I have some models of the world which lead me to think that the idea was unpromising. Some of them clearly have a subjective component. Still, I’m using the same “muscles” as when forecasting, and I trust that those muscles will usually produce sensible conclusions.
It is possible that in this case I had too negative a view, though not in a way which is clearly wrong (to me). If I was forecasting the question “will a charity be incubated to work on philosophy in schools” (surprise reveal: this is similar to what I was doing all along), I imagine I’d give it a very low probability, but that my team mates would give it a slightly higher probability. After discussion, we’d both probably move towards the center, and thus be more accurate.
Note that if we model my subjective promisingness = true promisingness + error term, if we pick the candidate idea at the very bottom of my list (in this case, philosophy in schools, the idea under discussion and one of the four ideas to which I assigned a “very unpromising” rating), we’d expect it to both be unpromising (per your own view) and have a large error term (I clearly don’t view philosophy very favorably)
Thanks for the clarifications in your previous two comments. Helpful to get more of an insight into your thought process.
Just a few comments:
I stronglydon’t think a charity to work on philosophy in schools would be helpful and I don’t like that way of thinking about it. My suggestions were having prominent philosophers join (existing) advocacy efforts for philosophy in the curriculum, more people becoming philosophy teachers (if this might be their comparative advantage), trying to shift educational spending towards values-based education, more research into values-based education (to name a few).
This is a whole separate conversation that I’m not sure we have to get into right now too deeply (I think I’d rather not) but I think there are severe issues with development economics as a field to the extent that I would place it near the bottom of the pecking order within EA. Firstly the generalisability of RCT results is highly questionable (for example see Eva Vivalt’s research). More importantly and fundamentally, the problem of complex cluelessness (see here and here). It is partly considerations of cluelessness that makes me interested in longtermist areas such as moral circle expansion and broadly promoting positive values, along with x-risk reduction.
I’m hoping we’re nearing a good enough understanding of each other’s views that we don’t need to keep discussing for much longer, but I’m happy to continue a bit if helpful.
tl;dr/Notes:
I have some models of the world which lead me to think that the idea was unpromising. Some of them clearly have a subjective component. Still, I’m using the same “muscles” as when forecasting, and I trust that those muscles will usually produce sensible conclusions.
It is possible that in this case I had too negative a view, though not in a way which is clearly wrong (to me). If I was forecasting the question “will a charity be incubated to work on philosophy in schools” (surprise reveal: this is similar to what I was doing all along), I imagine I’d give it a very low probability, but that my team mates would give it a slightly higher probability. After discussion, we’d both probably move towards the center, and thus be more accurate.
Note that if we model my subjective promisingness = true promisingness + error term, if we pick the candidate idea at the very bottom of my list (in this case, philosophy in schools, the idea under discussion and one of the four ideas to which I assigned a “very unpromising” rating), we’d expect it to both be unpromising (per your own view) and have a large error term (I clearly don’t view philosophy very favorably)
Thanks for the clarifications in your previous two comments. Helpful to get more of an insight into your thought process.
Just a few comments:
I strongly don’t think a charity to work on philosophy in schools would be helpful and I don’t like that way of thinking about it. My suggestions were having prominent philosophers join (existing) advocacy efforts for philosophy in the curriculum, more people becoming philosophy teachers (if this might be their comparative advantage), trying to shift educational spending towards values-based education, more research into values-based education (to name a few).
This is a whole separate conversation that I’m not sure we have to get into right now too deeply (I think I’d rather not) but I think there are severe issues with development economics as a field to the extent that I would place it near the bottom of the pecking order within EA. Firstly the generalisability of RCT results is highly questionable (for example see Eva Vivalt’s research). More importantly and fundamentally, the problem of complex cluelessness (see here and here). It is partly considerations of cluelessness that makes me interested in longtermist areas such as moral circle expansion and broadly promoting positive values, along with x-risk reduction.
I’m hoping we’re nearing a good enough understanding of each other’s views that we don’t need to keep discussing for much longer, but I’m happy to continue a bit if helpful.
Acknowledged.