How about this gripe: You’ve shown that in theory, for an arbitrary set of probability assignments, it’s very difficult to compute implications.
But the landscape of probabilities in the real world is not an arbitrary set, and we’d expect to have it much more structure.
Thoughts?
This is the issue I was trying to address in counterargument 2.
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How about this gripe: You’ve shown that in theory, for an arbitrary set of probability assignments, it’s very difficult to compute implications.
But the landscape of probabilities in the real world is not an arbitrary set, and we’d expect to have it much more structure.
Thoughts?
This is the issue I was trying to address in counterargument 2.