My vague impression is that this is referred to as pluralism in the philosophy literature, and there are a few philosophers at GPI who subscribe to this view.
From skimming the SEP article on pluralism, it doesn’t quite seem like what I’m talking about. Pluralism + incomparability comes closer, but still seems like a subset of my position, since there are other ways that indefinability could be true (e.g. there’s only one type of value, but it’s intrinsically vague)
My vague impression is that this is referred to as pluralism in the philosophy literature, and there are a few philosophers at GPI who subscribe to this view.
From skimming the SEP article on pluralism, it doesn’t quite seem like what I’m talking about. Pluralism + incomparability comes closer, but still seems like a subset of my position, since there are other ways that indefinability could be true (e.g. there’s only one type of value, but it’s intrinsically vague)