Suppose for sake of argument that I have p < .1% that a being existed who had access to moral facts and could influence the world. Given this, the likelihood that one is confused on some basic question about morality would be higher.
Good point—this sort of worry seems sensible, for example if you have a zero credence in God then the argument just obviously won’t go through.
I guess from my assessment of the philosophy of religion literature it doesn’t seem plausible to have a credence so low for theism that background uncertainties about being confused on some basic question of morality would be likely to make the argument all things considered unsuccessful.
Regardless, I think that the argument should still result in the possibility of theism having a larger influence on your decisions then the mere part of your probability space it takes up.
Suppose for sake of argument that I have p < .1% that a being existed who had access to moral facts and could influence the world. Given this, the likelihood that one is confused on some basic question about morality would be higher.
Good point—this sort of worry seems sensible, for example if you have a zero credence in God then the argument just obviously won’t go through.
I guess from my assessment of the philosophy of religion literature it doesn’t seem plausible to have a credence so low for theism that background uncertainties about being confused on some basic question of morality would be likely to make the argument all things considered unsuccessful.
Regardless, I think that the argument should still result in the possibility of theism having a larger influence on your decisions then the mere part of your probability space it takes up.