I’d agree, but want to say slightly more about the appropriate attitude as well as the right action—something along the lines of non-destructive and non-aggrandising regret.
Out of interest, do you think this attitude for consequentialist reasons (e.g. such an attitude will lead to greater effort devoted towards self-improvement / pruning of not-actually-needed luxuries) or non-consequentialist ones (it’s just inherently blameworthy to really want a sports car when children in Africa are starving)?
needing to sleep (even if she needs to sleep more than others) is not a blameworthy trait
It’s not really clear to me why a need for sleep is not blameworthy while a psychological attachment to luxuries is. One need is universal, while the other is particular, but I’m not sure that matters per se? And even that distinction breaks down if you posit that Agape needs more sleep than other people.
I think you could make the claim that in reality there is a difference in your ability to affect your future self’s attitude to luxuries (e.g. by incrementally weaning yourself off them, cultivating mindfulness, etc.), such that regret is more useful in one case than the other, but if we assume ex hypothesi that that isn’t the case (Agape’s desire for a sports care is deep-seated and unshakeable) then I’m not sure whence the difference in blameworthiness comes.
Part of the story, on a consequentialising-virtue account, is typically desire for luxury is amenable to being changed in general, if not in Agape’s case in particular. Thus her attitude of regret rather than shrugging her shoulders typically makes things go better, if not for her but for third parties who have a shot at improving this aspect of themselves.
I think most non-consequentialist views (including ones I’m personally sympathetic to) would fuzzily circumscribe character traits where moral blameworthiness can apply even if they are incorrigible. To pick two extremes: if Agape was born blind, and this substantially impeded her from doing as much good as she would like, the commonsense view could sympathise with her regret, but insist she really has ‘nothing to be sorry about’; yet if Agape couldn’t help being a vicious racist, and this substantially impeded her from helping others (say, because the beneficiaries are members of racial groups she despises), this is a character-staining fault Agape should at least feel bad about even if being otherwise is beyond her—plausibly, it would recommend her make strenuous efforts to change even if both she and others knew for sure all such attempts are futile.
Out of interest, do you think this attitude for consequentialist reasons (e.g. such an attitude will lead to greater effort devoted towards self-improvement / pruning of not-actually-needed luxuries) or non-consequentialist ones (it’s just inherently blameworthy to really want a sports car when children in Africa are starving)?
It’s not really clear to me why a need for sleep is not blameworthy while a psychological attachment to luxuries is. One need is universal, while the other is particular, but I’m not sure that matters per se? And even that distinction breaks down if you posit that Agape needs more sleep than other people.
I think you could make the claim that in reality there is a difference in your ability to affect your future self’s attitude to luxuries (e.g. by incrementally weaning yourself off them, cultivating mindfulness, etc.), such that regret is more useful in one case than the other, but if we assume ex hypothesi that that isn’t the case (Agape’s desire for a sports care is deep-seated and unshakeable) then I’m not sure whence the difference in blameworthiness comes.
Part of the story, on a consequentialising-virtue account, is typically desire for luxury is amenable to being changed in general, if not in Agape’s case in particular. Thus her attitude of regret rather than shrugging her shoulders typically makes things go better, if not for her but for third parties who have a shot at improving this aspect of themselves.
I think most non-consequentialist views (including ones I’m personally sympathetic to) would fuzzily circumscribe character traits where moral blameworthiness can apply even if they are incorrigible. To pick two extremes: if Agape was born blind, and this substantially impeded her from doing as much good as she would like, the commonsense view could sympathise with her regret, but insist she really has ‘nothing to be sorry about’; yet if Agape couldn’t help being a vicious racist, and this substantially impeded her from helping others (say, because the beneficiaries are members of racial groups she despises), this is a character-staining fault Agape should at least feel bad about even if being otherwise is beyond her—plausibly, it would recommend her make strenuous efforts to change even if both she and others knew for sure all such attempts are futile.