I don’t say that moral uncertainty implies or requires moral realism to make sense. Primarily, my post is about how the only pathway to confident moral realism requires moral certainty. (So the post is primarily against confident moral realism, not against moral uncertainty.)
I do say that moral uncertainty often comes up in a moral realist context. Related to that, perhaps the part you’re replying to is this part:
“Since moral uncertainty often comes up in a moral realist context, I think this causes some problems for the concept.”
By “problems” (I think that phrasing was potentially misleading), I don’t mean that moral uncertainty is altogether unworkable or not useful. I mean only that, if we make explicit that moral uncertainty also includes uncertainty between moral realism vs. moral anti-realism, it potentially changes the way we’d want to deal with our uncertainty (because it changes what we’re uncertain about).
A further premise here is that anti-realism doesn’t deserve the connotations of the term “nihilism.” (I argue for that in previousposts.)
If someone thought anti-realism is the same as nihilism, in the sense of “nothing matters under nihilism and we may as well ignore the possibility, for all practical purposes,” then my point wouldn’t have any interesting implications.
However, if the way things can matter under anti-realism is still relevant for effective altruists, then it makes a difference how much of our “moral uncertainty” expects moral realism vs. how much of it expects anti-realism.
To summarize, the “problem” with moral uncertainty is just that it’s not precise enough, it doesn’t quite carve reality at its joints. Ideally, we’d want more precise concepts that then tell us more about how to operate under various subtypes of uncertainty.
I don’t say that moral uncertainty implies or requires moral realism to make sense. Primarily, my post is about how the only pathway to confident moral realism requires moral certainty. (So the post is primarily against confident moral realism, not against moral uncertainty.)
I do say that moral uncertainty often comes up in a moral realist context. Related to that, perhaps the part you’re replying to is this part:
“Since moral uncertainty often comes up in a moral realist context, I think this causes some problems for the concept.”
By “problems” (I think that phrasing was potentially misleading), I don’t mean that moral uncertainty is altogether unworkable or not useful. I mean only that, if we make explicit that moral uncertainty also includes uncertainty between moral realism vs. moral anti-realism, it potentially changes the way we’d want to deal with our uncertainty (because it changes what we’re uncertain about).
A further premise here is that anti-realism doesn’t deserve the connotations of the term “nihilism.” (I argue for that in previous posts.)
If someone thought anti-realism is the same as nihilism, in the sense of “nothing matters under nihilism and we may as well ignore the possibility, for all practical purposes,” then my point wouldn’t have any interesting implications.
However, if the way things can matter under anti-realism is still relevant for effective altruists, then it makes a difference how much of our “moral uncertainty” expects moral realism vs. how much of it expects anti-realism.
To summarize, the “problem” with moral uncertainty is just that it’s not precise enough, it doesn’t quite carve reality at its joints. Ideally, we’d want more precise concepts that then tell us more about how to operate under various subtypes of uncertainty.
Ok, thanks for the reply Lukas. I think this clarifies some things, although I expect I should read some of your other posts to get fully clear.