Well, with those extra assumptions I would no longer consider it a Pascalian Mugging, I would probably just consider it a prone-to-mislead thought experiment.
Would I take a 1*10−10 chance of getting 1015 utilons over the option of a 100% chance of 1 utilon? Well, if we assume that:
Utilons are the only thing that matter for morality/wellbeing (ignore all moral uncertainty),
I don’t have any additional time to reduce my uncertainty (or I have maximal certainty of the 1*10−10 chance estimate),
The 1*10−10 chance estimate already takes into account all of the outside views, intuitions, and any other arguments that says “this is extremely improbable”,
There’s no such thing as opportunity cost,
Diminishing marginal returns don’t apply,
Psychological and social factors are non-existent,
Your answer to this hypothetical question will not be used to judge your intelligence/character in the real world,
(And how about for good measure, “Assume away any other argument which could dispute the intended conclusion”),
Then the answer is probably yes?
I have a hard-to-articulate set of thoughts on what makes some thought experiments valuable vs. misleading, with one of them being something along the lines of “It’s unhelpful to generate an unrealistic thought experiment and then use the answer/response produced by a framework/system as an argument against using that framework/system in the real world if the argument is (at least implicitly) ‘Wow, look at what an unreasonable answer this could produce for real world problems,’ especially given how people may be prone to misinterpret such evidence (especially due to framing effects) for frameworks/systems that they are unfamiliar with or are already biased against.”
But I don’t have time to get into that can of worms, unfortunately.
Pascal’s mugging is only there to uncover ifthere might be a potential problem with using EV maximisation when probabilities get very small. It’s a thought experiment in decision theory. For that reason I actually think my altered thought experiment is useful, as I think you were introducing complications that distract from this central message of the thought experiment. Pascal’s mugging doesn’t in itself say anything about the relevance of these issues to real life. It may be all a moot point at the end of the day.
It sounds to me as if you don’t see any issues with EV maximisation when probabilities get very small. So in my altered thought experiment you would indeed give away your wallet to some random dude claiming to be a wizard, thereby giving up all those awesome things from the store. It’s worth at least noting that many people wouldn’t do the same, and who is right or wrong is where the interesting conundrum lies.
It’s worth at least noting that many people wouldn’t do the same
I don’t think many people are capable of actually internalizing all of the relevant assumptions that in real life would be totally unreasonable, nor do most people have a really good sense of why they have certain intuitions in the first place. So, it’s not particularly surprising/interesting that people would have very different views on this question.
Well, with those extra assumptions I would no longer consider it a Pascalian Mugging, I would probably just consider it a prone-to-mislead thought experiment.
Would I take a 1*10−10 chance of getting 1015 utilons over the option of a 100% chance of 1 utilon? Well, if we assume that:
Utilons are the only thing that matter for morality/wellbeing (ignore all moral uncertainty),
I don’t have any additional time to reduce my uncertainty (or I have maximal certainty of the 1*10−10 chance estimate),
The 1*10−10 chance estimate already takes into account all of the outside views, intuitions, and any other arguments that says “this is extremely improbable”,
There’s no such thing as opportunity cost,
Diminishing marginal returns don’t apply,
Psychological and social factors are non-existent,
Your answer to this hypothetical question will not be used to judge your intelligence/character in the real world,
(And how about for good measure, “Assume away any other argument which could dispute the intended conclusion”),
Then the answer is probably yes?
I have a hard-to-articulate set of thoughts on what makes some thought experiments valuable vs. misleading, with one of them being something along the lines of “It’s unhelpful to generate an unrealistic thought experiment and then use the answer/response produced by a framework/system as an argument against using that framework/system in the real world if the argument is (at least implicitly) ‘Wow, look at what an unreasonable answer this could produce for real world problems,’ especially given how people may be prone to misinterpret such evidence (especially due to framing effects) for frameworks/systems that they are unfamiliar with or are already biased against.”
But I don’t have time to get into that can of worms, unfortunately.
Pascal’s mugging is only there to uncover if there might be a potential problem with using EV maximisation when probabilities get very small. It’s a thought experiment in decision theory. For that reason I actually think my altered thought experiment is useful, as I think you were introducing complications that distract from this central message of the thought experiment. Pascal’s mugging doesn’t in itself say anything about the relevance of these issues to real life. It may be all a moot point at the end of the day.
It sounds to me as if you don’t see any issues with EV maximisation when probabilities get very small. So in my altered thought experiment you would indeed give away your wallet to some random dude claiming to be a wizard, thereby giving up all those awesome things from the store. It’s worth at least noting that many people wouldn’t do the same, and who is right or wrong is where the interesting conundrum lies.
I don’t think many people are capable of actually internalizing all of the relevant assumptions that in real life would be totally unreasonable, nor do most people have a really good sense of why they have certain intuitions in the first place. So, it’s not particularly surprising/interesting that people would have very different views on this question.