I think it would require an unreasonably radical interpretation of longtermism to believe, for example, that delaying something as valuable as a cure for cancer by 10 years (or another comparably significant breakthrough) would be justified, let alone overwhelmingly outweighed, because of an extremely slight and speculative anticipated positive impact on existential risk. Similarly, I think the same is true about AI, if indeed pausing the technology would only have a very slight impact on existential risk in expectation.
I’ve already provided a pragmatic argument for incorporating at least a slight amount of time discounting into one’s moral framework, but I want to reemphasize and elaborate on this point for clarity. Even if you are firmly committed to the idea that we should have no pure rate of time preference—meaning you believe future lives and welfare matter just as much as present ones—you should still account for the fact that the future is inherently uncertain. Our ability to predict the future diminishes significantly the farther we look ahead. This uncertainty should generally lead us to favor not delaying the realization of clearly good outcomes unless there is a strong and concrete justification for why the delay would yield substantial benefits.
Longtermism, as I understand it, is simply the idea that the distant future matters a great deal and should be factored into our decision-making. Longtermism does not—and should not—imply that we should essentially ignore enormous, tangible and clear short-term harms just because we anticipate extremely slight and highly speculative long-term gains that might result from a particular course of action.
I recognize that someone who adheres to an extremely strong and rigid version of longtermism might disagree with the position I’m articulating here. Such a person might argue that even a very small and speculative reduction in existential risk justifies delaying massive and clear near-term benefits. However, I generally believe that people should not adopt this kind of extreme strong longtermism. It leads to moral conclusions that are unreasonably detached from the realities of suffering and flourishing in the present and near future, and I think this approach undermines the pragmatic and balanced principles that arguably drew many of us to longtermism in the first place.
I think it would require an unreasonably radical interpretation of longtermism to believe, for example, that delaying something as valuable as a cure for cancer by 10 years (or another comparably significant breakthrough) would be justified, let alone overwhelmingly outweighed, because of an extremely slight and speculative anticipated positive impact on existential risk. Similarly, I think the same is true about AI, if indeed pausing the technology would only have a very slight impact on existential risk in expectation.
I’ve already provided a pragmatic argument for incorporating at least a slight amount of time discounting into one’s moral framework, but I want to reemphasize and elaborate on this point for clarity. Even if you are firmly committed to the idea that we should have no pure rate of time preference—meaning you believe future lives and welfare matter just as much as present ones—you should still account for the fact that the future is inherently uncertain. Our ability to predict the future diminishes significantly the farther we look ahead. This uncertainty should generally lead us to favor not delaying the realization of clearly good outcomes unless there is a strong and concrete justification for why the delay would yield substantial benefits.
Longtermism, as I understand it, is simply the idea that the distant future matters a great deal and should be factored into our decision-making. Longtermism does not—and should not—imply that we should essentially ignore enormous, tangible and clear short-term harms just because we anticipate extremely slight and highly speculative long-term gains that might result from a particular course of action.
I recognize that someone who adheres to an extremely strong and rigid version of longtermism might disagree with the position I’m articulating here. Such a person might argue that even a very small and speculative reduction in existential risk justifies delaying massive and clear near-term benefits. However, I generally believe that people should not adopt this kind of extreme strong longtermism. It leads to moral conclusions that are unreasonably detached from the realities of suffering and flourishing in the present and near future, and I think this approach undermines the pragmatic and balanced principles that arguably drew many of us to longtermism in the first place.