Part of the authorsā argument is that axiological/āconsequentialist considerations outweigh other kinds of considerations when the stakes are sufficiently high. But I donāt think the examples they give are as relevant or as persuasive/āintuitive as they think.
(I personally basically agree with their conclusion, as Iām already mostly a utilitarian, but they want to convince people who arenāt sold on consequentialism.)
They write
Further, āin āemergency situationā situations like wartime, axiological considerations outweigh non-consequentialist considerations (at least for those fighting a just war). Consider, for example, the intuitions that one would have with respect to how one should act if one lived in Britain during World War II. Itās very intuitive that, in that situation, that one is morally obligated to make significant sacrifices for the greater good that would not normally be required, such as by living far more frugally, separating oneself from oneās family, and taking significant risks to oneās own life ā and this because the axiological stakes are so high.
But I donāt think that the key thing driving these intuitions is the axiological stakes being so high
I think the stakes of an individualās decision in this context are probably lower than the stakes of donating effectively, given how little an individualās frugality would influence the war effort
Yet most people donāt have the intuition that whatās best axiologically is morally obligatory when it comes to donating effectively
(Though that is probably at least partly because people underestimate the stakes involved in effective charity and/āor overestimate the stakes involved in being frugal during WWII)
Iād guess that the major driver of our intuitions is probably actually humans having an instinct and/āor strong norm for acting more cooperatively and shunning defectors when in situations of intergroup conflict
E.g., we can also see people making strong sacrifices of a sort for their sports teams, where the axiological stakes are clearly fairly low
Relatedly, Iād guess that people in WWII thought more in terms of a deontic duty to country or comrades, or virtues, or something like that, without explicit attention to consequences or axiology
I also think itās just empirically a fact that a decent portion of people didnāt make relevant types of significant sacrifices for the greater good during these periods, and/āor didnāt feel that they were morally required to
E.g., there were black markets and conscientious objectors
Iām surprised by how confident Greaves and MacAskill seem to be about this example/āargument. They use it again in two places:
āFirst, one could reject the idea of āthe goodā altogether (Thomson 2008). On this view, there is simply no such thing as axiology. Itās clear that our argument would not be relevant to those who hold such views. But such views have other problems, such as how to explain the fact that, in cases where there is a huge amount at stake, such as during wartime, ordinary prerogatives get overridden. It seems likely to us that any such explanation will result in similar conclusions to those we have drawn, via similar arguments.ā
āLetās first consider the non-aggregationist rāesponse. Consider the example of someone alive in Britain during WWII, and considering whether or not to fight; or consider someone debating whether to vote in their countryās general election; or someone who is deciding whether to join an important political protest; or someone who is reducing their carbon footprint. In each case, the āex ante benefits to any particular other person are tiny. But in at least some such cases, itās clear that the person is question is obligated to undertake the relevant action. ā
Here the authors seem to me to be strangely confident that all readers would share the authorsā views/āintuitions in some other cases as well.
But I think itās very clearly the case that many people in fact donāt share the intuition/āview that those other actors are obligatory.
Large fractions of people donāt vote in general elections, participate in any political protests, or make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. And I think many of these people would indeed say that they donāt think theyāre morally required to do these things (rather than thinking that theyāre required but are weak-willed, or something like that).
I wonder if this is partly due to the authors leaning politically left and non-libertarian, and their usual readers leaning the same way, such that they just donāt notice how other types of people would perceive the same situations?
Part of the authorsā argument is that axiological/āconsequentialist considerations outweigh other kinds of considerations when the stakes are sufficiently high. But I donāt think the examples they give are as relevant or as persuasive/āintuitive as they think.
(I personally basically agree with their conclusion, as Iām already mostly a utilitarian, but they want to convince people who arenāt sold on consequentialism.)
They write
But I donāt think that the key thing driving these intuitions is the axiological stakes being so high
I think the stakes of an individualās decision in this context are probably lower than the stakes of donating effectively, given how little an individualās frugality would influence the war effort
Yet most people donāt have the intuition that whatās best axiologically is morally obligatory when it comes to donating effectively
(Though that is probably at least partly because people underestimate the stakes involved in effective charity and/āor overestimate the stakes involved in being frugal during WWII)
Iād guess that the major driver of our intuitions is probably actually humans having an instinct and/āor strong norm for acting more cooperatively and shunning defectors when in situations of intergroup conflict
E.g., we can also see people making strong sacrifices of a sort for their sports teams, where the axiological stakes are clearly fairly low
Relatedly, Iād guess that people in WWII thought more in terms of a deontic duty to country or comrades, or virtues, or something like that, without explicit attention to consequences or axiology
I also think itās just empirically a fact that a decent portion of people didnāt make relevant types of significant sacrifices for the greater good during these periods, and/āor didnāt feel that they were morally required to
E.g., there were black markets and conscientious objectors
Iām surprised by how confident Greaves and MacAskill seem to be about this example/āargument. They use it again in two places:
āFirst, one could reject the idea of āthe goodā altogether (Thomson 2008). On this view, there is simply no such thing as axiology. Itās clear that our argument would not be relevant to those who hold such views. But such views have other problems, such as how to explain the fact that, in cases where there is a huge amount at stake, such as during wartime, ordinary prerogatives get overridden. It seems likely to us that any such explanation will result in similar conclusions to those we have drawn, via similar arguments.ā
āLetās first consider the non-aggregationist rāesponse. Consider the example of someone alive in Britain during WWII, and considering whether or not to fight; or consider someone debating whether to vote in their countryās general election; or someone who is deciding whether to join an important political protest; or someone who is reducing their carbon footprint. In each case, the āex ante benefits to any particular other person are tiny. But in at least some such cases, itās clear that the person is question is obligated to undertake the relevant action. ā
Here the authors seem to me to be strangely confident that all readers would share the authorsā views/āintuitions in some other cases as well.
But I think itās very clearly the case that many people in fact donāt share the intuition/āview that those other actors are obligatory.
Large fractions of people donāt vote in general elections, participate in any political protests, or make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. And I think many of these people would indeed say that they donāt think theyāre morally required to do these things (rather than thinking that theyāre required but are weak-willed, or something like that).
I wonder if this is partly due to the authors leaning politically left and non-libertarian, and their usual readers leaning the same way, such that they just donāt notice how other types of people would perceive the same situations?