But this argument is attacking the exact reasons you thought it was good to do the thing in the first place no? I.e. that you expected it would have positive consequences?
I think you’re basically describing the wager argument, which I think is in this post approximated by the ‘heuristics’ counterargument.
I’d be keen to see someone develop the wager argument more. (i.e. ‘wager’ like in Pascal’s wager)
Cluelessness makes the belief that the preferred action has good consequences weaker, but it doesn’t raise any other action above the otherwise-preferred action in terms of expected consequences. So it’s irrelevant to decision-making, and you should still do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Let me know if you have any arguments indicating otherwise. I was hoping this post would provide some.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it? I think that’s the bit that’s confusing me. The cluelessness argument (if it goes through—idk if it does or not, hence competition) attacks your reasons for preferring that action, so you’re back to the drawing board. It doesn’t make much sense to still insist on the action when you find out that your reasons for preferring it are flawed.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it?
Yes.
If cluelessness is false, then you have some preferred action.
If cluelessness is true, then your preferred action is unjustified.
There’s some level of credence in cluelessness. The worst case for your otherwise-preferred action is when p(cluelessness)=100%. In that case it doesn’t matter what you do.
So you might as well do whatever you were going to do anyway.
There’s no case where cluelessness is relevant to your decision process.
I think we’ll end up going in circles—my point is that cluelessness is a problem with the reasoning that gets you to your preferred action, so if it is true, then the reasoning is faulty and the preference is unjustified.
Also, since you can still have preferences if you believe in cluelessness, I don’t quite know how you’d compare between your preference to act deontologically in cluelessness world and your preference to maximise impartial welfare in non-clueless world. Both would be good preferences in their respective worlds. IDK how the meta-normative comparison should go here.
Edit: to clarify, I think our crux might be at this metanormative level, i.e. at comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences. I realise I’m pretty agnostic on how to do that, but a good argument here could cause me to find the wager response to cluelessness more convincing.
comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences
To decide whether you should act based on your cluelessness world preferences or your non-cluelessness world preferences, you’d have to use evidence (either empirical or theoretical) for which world you’re in.
But an ordinary consequentialist decision-making process would already take this evidence into account. (I think cluelessness-believers sometimes strawman cluelessness-skeptics and assume that they haven’t thought of this or wouldn’t update on such evidence.)
I think a more interesting crux is that cluelessness advocates believe that cluelessness undermines consequentialism while leaving deontology or virtue ethics relatively unscathed, but it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.
But this argument is attacking the exact reasons you thought it was good to do the thing in the first place no? I.e. that you expected it would have positive consequences?
I think you’re basically describing the wager argument, which I think is in this post approximated by the ‘heuristics’ counterargument.
I’d be keen to see someone develop the wager argument more. (i.e. ‘wager’ like in Pascal’s wager)
Cluelessness makes the belief that the preferred action has good consequences weaker, but it doesn’t raise any other action above the otherwise-preferred action in terms of expected consequences. So it’s irrelevant to decision-making, and you should still do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Let me know if you have any arguments indicating otherwise. I was hoping this post would provide some.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it? I think that’s the bit that’s confusing me. The cluelessness argument (if it goes through—idk if it does or not, hence competition) attacks your reasons for preferring that action, so you’re back to the drawing board. It doesn’t make much sense to still insist on the action when you find out that your reasons for preferring it are flawed.
Yes.
If cluelessness is false, then you have some preferred action.
If cluelessness is true, then your preferred action is unjustified.
There’s some level of credence in cluelessness. The worst case for your otherwise-preferred action is when p(cluelessness)=100%. In that case it doesn’t matter what you do.
So you might as well do whatever you were going to do anyway.
There’s no case where cluelessness is relevant to your decision process.
I think we’ll end up going in circles—my point is that cluelessness is a problem with the reasoning that gets you to your preferred action, so if it is true, then the reasoning is faulty and the preference is unjustified.
Also, since you can still have preferences if you believe in cluelessness, I don’t quite know how you’d compare between your preference to act deontologically in cluelessness world and your preference to maximise impartial welfare in non-clueless world. Both would be good preferences in their respective worlds. IDK how the meta-normative comparison should go here.
Edit: to clarify, I think our crux might be at this metanormative level, i.e. at comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences. I realise I’m pretty agnostic on how to do that, but a good argument here could cause me to find the wager response to cluelessness more convincing.
To decide whether you should act based on your cluelessness world preferences or your non-cluelessness world preferences, you’d have to use evidence (either empirical or theoretical) for which world you’re in.
But an ordinary consequentialist decision-making process would already take this evidence into account. (I think cluelessness-believers sometimes strawman cluelessness-skeptics and assume that they haven’t thought of this or wouldn’t update on such evidence.)
I think a more interesting crux is that cluelessness advocates believe that cluelessness undermines consequentialism while leaving deontology or virtue ethics relatively unscathed, but it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.
“but it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.”
This seems important. Why do you think that?