Thanks for the write-up. I think historical examples can be helpful in understanding the nature of current social tendencies, but I also think it is important to precisely analyse the possible deleterious impacts of de-platforming or “cancel culture”, which differ substantially from the analogous occurrences you cite in the Cultural Revolution. In particular, I think it is necessary to distinguish between the first-order effects, which I think are not very severe, and the second-order or third-order effects, which are more concerning.
By first-order effects, I refer to the instances you cite of cancellation-for-cultural-heresy.
First, the immediate stakes are far lower—in the Cultural Revolution, “counter-revolutionary revisionists” were sent cross-country to re-education camps, tortured, killed, even eaten. As far as I am aware, none of these things have happened recently in America to public figures (or made-public-by-Twitter figures) as a result of the sort of backlash you discuss.
Second, the scale of the first-order effects, although difficult to precisely ascertain, probably appears to be much larger than it actually is due to availability selection effects (similar selection effects to those which lead to scope insensitivity in e.g. videos of deaths from police brutality as opposed to deaths from coronavirus). Particularly egregious cases of cancellation—which certainly exist (such as the case of citing detailed studies on police brutality by race you mentioned) - are probably pretty rare on the whole, just as particularly egregious cases of police brutality are pretty rare on the whole. Both, of course (and far more the latter), are concerning when they do occur, but they should be considered in context, and one has to be very careful as an observer to understand the selection effects at play.
Third, at the moment, this cultural movement (whatever you want to call it) is not orchestrated top-down or directly backed by the formal structures of power (legislative, executive, and judicial branches of American government, and the military), in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution. Unless this changes (which is possible), I think this makes violent conflict quite unlikely (also for the reasons of interdependence between urban/rural areas that you cite), and it means that constitutional protections (although under threat for other reasons) are not directly at risk for reasons of “cultural heresy”.
For these reasons, I think the first-order effects are not that concerning, and the comparison to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution on that basis is not particularly well-founded.
I think the higher-order effects are more serious.
First, cancellation-for-heresy can create a “chilling effect” where intellectuals and public figures are unwilling to voice their true opinions for fear of being accused of heresy and losing their jobs or reputations. Fixing the underlying problems—whatever the particulars—requires a dispassionate analysis of the facts of the matter, and an appreciation for the real scale of particular problems independent of availability heuristics—so the “chilling effect” may actually achieve the opposite of its nominal intent and prevent people who would have otherwise been e.g. doing research into evidence-based police reform strategies from doing so, and thus prevent the results of that research from being enacted into policy.
Second, the contortions induced by conformity to this kind of pressure, e.g. the about-face of many health professionals and public figures on the coronavirus dangers posed by Black Lives Matter protests vs. Trump rallies, whatever their private views may have been, have potentially serious consequences both to immediate behaviour (COVID19 will spread at a protest without regard to the political motivations of its attendees), and to public trust in institutions, already at a low point and continuing to fall. Considering the current US coronavirus death toll, I think these kinds of second- and third-order consequences (although certainly not solely a result of this cultural phenomenon) are much more concerning than the immediate first-order consequences of “cancellation” or the like.
EDIT: I want to highlight this take by someone who’s much more knowledgable than I am; you should probably read it before reading my comment.
First, the immediate stakes are far lower—in the Cultural Revolution, “counter-revolutionary revisionists” were sent cross-country to re-education camps, tortured, killed, even eaten. As far as I am aware, none of these things have happened recently in America to public figures (or made-public-by-Twitter figures) as a result of the sort of backlash you discuss.
This hasn’t happened yet, and probably won’t happen any time soon, but it’s conceivable to me that it might happen eventually if things get much worse. What if we saw a resurgence in targeted killings in a world where police have been abolished/shamed into inaction and discussing the killings in the media is seen as blowing a dog whistle? (However, even in this world, one could move to a part of the US where the rate of private gun ownership is high… from what I’ve seen, rioting hasn’t really been taking place in those areas.)
Third, at the moment, this cultural movement (whatever you want to call it) is not orchestrated top-down or directly backed by the formal structures of power (legislative, executive, and judicial branches of American government, and the military), in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution was not backed by the formal structures of power. The Red Guard organizations precipitating the revolution were frequently in opposition to established party structures (and each other). Here are some quotes from Mao: A Very Short Introduction:
All groups justified their policies and actions with reference to Mao’s works. When Mao gave a clear order they tried to obey it. Much of the time, however, Mao was careful to hide his hand. His comments were Delphic in their ambiguity leaving Red Guard organizations considerable room to act on their own initiative. Communist leaders vying for power or survival whether at local or national level tried to manipulate Red Guard groups, sometimes through their own children. Like gang members anywhere, Red Guard organizations developed their own rivalries and antagonisms, albeit with ideological rationalizations. In some cases, they imprisoned, tortured, and even murdered each other with disturbing brutality.”
...
When [Party leaders] were dragged before struggle meetings, Mao left the masses to do as they saw fit. He did not order their ill treatment but neither did he intervene to prevent it.
...
...At this point, however, Mao drew back from the abyss, condemning the commune and the free elections it had announced...
...
Finally in the summer of 1968, faced with near civil war in various provinces, Mao decided to call a halt. Work teams were sent onto the campuses to restore order but were sometimes viciously attacked. Mao called a meeting of Red Guard leaders in the capital. Confronting their complaint that a ‘Black Hand’ was attempting to suppress the campus revolution, he announced that he himself was that Black Hand.
Lack of top-down authority could be a bad thing. With the current situation, since there is no cult of personality, there is no one with the authority to be a ‘Black Hand’ if things get truly crazy. Memetic evolution seems to be the primary master.
On the other hand, there is the point that police, military, and privately-owned guns in the US all appear to not be very inclined to revolution, at least for the time being.
Third, at the moment, this cultural movement (whatever you want to call it) is not orchestrated top-down or directly backed by the formal structures of power (legislative, executive, and judicial branches of American government, and the military), in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution.
Right, and the Democratic Party would have to be much weaker as an institution to allow a leader with this intent to gain power. This is why political scientists seemed happy with the results of the primary—it meant we had at least one partially functioning major party.
Thanks for the write-up. I think historical examples can be helpful in understanding the nature of current social tendencies, but I also think it is important to precisely analyse the possible deleterious impacts of de-platforming or “cancel culture”, which differ substantially from the analogous occurrences you cite in the Cultural Revolution. In particular, I think it is necessary to distinguish between the first-order effects, which I think are not very severe, and the second-order or third-order effects, which are more concerning.
By first-order effects, I refer to the instances you cite of cancellation-for-cultural-heresy.
First, the immediate stakes are far lower—in the Cultural Revolution, “counter-revolutionary revisionists” were sent cross-country to re-education camps, tortured, killed, even eaten. As far as I am aware, none of these things have happened recently in America to public figures (or made-public-by-Twitter figures) as a result of the sort of backlash you discuss.
Second, the scale of the first-order effects, although difficult to precisely ascertain, probably appears to be much larger than it actually is due to availability selection effects (similar selection effects to those which lead to scope insensitivity in e.g. videos of deaths from police brutality as opposed to deaths from coronavirus). Particularly egregious cases of cancellation—which certainly exist (such as the case of citing detailed studies on police brutality by race you mentioned) - are probably pretty rare on the whole, just as particularly egregious cases of police brutality are pretty rare on the whole. Both, of course (and far more the latter), are concerning when they do occur, but they should be considered in context, and one has to be very careful as an observer to understand the selection effects at play.
Third, at the moment, this cultural movement (whatever you want to call it) is not orchestrated top-down or directly backed by the formal structures of power (legislative, executive, and judicial branches of American government, and the military), in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution. Unless this changes (which is possible), I think this makes violent conflict quite unlikely (also for the reasons of interdependence between urban/rural areas that you cite), and it means that constitutional protections (although under threat for other reasons) are not directly at risk for reasons of “cultural heresy”.
For these reasons, I think the first-order effects are not that concerning, and the comparison to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution on that basis is not particularly well-founded.
I think the higher-order effects are more serious.
First, cancellation-for-heresy can create a “chilling effect” where intellectuals and public figures are unwilling to voice their true opinions for fear of being accused of heresy and losing their jobs or reputations. Fixing the underlying problems—whatever the particulars—requires a dispassionate analysis of the facts of the matter, and an appreciation for the real scale of particular problems independent of availability heuristics—so the “chilling effect” may actually achieve the opposite of its nominal intent and prevent people who would have otherwise been e.g. doing research into evidence-based police reform strategies from doing so, and thus prevent the results of that research from being enacted into policy.
Second, the contortions induced by conformity to this kind of pressure, e.g. the about-face of many health professionals and public figures on the coronavirus dangers posed by Black Lives Matter protests vs. Trump rallies, whatever their private views may have been, have potentially serious consequences both to immediate behaviour (COVID19 will spread at a protest without regard to the political motivations of its attendees), and to public trust in institutions, already at a low point and continuing to fall. Considering the current US coronavirus death toll, I think these kinds of second- and third-order consequences (although certainly not solely a result of this cultural phenomenon) are much more concerning than the immediate first-order consequences of “cancellation” or the like.
EDIT: I want to highlight this take by someone who’s much more knowledgable than I am; you should probably read it before reading my comment.
This hasn’t happened yet, and probably won’t happen any time soon, but it’s conceivable to me that it might happen eventually if things get much worse. What if we saw a resurgence in targeted killings in a world where police have been abolished/shamed into inaction and discussing the killings in the media is seen as blowing a dog whistle? (However, even in this world, one could move to a part of the US where the rate of private gun ownership is high… from what I’ve seen, rioting hasn’t really been taking place in those areas.)
The Cultural Revolution was not backed by the formal structures of power. The Red Guard organizations precipitating the revolution were frequently in opposition to established party structures (and each other). Here are some quotes from Mao: A Very Short Introduction:
Lack of top-down authority could be a bad thing. With the current situation, since there is no cult of personality, there is no one with the authority to be a ‘Black Hand’ if things get truly crazy. Memetic evolution seems to be the primary master.
On the other hand, there is the point that police, military, and privately-owned guns in the US all appear to not be very inclined to revolution, at least for the time being.
Right, and the Democratic Party would have to be much weaker as an institution to allow a leader with this intent to gain power. This is why political scientists seemed happy with the results of the primary—it meant we had at least one partially functioning major party.