I disagree Max. We can all recall anecdotes of overconfidence because they create well-publicized narratives. With hindsight bias, it seems obvious that overconfidence was the subject. So naturally we overestimate overconfidence risks, just like nuclear power.
The costs of under confidence are invisible and ubiquitous. A grad student fails to submit her paper. An applicant doesn’t apply. A graduate doesn’t write down her NGO idea. Because you can’t see the costs of underconfidence, they could be hundreds or thousands of times the overconfidence costs.
To break apart the question
Should people update based on evidence and not have rigid world-models. Is people disagreeing with you moderate evidence?
Yes to both
Once someone builds the best world-model they can, should they defer to higher-status people’s models
Much much less often than we currently do
How much should we weight disagreement between our models and the models of others?
I disagree Max. We can all recall anecdotes of overconfidence because they create well-publicized narratives. With hindsight bias, it seems obvious that overconfidence was the subject. So naturally we overestimate overconfidence risks, just like nuclear power.
The costs of under confidence are invisible and ubiquitous. A grad student fails to submit her paper. An applicant doesn’t apply. A graduate doesn’t write down her NGO idea. Because you can’t see the costs of underconfidence, they could be hundreds or thousands of times the overconfidence costs.
To break apart the question
Should people update based on evidence and not have rigid world-models. Is people disagreeing with you moderate evidence?
Yes to both
Once someone builds the best world-model they can, should they defer to higher-status people’s models
Much much less often than we currently do
How much should we weight disagreement between our models and the models of others?
See Yud’s book: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/svoD5KLKHyAKEdwPo/against-modest-epistemology