FWIW, I don’t see that piece as making a case against panpsychism, but rather against something like “pansufferingism” or “pansentienceism”. In my view, these arguments against the ontological prevalence of suffering are compatible with the panpsychist view that (extremely simple) consciousness / “phenomenality” is ontologically prevalent (cf. this old post on “Thinking of consciousness as waves”).
I think we can extend your argument to one against pan-experience-of-X-ism, for (almost?) any given X, no matter how specific or broad, with your other example for X being “wanting to go to a Taylor Swift concert so as to share the event with your Instagram followers”. This is distinct from panpsychism, which only (?) requires that mental contents or experiences of something in general be widespread, not that any given (specific or kind of) mental content X be widespread.
FWIW, I don’t see that piece as making a case against panpsychism, but rather against something like “pansufferingism” or “pansentienceism”. In my view, these arguments against the ontological prevalence of suffering are compatible with the panpsychist view that (extremely simple) consciousness / “phenomenality” is ontologically prevalent (cf. this old post on “Thinking of consciousness as waves”).
Good point.
I think we can extend your argument to one against pan-experience-of-X-ism, for (almost?) any given X, no matter how specific or broad, with your other example for X being “wanting to go to a Taylor Swift concert so as to share the event with your Instagram followers”. This is distinct from panpsychism, which only (?) requires that mental contents or experiences of something in general be widespread, not that any given (specific or kind of) mental content X be widespread.