The core issue here is that you’re failing to distinguish intrinsic and instrumental value. The standard view is that all lives have equal intrinsic value. But obviously they can differ in instrumental value.
Are you saying that the notion of intrinsic value is central to philosophical underpinnings of EA? And would you say that, absent it, my objections are correct?
I think that my objections are sound even if you accept that life has intrinsic value. Robin Hanson and Tyler Cowen have made similar arguments so I’m not claiming to be original or anything, but if you can save 1 life for $X today or you can invest that money and save 3 lives for $3X in 10 years, then isn’t that the Utility-maximizing thing to do? Future lives don’t have any less intrinsic value than present lives do, (c.f. Singer’s argument that lives 8,000 miles away don’t have any less value than lives next door). The point being that if you care about human flourishing, however defined, then you have to grapple with the notion that the single greatest contributor to human flourishing is economic growth. Any charitable intervention must be judged against the value of directing that resource towards economic growth. Since economic growth is exponential, any life saved today will come at the expense of an exponentially larger set of lives later. It seems to me that any philosophically rigorous EA advocate needs to have a robust response to that issue. Has this been addressed by anyone?
They’re not “objections”, because you’ve misunderstood your target. EA is perfectly compatible with judging that it’s better to give later. That’s an open empirical question. But yes, lots has been written on it. See, e.g., Julia Wise’s Giving now vs later: a summary (and the many links contained therein).
>They’re not “objections”, because you’ve misunderstood your target
Then please, explain what I’ve misunderstood.
Thanks for the link, but most of the links included therein were either broken or argued for exactly my point. For example, the link to the SSC essay concluded with “unless you think the world is more than 70% certain to end before you die, saving like Robin suggests is the best option” …. meaning that it’s smarter to invest than to donate. Do you have a better source or argument to present?
Also I’d appreciate it if you could respond to my previous question about the dependence of the EA position on the notion of intrinsic value.
The core issue here is that you’re failing to distinguish intrinsic and instrumental value. The standard view is that all lives have equal intrinsic value. But obviously they can differ in instrumental value.
For further explanation, see this comment, along with the utilitarianism.net page on instrumental favoritism.
Thanks for the reply!
Are you saying that the notion of intrinsic value is central to philosophical underpinnings of EA? And would you say that, absent it, my objections are correct?
I think that my objections are sound even if you accept that life has intrinsic value. Robin Hanson and Tyler Cowen have made similar arguments so I’m not claiming to be original or anything, but if you can save 1 life for $X today or you can invest that money and save 3 lives for $3X in 10 years, then isn’t that the Utility-maximizing thing to do? Future lives don’t have any less intrinsic value than present lives do, (c.f. Singer’s argument that lives 8,000 miles away don’t have any less value than lives next door). The point being that if you care about human flourishing, however defined, then you have to grapple with the notion that the single greatest contributor to human flourishing is economic growth. Any charitable intervention must be judged against the value of directing that resource towards economic growth. Since economic growth is exponential, any life saved today will come at the expense of an exponentially larger set of lives later. It seems to me that any philosophically rigorous EA advocate needs to have a robust response to that issue. Has this been addressed by anyone?
They’re not “objections”, because you’ve misunderstood your target. EA is perfectly compatible with judging that it’s better to give later. That’s an open empirical question. But yes, lots has been written on it. See, e.g., Julia Wise’s Giving now vs later: a summary (and the many links contained therein).
I’d appreciate a reply to my comment, even if it’s to just to tell me that intrinsic value is inherent to the EA philosophy.
>They’re not “objections”, because you’ve misunderstood your target
Then please, explain what I’ve misunderstood.
Thanks for the link, but most of the links included therein were either broken or argued for exactly my point. For example, the link to the SSC essay concluded with “unless you think the world is more than 70% certain to end before you die, saving like Robin suggests is the best option” …. meaning that it’s smarter to invest than to donate. Do you have a better source or argument to present?
Also I’d appreciate it if you could respond to my previous question about the dependence of the EA position on the notion of intrinsic value.