Conclusion (VRC) [for those who don’t know, here’s a full text (PDF) which defines both Conclusions in the introduction]? Accepting VRC would be required by CU, in this hypothetical. So, assuming CU, rejecting VRC would need justification.
Perhaps so. On the other hand, as Vinding also writes (ibid, 5.6; 8.10), the qualitative difference between extreme suffering and suffering that could be extreme if we push a bit further may be still be huge. So, “slightly weaker” would not apply to the severity of suffering.
Also, irrespective of whether the above point is true, one (as Taurek did as I mention in the text) argue that (a) is still less bad than (b), for no one in (a) suffers a much as the one in (b).
Here we might at least agree that some forms of aggregating are more plausible than others, at least in practice: e.g. intrapersonal vs interpersonal aggregating.
Vinding too brings up such a disutility monster in Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications, 3.1, BTW:
Yep, this is what I was getting at, sorry that I wasn’t clear. I meant “defense of CU against this case.”
Yeah, I don’t object to the possibility of this in principle, just noting that it’s not without its counterintuitive consequences. Neither is pure NU, or any sensible moral theory in my opinion.