“Don’t do fraud in service of EA because it’s bad PR” (my read of what you said) is not, in fact, a condemnation of fraud. Nor is it good PR.
Hardcore utilitarians may not have a better condemnation to make, but that’s not a problem, because only a minority of EAs are actually full utilitarians, rather than having one foot in common-sense morality or other moralities, or in uncertainty.
If hardcore utilitarians can’t say something to unequivocally condemn fraud, they should leave it to those who have one foot in common-sense morality to do so.
Hardcore utilitarians can endorse a norm that says “don’t commit fraud” because they think such a norm will have better consequences than an alternative norm that says “generally don’t commit fraud unless it seems like it could achieve more good than harm”.
The former norm is likely to avoid instances of fraud, which isn’t only good because fraud can lead to bad PR, but also because a society with widespread fraud is unlikely to be a pleasant one.
So I do think hardcore utilitarians can be justified in condemning fraud in the strongest possible terms, although I accept one could debate this point.
taking that seriously: wouldn’t it be the best for EA, to officially say that any fraud is bad (thus getting good PR), but at the same time internally looking away, thus not to be forced to see fraud?
taking that seriously: wouldn’t it be the best for EA, to officially say that any fraud is bad (thus getting good PR), but at the same time internally looking away, thus not to be forced to see fraud?
Would still using the money already be that?
This is a perfect example of Goodhart’s law. More specifically, assuming you don’t value fraud or lying (in a moral anti-realist framework), not seeing fraud or lying does not equal no fraud or lying is occuring.
This is a thermonuclear idea bound to fail due to Extremal Goodhart.
That’s a pretty wild misreading of my post. The main thesis of the post is that we should unequivocally condemn fraud. I do not think that the reason that fraud is bad is because of PR reasons, nor do I say that in the post—if you read what I wrote about why I think it’s wrong to commit fraud at the end, what I say is that you should have a general policy against ever committing fraud, regardless of the PR consequences one way or another.
The main thesis of your post (we should unequivocally condemn fraud) is correct, but the way you defend it is in conflict with it (by saying it’s wrong for instrumental reasons).
Here’s the PR argument:
I think the lasting consequences to EA—and the damage caused by FTX to all of their customers and employees—will likely outweigh the altruistic funding already provided by FTX to effective causes.
This weakens the condemnation, by making it be about the risks of being found out, not the badness of the action.
When you explain that pre-committing to not commit fraud is an advantageous strategy, I read this as another instrumental argument.
It’s hard to condemn things unequivocally from a purely utilitarian point of view, because then all reasons are instrumental. I’m not saying your reasons are untrue, but I think that when non-utilitarians read them, they won’t see an unequivocal condemnation, but a pragmatic argument that in other contexts could be turned in defence of fraud, if the consequences come out the other way.
That said, Jack Malde’s reply to me is a pretty good attempt at unequivocal condemnation from within a utilitarian frame, because it doesn’t talk about conditions that might not hold for some instance of fraud. (But it’s not necessarily correct.)
The portion you quote is included at the very end as an additional point about how even if you don’t buy my primary arguments that fraud in general is bad, in this case it was empirically bad. It is not my primary reason for thinking fraud is bad here, and I think the post is quite clear about that.
“Don’t do fraud in service of EA because it’s bad PR” (my read of what you said) is not, in fact, a condemnation of fraud. Nor is it good PR.
Hardcore utilitarians may not have a better condemnation to make, but that’s not a problem, because only a minority of EAs are actually full utilitarians, rather than having one foot in common-sense morality or other moralities, or in uncertainty.
If hardcore utilitarians can’t say something to unequivocally condemn fraud, they should leave it to those who have one foot in common-sense morality to do so.
Hardcore utilitarians can endorse a norm that says “don’t commit fraud” because they think such a norm will have better consequences than an alternative norm that says “generally don’t commit fraud unless it seems like it could achieve more good than harm”.
The former norm is likely to avoid instances of fraud, which isn’t only good because fraud can lead to bad PR, but also because a society with widespread fraud is unlikely to be a pleasant one.
So I do think hardcore utilitarians can be justified in condemning fraud in the strongest possible terms, although I accept one could debate this point.
Good point
taking that seriously: wouldn’t it be the best for EA, to officially say that any fraud is bad (thus getting good PR), but at the same time internally looking away, thus not to be forced to see fraud?
Would still using the money already be that?
This is a perfect example of Goodhart’s law. More specifically, assuming you don’t value fraud or lying (in a moral anti-realist framework), not seeing fraud or lying does not equal no fraud or lying is occuring.
This is a thermonuclear idea bound to fail due to Extremal Goodhart.
That’s a pretty wild misreading of my post. The main thesis of the post is that we should unequivocally condemn fraud. I do not think that the reason that fraud is bad is because of PR reasons, nor do I say that in the post—if you read what I wrote about why I think it’s wrong to commit fraud at the end, what I say is that you should have a general policy against ever committing fraud, regardless of the PR consequences one way or another.
The main thesis of your post (we should unequivocally condemn fraud) is correct, but the way you defend it is in conflict with it (by saying it’s wrong for instrumental reasons).
Here’s the PR argument:
This weakens the condemnation, by making it be about the risks of being found out, not the badness of the action.
When you explain that pre-committing to not commit fraud is an advantageous strategy, I read this as another instrumental argument.
It’s hard to condemn things unequivocally from a purely utilitarian point of view, because then all reasons are instrumental. I’m not saying your reasons are untrue, but I think that when non-utilitarians read them, they won’t see an unequivocal condemnation, but a pragmatic argument that in other contexts could be turned in defence of fraud, if the consequences come out the other way.
That said, Jack Malde’s reply to me is a pretty good attempt at unequivocal condemnation from within a utilitarian frame, because it doesn’t talk about conditions that might not hold for some instance of fraud. (But it’s not necessarily correct.)
The portion you quote is included at the very end as an additional point about how even if you don’t buy my primary arguments that fraud in general is bad, in this case it was empirically bad. It is not my primary reason for thinking fraud is bad here, and I think the post is quite clear about that.