Either you do not know that there are other values at playāin which case you are not arguing properly, since you have not investigated sufficientlyāor you do know that there are other values at play, but are choosing not to point this out to your readerāin which case you are not arguing honestly.)
Obviously Iām engaging with a position on which there are believed to be āother values in playā (e.g. a conception of fairness which prioritizes national representation over number of people helped), since Iām arguing that those other values are ultimately indefensible.
Iām going to leave the conversation at that. I can deal with polite philosophical ignorance (e.g. not understanding how to engage productively with thought experiments), or with arrogance from a sharp interlocutor who is actually making good points; but the combination of arrogance and ignorance is just too much for me.
Thanks for continuing to engageāI appreciate that it must be frustrating for you.
The other values at play are quite obviously not āprioritise national representation over number of people helpedā. Thatās why I proposed the parallel thought experiment of schoolboys and schoolgirls in Bangladeshāto show that your calculus is subject to the exact same objections without any implication of ānational representationā, and therefore ānational representationā is not part of this discussion.
The other values that I am referring to (as Iāve mentioned in other replies) might be the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. These values are contested, and youāre obviously welcome to contest them, but they are the moral and to some extent legal basis of C20 humanitarian action.
They are not necessarily key to e.g. education provision, which although it is often delivered by ādual mandateā organisations, is not strictly speaking a lifesaving activity, so you may wish to reject them on those grounds. However it seems to me that you believe that your cardinal value of effectiveness is applicable across all areas of altruism, so I think they are relevant to the argument.
You originally asked for any feedback, and I took you at your word. My feedback is simply that this paper is preaching to the choir, and it would be a stronger paper if you addressed these other value systemsāthe very basis of the topic that you are discussingārather than ignoring them completely. You can of course argue that theyāre indefensibleāand clearly we disagree thereābut first you have to identify them correctly.
To the accusations of arrogance and ignorance. Obviously weāre all ignorantāitās the human conditionābut I try to alleviate my ignorance by e.g. reading papers and listening to viewpoints that I disagree with. Clearly you find me arrogant, but thereās not much I can do about thatāIāve tried to be as polite as I can, but clearly that was insufficient.
If you can give me any tips on how to engage productively with thought experiments, I would welcome them. I would however note that Iāve always believed that the trolley problem was intended as a basis for discussion, rather than as a basis for policy decisions about public transport systems.
Clearly you find me arrogant, but thereās not much I can do about thatāIāve tried to be as polite as I can, but clearly that was insufficient.
You come across as arrogant for a few reasons which are in principle fixable.
1: You seem to believe people who donāt share your values are simply ignorant of them, and not in a deep ālooking for a black cat in an unlit room through a mirror darklyā sort of way. If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people doābut you still have to argue for them.
2: You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged. At the risk of reproducing exactly that pattern, hereās an example:
In humanitarian action effectiveness is an instrumental value not an intrinsic value
...
EA is a form of utilitarianism, and when the word effective is used it has generally been in the sense of ācost effectiveā. If you are not an effective altruist (which I am not), then cost effectivenessāwhile importantāis an instrumental value rather than an intrinsic value.
...
Iām not a utilitarian, so I reject the premise of this question when presented in the abstract as it is here. Effectiveness for me is an instrumental value
As you have been more politely told many times in this comment section already: claiming that utilitarians assign intrinsic value to cost-effectiveness is absurd. Utilitarians value total well-being (though what exactly that means is a point of contention) and nothing else. I would happily incinerate all the luxury goods humanity has ever produced if it meant no one ever went hungry again. Others would go much further.
What I suspect youāre actually objecting to is aggregation of utility across personsāsince that, plus the grossly insufficient resources available to us, is what makes cost-effectiveness a key instrumental concern in almost all situationsābut if so the objection is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.
3: Bafflingly, given (1), you also donāt seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence
in precisely the same way. But we donāt. For example: utilitarianism is clearly āimpartialā and āneutralā as I understand them (i.e. agent-neutral and impartial with respect to different moral patients) whereas folk-morality is clearly not.
Iām guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this
Humanity means that human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable.
Neutrality means that humanitarian aid must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute.
Impartiality means that humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination.
Independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives.
in which case thereās a further complication: youāre almost certainly using āintrinsic valueā and āinstrumental valueā in a very different sense from the people youāre talking to. The above versions of āindependenceā and āneutralityā are, by my lights, obviously instrumentalāthese are cultural norms for one particular sort of organization at one particular moment in human history, not universal moral law.
Thanks for your comment. Iāll try to address each of your points.
āYou seem to believe people who donāt share your values are simply ignorant of themā¦ If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people doābut you still have to argue for them.ā
In general, noāI do not believe that people who donāt share my values are simply ignorant of them, and I have communicated poorly if that is your impression. Nor do I believe that my beliefs are prima facie correct, and I donāt think Iāve claimed that in any of these comments. I did not post here to argue for my beliefsāI donāt expect anybody on this forum to agree with themābut to point out that the paper under discussion fails to deal with those beliefs adequately, which seemed to me a weakness.
āYou mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged.ā
I think itās an exaggeration to say that my characterisation is āfrankly incomprehensibleā and that I ābecome evasiveā when challenged. My characterisation may be slightly inaccurate, but itās not as if I am a million miles away from common understanding, and I have tried to be as direct as possible in my responses.
The confusion may arise from the fact that when I claim that effectiveness is an intrinsic value, I am making that claim for effective altruism specifically, rather than utilitarianism more broadly. And indeed effectiveness does appear to be an intrinsic value for effective altruismābecause if what effective altruists proposed was not effective, it would not constitute effective altruism.
Your final point has the most traction:
āBafflingly, given (1), you also donāt seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understoodā¦ Iām guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like thisā
I was indeed referring to these principles, and youāre rightāI didnāt explain them! This may have been a mistake on my part, but as I implied above, my intent was not to persuade anybody here to accept those principles. I am not expecting random people on a message board to even be aware of these principlesābut I would expect an academic who writes a paper on the subject that in part intends to refute the arguments of organisations involved in humanitarian action to refer to these principles at least in passing, wouldnāt you?
āyouāre almost certainly using āintrinsic valueā and āinstrumental valueā in a very different sense from the people youāre talking to.ā
Yes, this may be the case. In another comment in this thread I reconsidered my position, and suggested that humanitarian principles are a curious mix of intrinsic and instrumental. But Iām not sure my usage is that far away from the common usage, is it? I also raised the point that they are in fact contestedāpartly for the cultural reason you raiseāand the way in which they are viewed varies from organisation to organisation. Obviously this will cause more concern for people who prefer their principles much cleaner!
Obviously Iām engaging with a position on which there are believed to be āother values in playā (e.g. a conception of fairness which prioritizes national representation over number of people helped), since Iām arguing that those other values are ultimately indefensible.
Iām going to leave the conversation at that. I can deal with polite philosophical ignorance (e.g. not understanding how to engage productively with thought experiments), or with arrogance from a sharp interlocutor who is actually making good points; but the combination of arrogance and ignorance is just too much for me.
Thanks for continuing to engageāI appreciate that it must be frustrating for you.
The other values at play are quite obviously not āprioritise national representation over number of people helpedā. Thatās why I proposed the parallel thought experiment of schoolboys and schoolgirls in Bangladeshāto show that your calculus is subject to the exact same objections without any implication of ānational representationā, and therefore ānational representationā is not part of this discussion.
The other values that I am referring to (as Iāve mentioned in other replies) might be the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. These values are contested, and youāre obviously welcome to contest them, but they are the moral and to some extent legal basis of C20 humanitarian action.
They are not necessarily key to e.g. education provision, which although it is often delivered by ādual mandateā organisations, is not strictly speaking a lifesaving activity, so you may wish to reject them on those grounds. However it seems to me that you believe that your cardinal value of effectiveness is applicable across all areas of altruism, so I think they are relevant to the argument.
You originally asked for any feedback, and I took you at your word. My feedback is simply that this paper is preaching to the choir, and it would be a stronger paper if you addressed these other value systemsāthe very basis of the topic that you are discussingārather than ignoring them completely. You can of course argue that theyāre indefensibleāand clearly we disagree thereābut first you have to identify them correctly.
To the accusations of arrogance and ignorance. Obviously weāre all ignorantāitās the human conditionābut I try to alleviate my ignorance by e.g. reading papers and listening to viewpoints that I disagree with. Clearly you find me arrogant, but thereās not much I can do about thatāIāve tried to be as polite as I can, but clearly that was insufficient.
If you can give me any tips on how to engage productively with thought experiments, I would welcome them. I would however note that Iāve always believed that the trolley problem was intended as a basis for discussion, rather than as a basis for policy decisions about public transport systems.
You come across as arrogant for a few reasons which are in principle fixable.
1: You seem to believe people who donāt share your values are simply ignorant of them, and not in a deep ālooking for a black cat in an unlit room through a mirror darklyā sort of way. If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people doābut you still have to argue for them.
2: You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged. At the risk of reproducing exactly that pattern, hereās an example:
As you have been more politely told many times in this comment section already: claiming that utilitarians assign intrinsic value to cost-effectiveness is absurd. Utilitarians value total well-being (though what exactly that means is a point of contention) and nothing else. I would happily incinerate all the luxury goods humanity has ever produced if it meant no one ever went hungry again. Others would go much further.
What I suspect youāre actually objecting to is aggregation of utility across personsāsince that, plus the grossly insufficient resources available to us, is what makes cost-effectiveness a key instrumental concern in almost all situationsābut if so the objection is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.
3: Bafflingly, given (1), you also donāt seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood
in precisely the same way. But we donāt. For example: utilitarianism is clearly āimpartialā and āneutralā as I understand them (i.e. agent-neutral and impartial with respect to different moral patients) whereas folk-morality is clearly not.
Iām guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this
in which case thereās a further complication: youāre almost certainly using āintrinsic valueā and āinstrumental valueā in a very different sense from the people youāre talking to. The above versions of āindependenceā and āneutralityā are, by my lights, obviously instrumentalāthese are cultural norms for one particular sort of organization at one particular moment in human history, not universal moral law.
Thanks for your comment. Iāll try to address each of your points.
āYou seem to believe people who donāt share your values are simply ignorant of themā¦ If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people doābut you still have to argue for them.ā
In general, noāI do not believe that people who donāt share my values are simply ignorant of them, and I have communicated poorly if that is your impression. Nor do I believe that my beliefs are prima facie correct, and I donāt think Iāve claimed that in any of these comments. I did not post here to argue for my beliefsāI donāt expect anybody on this forum to agree with themābut to point out that the paper under discussion fails to deal with those beliefs adequately, which seemed to me a weakness.
āYou mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged.ā
I think itās an exaggeration to say that my characterisation is āfrankly incomprehensibleā and that I ābecome evasiveā when challenged. My characterisation may be slightly inaccurate, but itās not as if I am a million miles away from common understanding, and I have tried to be as direct as possible in my responses.
The confusion may arise from the fact that when I claim that effectiveness is an intrinsic value, I am making that claim for effective altruism specifically, rather than utilitarianism more broadly. And indeed effectiveness does appear to be an intrinsic value for effective altruismābecause if what effective altruists proposed was not effective, it would not constitute effective altruism.
Your final point has the most traction:
āBafflingly, given (1), you also donāt seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understoodā¦ Iām guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like thisā
I was indeed referring to these principles, and youāre rightāI didnāt explain them! This may have been a mistake on my part, but as I implied above, my intent was not to persuade anybody here to accept those principles. I am not expecting random people on a message board to even be aware of these principlesābut I would expect an academic who writes a paper on the subject that in part intends to refute the arguments of organisations involved in humanitarian action to refer to these principles at least in passing, wouldnāt you?
āyouāre almost certainly using āintrinsic valueā and āinstrumental valueā in a very different sense from the people youāre talking to.ā
Yes, this may be the case. In another comment in this thread I reconsidered my position, and suggested that humanitarian principles are a curious mix of intrinsic and instrumental. But Iām not sure my usage is that far away from the common usage, is it? I also raised the point that they are in fact contestedāpartly for the cultural reason you raiseāand the way in which they are viewed varies from organisation to organisation. Obviously this will cause more concern for people who prefer their principles much cleaner!