Nice one. Apologies for once again offering my âc-minor moodâ key variation: Although I agree with the policy upshot, âobligatory, demanding effective altruismâ does have some disquieting consequences for agents following this policy in terms of their moral self-evaluation.
As you say, Agape does the right thing if she realises (similar to prof procrastinate) that although, in theory, she could give 90% (or whatever) of her income/âeffort to help others, in practice she knows this isnât going to work out, and so given she wants to do the most good, she should opt for doing somewhat less (10% or whatever), as she foresees being able to sustain this.
Yet the underlying reason for this is a feature of her character which should be the subject of great moral regret. Bluntly: she likes her luxuries so much that she canât abide being without them, despite being aware (inter alia) that a) many people have no choice but to go without the luxuries she licenses herself to enjoy; b) said self-provision implies grave costs to those in great need if (per impossible) she could give more; c) her competing âneedâ doesnât have great non-consequentialist defences (cf. if she was giving 10% rather than 90% due to looking after members of her family); d) thereâs probably not a reasonable story of desert for why she is in this fortunate position in the first place; e) she is aware of other people, similarly situated to her, who nonetheless do manage to do without similar luxuries and give more of themselves to help others.
This seems distinct from other prudential limitations a wise person should attend to. Agape, when making sure she gets enough sleep, may in some sense âregretâ she has to sleep for several hours each day. Yet it is wise for Agape to sleep enough, and needing to sleep (even if she needs to sleep more than others) is not a blameworthy trait. It is also wise for Agape to give less in the OP given her disposition of, essentially, âI know I wonât keep giving to charity unless I also have a sports carâ. But even if Agape canât help this no more than needing to sleep, this trait is blameworthy.
Agape is not alone in having blameworthy features of her characterâI, for one, have many; moral saintliness is rare, and most readers probably could do more to make the world better were they better people. âObligatory, demanding effective altruismâ would also make recommendations against responses to this fact which are counterproductive (e.g. excessive self-flagellation, scrupulosity). Iâd agree, but want to say slightly more about the appropriate attitude as well as the right actionâsomething along the lines of non-destructive and non-aggrandising regret.[1] I often feel EAs tend to err in the direction of being estranged from their own virtue; but they should also try to avoid being too complaisant to their own vice.
[1] Cf. Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death
Either in confused obscurity about oneself and oneâs significance, or with a trace of hypocrisy, or by the help of cunning and sophistry which is present in all despair, despair over sin is not indisposed to bestow upon itself the appearance of something good. So it is supposed to be an expression for a deep nature which thus takes its sin so much to heart. I will adduce an example. When a man who has been addicted to one sin or another, but then for a long while has withstood temptation and conqueredâif he has a relapse and again succumbs to temptation, the dejection which ensues is by no means always sorrow over sin. It may be something else, for the matter of that it may be exasperation against providence, as if it were providence which had allowed him to fall into temptation, as if it ought not to have been so hard on him, since for a long while he had victoriously withstood temptation. But at any rate it is womanish [recte maudlin] without more ado to regard this sorrow as good, not to be in the least observant of the duplicity there is in all passionateness, which in turn has this ominous consequence that at times the passionate man understands afterwards, almost to the point of frenzy, that he has said exactly the opposite of that which he meant to say. Such a man asseverated with stronger and stronger expressions how much this relapse tortures and torments him, how it brings him to despair, âI can never forgive myself for itâ; he says. And all this is supposed to be the expression for how much good there dwells within him, what a deep nature he is.
Iâd agree, but want to say slightly more about the appropriate attitude as well as the right actionâsomething along the lines of non-destructive and non-aggrandising regret.
Out of interest, do you think this attitude for consequentialist reasons (e.g. such an attitude will lead to greater effort devoted towards self-improvement /â pruning of not-actually-needed luxuries) or non-consequentialist ones (itâs just inherently blameworthy to really want a sports car when children in Africa are starving)?
needing to sleep (even if she needs to sleep more than others) is not a blameworthy trait
Itâs not really clear to me why a need for sleep is not blameworthy while a psychological attachment to luxuries is. One need is universal, while the other is particular, but Iâm not sure that matters per se? And even that distinction breaks down if you posit that Agape needs more sleep than other people.
I think you could make the claim that in reality there is a difference in your ability to affect your future selfâs attitude to luxuries (e.g. by incrementally weaning yourself off them, cultivating mindfulness, etc.), such that regret is more useful in one case than the other, but if we assume ex hypothesi that that isnât the case (Agapeâs desire for a sports care is deep-seated and unshakeable) then Iâm not sure whence the difference in blameworthiness comes.
Part of the story, on a consequentialising-virtue account, is typically desire for luxury is amenable to being changed in general, if not in Agapeâs case in particular. Thus her attitude of regret rather than shrugging her shoulders typically makes things go better, if not for her but for third parties who have a shot at improving this aspect of themselves.
I think most non-consequentialist views (including ones Iâm personally sympathetic to) would fuzzily circumscribe character traits where moral blameworthiness can apply even if they are incorrigible. To pick two extremes: if Agape was born blind, and this substantially impeded her from doing as much good as she would like, the commonsense view could sympathise with her regret, but insist she really has ânothing to be sorry aboutâ; yet if Agape couldnât help being a vicious racist, and this substantially impeded her from helping others (say, because the beneficiaries are members of racial groups she despises), this is a character-staining fault Agape should at least feel bad about even if being otherwise is beyond herâplausibly, it would recommend her make strenuous efforts to change even if both she and others knew for sure all such attempts are futile.
Nice one. Apologies for once again offering my âc-minor moodâ key variation: Although I agree with the policy upshot, âobligatory, demanding effective altruismâ does have some disquieting consequences for agents following this policy in terms of their moral self-evaluation.
As you say, Agape does the right thing if she realises (similar to prof procrastinate) that although, in theory, she could give 90% (or whatever) of her income/âeffort to help others, in practice she knows this isnât going to work out, and so given she wants to do the most good, she should opt for doing somewhat less (10% or whatever), as she foresees being able to sustain this.
Yet the underlying reason for this is a feature of her character which should be the subject of great moral regret. Bluntly: she likes her luxuries so much that she canât abide being without them, despite being aware (inter alia) that a) many people have no choice but to go without the luxuries she licenses herself to enjoy; b) said self-provision implies grave costs to those in great need if (per impossible) she could give more; c) her competing âneedâ doesnât have great non-consequentialist defences (cf. if she was giving 10% rather than 90% due to looking after members of her family); d) thereâs probably not a reasonable story of desert for why she is in this fortunate position in the first place; e) she is aware of other people, similarly situated to her, who nonetheless do manage to do without similar luxuries and give more of themselves to help others.
This seems distinct from other prudential limitations a wise person should attend to. Agape, when making sure she gets enough sleep, may in some sense âregretâ she has to sleep for several hours each day. Yet it is wise for Agape to sleep enough, and needing to sleep (even if she needs to sleep more than others) is not a blameworthy trait. It is also wise for Agape to give less in the OP given her disposition of, essentially, âI know I wonât keep giving to charity unless I also have a sports carâ. But even if Agape canât help this no more than needing to sleep, this trait is blameworthy.
Agape is not alone in having blameworthy features of her characterâI, for one, have many; moral saintliness is rare, and most readers probably could do more to make the world better were they better people. âObligatory, demanding effective altruismâ would also make recommendations against responses to this fact which are counterproductive (e.g. excessive self-flagellation, scrupulosity). Iâd agree, but want to say slightly more about the appropriate attitude as well as the right actionâsomething along the lines of non-destructive and non-aggrandising regret.[1] I often feel EAs tend to err in the direction of being estranged from their own virtue; but they should also try to avoid being too complaisant to their own vice.
[1] Cf. Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death
Either in confused obscurity about oneself and oneâs significance, or with a trace of hypocrisy, or by the help of cunning and sophistry which is present in all despair, despair over sin is not indisposed to bestow upon itself the appearance of something good. So it is supposed to be an expression for a deep nature which thus takes its sin so much to heart. I will adduce an example. When a man who has been addicted to one sin or another, but then for a long while has withstood temptation and conqueredâif he has a relapse and again succumbs to temptation, the dejection which ensues is by no means always sorrow over sin. It may be something else, for the matter of that it may be exasperation against providence, as if it were providence which had allowed him to fall into temptation, as if it ought not to have been so hard on him, since for a long while he had victoriously withstood temptation. But at any rate it is womanish [recte maudlin] without more ado to regard this sorrow as good, not to be in the least observant of the duplicity there is in all passionateness, which in turn has this ominous consequence that at times the passionate man understands afterwards, almost to the point of frenzy, that he has said exactly the opposite of that which he meant to say. Such a man asseverated with stronger and stronger expressions how much this relapse tortures and torments him, how it brings him to despair, âI can never forgive myself for itâ; he says. And all this is supposed to be the expression for how much good there dwells within him, what a deep nature he is.
Out of interest, do you think this attitude for consequentialist reasons (e.g. such an attitude will lead to greater effort devoted towards self-improvement /â pruning of not-actually-needed luxuries) or non-consequentialist ones (itâs just inherently blameworthy to really want a sports car when children in Africa are starving)?
Itâs not really clear to me why a need for sleep is not blameworthy while a psychological attachment to luxuries is. One need is universal, while the other is particular, but Iâm not sure that matters per se? And even that distinction breaks down if you posit that Agape needs more sleep than other people.
I think you could make the claim that in reality there is a difference in your ability to affect your future selfâs attitude to luxuries (e.g. by incrementally weaning yourself off them, cultivating mindfulness, etc.), such that regret is more useful in one case than the other, but if we assume ex hypothesi that that isnât the case (Agapeâs desire for a sports care is deep-seated and unshakeable) then Iâm not sure whence the difference in blameworthiness comes.
Part of the story, on a consequentialising-virtue account, is typically desire for luxury is amenable to being changed in general, if not in Agapeâs case in particular. Thus her attitude of regret rather than shrugging her shoulders typically makes things go better, if not for her but for third parties who have a shot at improving this aspect of themselves.
I think most non-consequentialist views (including ones Iâm personally sympathetic to) would fuzzily circumscribe character traits where moral blameworthiness can apply even if they are incorrigible. To pick two extremes: if Agape was born blind, and this substantially impeded her from doing as much good as she would like, the commonsense view could sympathise with her regret, but insist she really has ânothing to be sorry aboutâ; yet if Agape couldnât help being a vicious racist, and this substantially impeded her from helping others (say, because the beneficiaries are members of racial groups she despises), this is a character-staining fault Agape should at least feel bad about even if being otherwise is beyond herâplausibly, it would recommend her make strenuous efforts to change even if both she and others knew for sure all such attempts are futile.