Utilitarianism is one of the more āmoderateā views in the field because at the very least it admits that individual insects have less welfare capacity than typical humans. Unitarian rights-based theories claim that right to life is equally strong for all sentient beings, which make insects an even bigger priority. What is your view on moral patienthood?
Hi, thanks for your reply. This is a difficult question. I should say as a disclaimer that Iām not coming from a rights-based ethical framework. I havenāt engaged deeply with rights-based theories, but from the limited exposure Iāve had, Iām not convinced they provide a particularly effective foundation for articulating or justifying moral judgments. They seem, to me, more like rhetorical containers rather than real moral artefacts, if that makes sense.
That said, my views on moral patienthood, while evolving, tend toward a kind of human-first perspective. Iād generally argue that human beings possess a kind of intrinsic moral worth, and that humanity, as a collective endeavour or end, ought to take precedence over other ends.
I do acknowledge that non-human animals are capable of being harmed or benefitted, and that we have some moral obligations not to inflict unnecessary harm onto them. However, when forced to choose between a human and a non-human animal, I anticipate I would almost always choose the human.
This perspective can be directly applied to the domain of cause prioritisation. If one holds that, as a general principle, human interests should take precedence over those of non-human animals, then it follows that causes which primarily benefit human beings will be prioritised over those that focus on non-human animals.
Of course, when comparing causes that fall entirely within the domain of non-human animal ethics, a different evaluative metric would need to be employed. However, given my prior commitment to a human-first moral framework and the reality of limited personal resources, it seems unlikely that I would allocate substantial effort toward evaluating or supporting animal-focused causes. Given my commitments, I should maximise my impact by concentrating on human-centred initiatives and, correspondingly, opting out of debates over the relative merits of animal-related causes.
Let me know if you have any reservations about anything Iāve just said there. Thanks again for reaching out.
Thank you for the detailed reply. Iām personally not satisfied by moral theories that attribute intrinsic moral significance to species-membership but I wonāt be available for further discussion.
Utilitarianism is one of the more āmoderateā views in the field because at the very least it admits that individual insects have less welfare capacity than typical humans. Unitarian rights-based theories claim that right to life is equally strong for all sentient beings, which make insects an even bigger priority. What is your view on moral patienthood?
Hi, thanks for your reply. This is a difficult question. I should say as a disclaimer that Iām not coming from a rights-based ethical framework. I havenāt engaged deeply with rights-based theories, but from the limited exposure Iāve had, Iām not convinced they provide a particularly effective foundation for articulating or justifying moral judgments. They seem, to me, more like rhetorical containers rather than real moral artefacts, if that makes sense.
That said, my views on moral patienthood, while evolving, tend toward a kind of human-first perspective. Iād generally argue that human beings possess a kind of intrinsic moral worth, and that humanity, as a collective endeavour or end, ought to take precedence over other ends.
I do acknowledge that non-human animals are capable of being harmed or benefitted, and that we have some moral obligations not to inflict unnecessary harm onto them. However, when forced to choose between a human and a non-human animal, I anticipate I would almost always choose the human.
This perspective can be directly applied to the domain of cause prioritisation. If one holds that, as a general principle, human interests should take precedence over those of non-human animals, then it follows that causes which primarily benefit human beings will be prioritised over those that focus on non-human animals.
Of course, when comparing causes that fall entirely within the domain of non-human animal ethics, a different evaluative metric would need to be employed. However, given my prior commitment to a human-first moral framework and the reality of limited personal resources, it seems unlikely that I would allocate substantial effort toward evaluating or supporting animal-focused causes. Given my commitments, I should maximise my impact by concentrating on human-centred initiatives and, correspondingly, opting out of debates over the relative merits of animal-related causes.
Let me know if you have any reservations about anything Iāve just said there. Thanks again for reaching out.
Thank you for the detailed reply. Iām personally not satisfied by moral theories that attribute intrinsic moral significance to species-membership but I wonāt be available for further discussion.