I think the first of those is close, but not quite there. Maybe this is how Iād put it (though Iād hadnāt tried to specify it to this extent before seeing your comment):
Differential progress is about actions that advance risk-reducing lasting changes relative to risk-increasing progress, regardless of how these actions achieve that objective.
Differential intellectual progress is a subset of differential progress where an increase in knowledge by some participant is a necessary step between the action and the outcomes. Itās not just that someone does learn something, or even that it would necessarily be true that someone would end up having learned something (e.g., as an inevitable outcome of the effect we care about). Itās instead that someone had to learn something in order for the outcome to occur.
In the democracy example, if I teach someone about democracy, then the way in which that may cause risk-reducing lasting changes is via changes in that personās knowledge. So thatās differential intellectual progress (and thus also differential progress, since thatās the broader category).
If instead I just persuade someone to be in favour of democracy by inspiring them or making liking democracy look cool, then that may not require them to have changes in knowledge. In reality, theyāre likely to also ālearn something newā along the lines of āthis guy gave a great speechā, or āthis really cool guy likes democracyā. But that new knowledge isnāt why they now want democracy; the causal pathway went via their emotions directly, with the change in their knowledge being an additional consequence that isnāt on the main path.
(Similar scenarios could also occur where a change in knowledge was necessary, such as if they choose to support democracy based on now explicitly thinking doing so will win them approval from me or from their friends. Iām talking about cases that arenāt like that; cases where itās more automatic and emotion-driven.)
Does that seem clearer to you? (Iām still writing these a bit quickly, and I still think this isnāt perfectly precise, but it seems fairly intuitive to me.)
And then we could perhaps further say that differential technological development is when a change in technology was a necessary step for the effect to occur. Again, itās not just an inevitable consequence of the chain of events, but rather something on the causal pathway between our action and the outcome we care about.
I think itās possible that this framing might make the relationship between all three clearer than I did in this post. (I think in the post, I more just pointed to a general idea and assumed readers would have roughly the same intuitions as meāand the authors I cite, I think.)
(Also, my phrasing about ācausal pathwaysā and such is influenced by Judea Pearlās The Book of Why, which I think is a great book. I think the phrasing is fairly understandable without that context, but just thought Iād add that in case itās not.)
Thatās a great criterion! We might be able to find some weird counter-example, but it solves all of my issues. Because intellectual work/āknowledge might be a part of all actions, but it isnāt necessary on the main causal path.
Iāve gone with adding a footnote that links to this comment thread. Probably wouldāve baked this explanation in if Iād had it initially, but I now couldnāt quickly find a neat, concise way to add it.
And thanks for the suggestion to make this idea/ācriterion into its own post. Iāll think about whether to do that, just adjust this postās main text to reflect that idea, or just add a footnote in this post.
I think the first of those is close, but not quite there. Maybe this is how Iād put it (though Iād hadnāt tried to specify it to this extent before seeing your comment):
Differential progress is about actions that advance risk-reducing lasting changes relative to risk-increasing progress, regardless of how these actions achieve that objective.
Differential intellectual progress is a subset of differential progress where an increase in knowledge by some participant is a necessary step between the action and the outcomes. Itās not just that someone does learn something, or even that it would necessarily be true that someone would end up having learned something (e.g., as an inevitable outcome of the effect we care about). Itās instead that someone had to learn something in order for the outcome to occur.
In the democracy example, if I teach someone about democracy, then the way in which that may cause risk-reducing lasting changes is via changes in that personās knowledge. So thatās differential intellectual progress (and thus also differential progress, since thatās the broader category).
If instead I just persuade someone to be in favour of democracy by inspiring them or making liking democracy look cool, then that may not require them to have changes in knowledge. In reality, theyāre likely to also ālearn something newā along the lines of āthis guy gave a great speechā, or āthis really cool guy likes democracyā. But that new knowledge isnāt why they now want democracy; the causal pathway went via their emotions directly, with the change in their knowledge being an additional consequence that isnāt on the main path.
(Similar scenarios could also occur where a change in knowledge was necessary, such as if they choose to support democracy based on now explicitly thinking doing so will win them approval from me or from their friends. Iām talking about cases that arenāt like that; cases where itās more automatic and emotion-driven.)
Does that seem clearer to you? (Iām still writing these a bit quickly, and I still think this isnāt perfectly precise, but it seems fairly intuitive to me.)
And then we could perhaps further say that differential technological development is when a change in technology was a necessary step for the effect to occur. Again, itās not just an inevitable consequence of the chain of events, but rather something on the causal pathway between our action and the outcome we care about.
I think itās possible that this framing might make the relationship between all three clearer than I did in this post. (I think in the post, I more just pointed to a general idea and assumed readers would have roughly the same intuitions as meāand the authors I cite, I think.)
(Also, my phrasing about ācausal pathwaysā and such is influenced by Judea Pearlās The Book of Why, which I think is a great book. I think the phrasing is fairly understandable without that context, but just thought Iād add that in case itās not.)
Thatās a great criterion! We might be able to find some weird counter-example, but it solves all of my issues. Because intellectual work/āknowledge might be a part of all actions, but it isnāt necessary on the main causal path.
I think this might actually deserve its own post.
Iāve gone with adding a footnote that links to this comment thread. Probably wouldāve baked this explanation in if Iād had it initially, but I now couldnāt quickly find a neat, concise way to add it.
Thanks again for prompting the thinking, though!
Great!
And thanks for the suggestion to make this idea/ācriterion into its own post. Iāll think about whether to do that, just adjust this postās main text to reflect that idea, or just add a footnote in this post.