Part of the authors’ argument is that axiological/consequentialist considerations outweigh other kinds of considerations when the stakes are sufficiently high. But I don’t think the examples they give are as relevant or as persuasive/intuitive as they think.
(I personally basically agree with their conclusion, as I’m already mostly a utilitarian, but they want to convince people who aren’t sold on consequentialism.)
They write
Further, in ‘emergency situation’ situations like wartime, axiological considerations outweigh non-consequentialist considerations (at least for those fighting a just war). Consider, for example, the intuitions that one would have with respect to how one should act if one lived in Britain during World War II. It’s very intuitive that, in that situation, that one is morally obligated to make significant sacrifices for the greater good that would not normally be required, such as by living far more frugally, separating oneself from one’s family, and taking significant risks to one’s own life — and this because the axiological stakes are so high.
But I don’t think that the key thing driving these intuitions is the axiological stakes being so high
I think the stakes of an individual’s decision in this context are probably lower than the stakes of donating effectively, given how little an individual’s frugality would influence the war effort
Yet most people don’t have the intuition that what’s best axiologically is morally obligatory when it comes to donating effectively
(Though that is probably at least partly because people underestimate the stakes involved in effective charity and/or overestimate the stakes involved in being frugal during WWII)
I’d guess that the major driver of our intuitions is probably actually humans having an instinct and/or strong norm for acting more cooperatively and shunning defectors when in situations of intergroup conflict
E.g., we can also see people making strong sacrifices of a sort for their sports teams, where the axiological stakes are clearly fairly low
Relatedly, I’d guess that people in WWII thought more in terms of a deontic duty to country or comrades, or virtues, or something like that, without explicit attention to consequences or axiology
I also think it’s just empirically a fact that a decent portion of people didn’t make relevant types of significant sacrifices for the greater good during these periods, and/or didn’t feel that they were morally required to
E.g., there were black markets and conscientious objectors
I’m surprised by how confident Greaves and MacAskill seem to be about this example/argument. They use it again in two places:
“First, one could reject the idea of ‘the good’ altogether (Thomson 2008). On this view, there is simply no such thing as axiology. It’s clear that our argument would not be relevant to those who hold such views. But such views have other problems, such as how to explain the fact that, in cases where there is a huge amount at stake, such as during wartime, ordinary prerogatives get overridden. It seems likely to us that any such explanation will result in similar conclusions to those we have drawn, via similar arguments.”
“Let’s first consider the non-aggregationist response. Consider the example of someone alive in Britain during WWII, and considering whether or not to fight; or consider someone debating whether to vote in their country’s general election; or someone who is deciding whether to join an important political protest; or someone who is reducing their carbon footprint. In each case, the ex ante benefits to any particular other person are tiny. But in at least some such cases, it’s clear that the person is question is obligated to undertake the relevant action. ”
Here the authors seem to me to be strangely confident that all readers would share the authors’ views/intuitions in some other cases as well.
But I think it’s very clearly the case that many people in fact don’t share the intuition/view that those other actors are obligatory.
Large fractions of people don’t vote in general elections, participate in any political protests, or make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. And I think many of these people would indeed say that they don’t think they’re morally required to do these things (rather than thinking that they’re required but are weak-willed, or something like that).
I wonder if this is partly due to the authors leaning politically left and non-libertarian, and their usual readers leaning the same way, such that they just don’t notice how other types of people would perceive the same situations?
Part of the authors’ argument is that axiological/consequentialist considerations outweigh other kinds of considerations when the stakes are sufficiently high. But I don’t think the examples they give are as relevant or as persuasive/intuitive as they think.
(I personally basically agree with their conclusion, as I’m already mostly a utilitarian, but they want to convince people who aren’t sold on consequentialism.)
They write
But I don’t think that the key thing driving these intuitions is the axiological stakes being so high
I think the stakes of an individual’s decision in this context are probably lower than the stakes of donating effectively, given how little an individual’s frugality would influence the war effort
Yet most people don’t have the intuition that what’s best axiologically is morally obligatory when it comes to donating effectively
(Though that is probably at least partly because people underestimate the stakes involved in effective charity and/or overestimate the stakes involved in being frugal during WWII)
I’d guess that the major driver of our intuitions is probably actually humans having an instinct and/or strong norm for acting more cooperatively and shunning defectors when in situations of intergroup conflict
E.g., we can also see people making strong sacrifices of a sort for their sports teams, where the axiological stakes are clearly fairly low
Relatedly, I’d guess that people in WWII thought more in terms of a deontic duty to country or comrades, or virtues, or something like that, without explicit attention to consequences or axiology
I also think it’s just empirically a fact that a decent portion of people didn’t make relevant types of significant sacrifices for the greater good during these periods, and/or didn’t feel that they were morally required to
E.g., there were black markets and conscientious objectors
I’m surprised by how confident Greaves and MacAskill seem to be about this example/argument. They use it again in two places:
“First, one could reject the idea of ‘the good’ altogether (Thomson 2008). On this view, there is simply no such thing as axiology. It’s clear that our argument would not be relevant to those who hold such views. But such views have other problems, such as how to explain the fact that, in cases where there is a huge amount at stake, such as during wartime, ordinary prerogatives get overridden. It seems likely to us that any such explanation will result in similar conclusions to those we have drawn, via similar arguments.”
“Let’s first consider the non-aggregationist response. Consider the example of someone alive in Britain during WWII, and considering whether or not to fight; or consider someone debating whether to vote in their country’s general election; or someone who is deciding whether to join an important political protest; or someone who is reducing their carbon footprint. In each case, the ex ante benefits to any particular other person are tiny. But in at least some such cases, it’s clear that the person is question is obligated to undertake the relevant action. ”
Here the authors seem to me to be strangely confident that all readers would share the authors’ views/intuitions in some other cases as well.
But I think it’s very clearly the case that many people in fact don’t share the intuition/view that those other actors are obligatory.
Large fractions of people don’t vote in general elections, participate in any political protests, or make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. And I think many of these people would indeed say that they don’t think they’re morally required to do these things (rather than thinking that they’re required but are weak-willed, or something like that).
I wonder if this is partly due to the authors leaning politically left and non-libertarian, and their usual readers leaning the same way, such that they just don’t notice how other types of people would perceive the same situations?