Iâm very late responding, but I have two questions about this:
Each new pocket universe starts âfrom scratchâ with no humans (or planets or whatever) in it, right? Itâs not like the many worlds interpretation where new local branches are nearly identical to one another and the seconds before, right?
Even if almost all of the pocket universes are young, that doesnât mean theyâre short-lived (or only support moral patients for a short period), right? They could still have very long futures with huge numbers of moral patients each ahead of them. In each pocket universe, couldnât targeting its far future be best (assuming risk neutral expected value-maximizing utilitarianism)? And then the same would hold across pocket universes.
If there are infinitely many pocket universes, then maybe the order of summation matters? If you first sum value across all pocket universes at each time point, and then sum over time, then maybe you get fanatical ultra-neartermism, like you suggest. If you first sum over time in each pocket universe and then across all pocket universes, then you get longtermism (or at least not ultra-neartermism).
If everything were finite, then summation order wouldnât matter, and as long as the pocket universes didnât end up disproportionately short-lived, you wouldnât get fanatical ultra-neartermism.
I should reiterate that my note above is rather speculative, and I really havenât thought much about this stuff.
1: Yes, I believe thatâs what inflation theories generally entail.
2: I agree, it doesnât follow that theyâre short-lived.
In each pocket universe, couldnât targeting its far future be best (assuming risk neutral expected value-maximizing utilitarianism)? And then the same would hold across pocket universes.
I guess it could be; I suppose it depends both on the empirical âdetailsâ and oneâs decision theory.
Regarding options a and b, a third option could be:
c: There is an ensemble of finitely many pocket universes wherein new pocket universes emerge in an unbounded manner for eternity, where there will always be a vast predominance of (finitely many) younger pocket universes. (Note that this need not imply that any individual pocket universe is eternal, let alone that any pocket universe can support the existence of value entities for eternity.) In this scenario, for any summation between two points in âglobal timeâ across the totality of the multiverse, earlier âpocket-universe momentsâ will vastly dominate. That might be an argument in favor of extreme neartermism (in that kind of scenario).
But, of course, we donât know whether we are in such a scenario â indeed, one could argue that we have strong anthropic evidence suggesting that we are not â and it seems that common-sense heuristics would in any case speak against giving much weight to these kinds of speculative considerations (though admittedly such heuristics also push somewhat against a strong long-term focus).
Iâm very late responding, but I have two questions about this:
Each new pocket universe starts âfrom scratchâ with no humans (or planets or whatever) in it, right? Itâs not like the many worlds interpretation where new local branches are nearly identical to one another and the seconds before, right?
Even if almost all of the pocket universes are young, that doesnât mean theyâre short-lived (or only support moral patients for a short period), right? They could still have very long futures with huge numbers of moral patients each ahead of them. In each pocket universe, couldnât targeting its far future be best (assuming risk neutral expected value-maximizing utilitarianism)? And then the same would hold across pocket universes.
If there are infinitely many pocket universes, then maybe the order of summation matters? If you first sum value across all pocket universes at each time point, and then sum over time, then maybe you get fanatical ultra-neartermism, like you suggest. If you first sum over time in each pocket universe and then across all pocket universes, then you get longtermism (or at least not ultra-neartermism).
If everything were finite, then summation order wouldnât matter, and as long as the pocket universes didnât end up disproportionately short-lived, you wouldnât get fanatical ultra-neartermism.
Thanks for your comment, Michael :)
I should reiterate that my note above is rather speculative, and I really havenât thought much about this stuff.
1: Yes, I believe thatâs what inflation theories generally entail.
2: I agree, it doesnât follow that theyâre short-lived.
I guess it could be; I suppose it depends both on the empirical âdetailsâ and oneâs decision theory.
Regarding options a and b, a third option could be:
c: There is an ensemble of finitely many pocket universes wherein new pocket universes emerge in an unbounded manner for eternity, where there will always be a vast predominance of (finitely many) younger pocket universes. (Note that this need not imply that any individual pocket universe is eternal, let alone that any pocket universe can support the existence of value entities for eternity.) In this scenario, for any summation between two points in âglobal timeâ across the totality of the multiverse, earlier âpocket-universe momentsâ will vastly dominate. That might be an argument in favor of extreme neartermism (in that kind of scenario).
But, of course, we donât know whether we are in such a scenario â indeed, one could argue that we have strong anthropic evidence suggesting that we are not â and it seems that common-sense heuristics would in any case speak against giving much weight to these kinds of speculative considerations (though admittedly such heuristics also push somewhat against a strong long-term focus).