Hey Wei, I appreciate you responding to Mo, but I found myself still confused after reading this reply. This isnât purely down to youâa lot of LessWrong writing refers to âstatusâ, but they never clearly define what it is or where the evidence and literature for it is.[1]To me, it seem to function as this magic word that can explain anything and everything. The whole concept of âstatusâ as Iâve seen it used in LW seems incredibly susceptible to being part of âjust-soâ stories.
Iâm highly sceptical of this though, like I donât know what a âstatus gradientâ is and I donât think it exists in the world? Maybe you mean an abstract description of behaviour? But then a âstatus gradientâ is just describing what happened in a social setting, rather than making scientific predictions. Maybe itâs instead a kind of non-reductionist sense of existing and having impact, which I do buy, but then things like âideasâ,âvaluesâ, and âbeliefsâ should also exist in this non-reductionist way and be as important for considering human action as âstatusâ is.
It also tends to lead to using explanations like this:
One tricky consideration here is that people donât like to explicitly think about status, because itâs generally better for oneâs status to appear to do everything for its own sake
Which to me is dangerously close to saying âif someone talks about status, itâs evidence itâs real. If they donât talk about it, then theyâre self-deceiving in a Hansion sense, and this is evidence for statusâ which sets off a lot of epistemological red-flags for me
a lot of LessWrong writing refers to âstatusâ, but they never clearly define what it is or where the evidence and literature for it is
Two citations that come to mind are Geoffrey Millerâs Virtue Signaling and Will Storrâs The Status Game (maybe also Robin Hansonâs book although its contents are not as fresh in my mind), but I agree that itâs not very scientific or well studied (unless thereâs a body of literature on it that Iâm unfamiliar with), which is something Iâd like to see change.
Maybe itâs instead a kind of non-reductionist sense of existing and having impact, which I do buy, but then things like âideasâ,âvaluesâ, and âbeliefsâ should also exist in this non-reductionist way and be as important for considering human action as âstatusâ is.
Well sure, I agree with this. I probably wouldnât have made my suggestion if EAs talked about status roughly as much as ideas, values, or beliefs.
Which to me is dangerously close to saying âif something talks about status, itâs evidence itâs real. If they donât talk about it, then theyâre self-deceiving in a Hansion sense, and this is evidence for statusâ which sets off a lot of epistemological red-flags for me
It seems right that youâre wary about this, but on reflection I think the main reason I think status is real is not because people talk or donât talk about it, but because I see human behavior that seems hard to explain without invoking such a concept. For example, why are humans moral but our moralities vary so much across different communities? Why do people sometimes abandon or fail to act according to their beliefs/âvalues without epistemic or philosophical reasons to do so? Why do communities sometimes collectively become very extreme in their beliefs/âvalues, again without apparent epistemic or philosophical justification?
why are humans moral but our moralities vary so much across different communities? Why do people sometimes abandon or fail to act according to their beliefs/âvalues without epistemic or philosophical reasons to do so? Why do communities sometimes collectively become very extreme in their beliefs/âvalues, again without apparent epistemic or philosophical justification?
I think âstatusâ plays some part in the answers to these, but only a fairly small one.
Why do moralities vary across different communities? Primarily because they are raised in different cultures with different prevalent beliefs. We then modify those beliefs from the baseline as we encounter new ideas and new events, and often end up seeking out other people with shared values to be friends with. But the majority of people arenât just pretending to hold those beliefs to fit in (although that does happen), the majority legitimately believe what they say.
Why do communities get extreme? Well, consult the literature on radicalisation, there are a ton of factors. A vivid or horrible event or ongoing trauma sometimes triggers an extreme response. Less radical members of groups might leave, making the average more radical, so even more moderates leave or split, until the group is just radicals.
As to why we fail to act according to their values, people generally have competing values, including self-preservation and instincts, and are not perfectly rational. Sometimes the primal urge to eat a juicy burger overcomes the calculated belief that eating meat is wrong.
These are all amateur takes, a sociologist could probably answer better.
Hey Wei, I appreciate you responding to Mo, but I found myself still confused after reading this reply. This isnât purely down to youâa lot of LessWrong writing refers to âstatusâ, but they never clearly define what it is or where the evidence and literature for it is.[1] To me, it seem to function as this magic word that can explain anything and everything. The whole concept of âstatusâ as Iâve seen it used in LW seems incredibly susceptible to being part of âjust-soâ stories.
Iâm highly sceptical of this though, like I donât know what a âstatus gradientâ is and I donât think it exists in the world? Maybe you mean an abstract description of behaviour? But then a âstatus gradientâ is just describing what happened in a social setting, rather than making scientific predictions. Maybe itâs instead a kind of non-reductionist sense of existing and having impact, which I do buy, but then things like âideasâ,âvaluesâ, and âbeliefsâ should also exist in this non-reductionist way and be as important for considering human action as âstatusâ is.
It also tends to lead to using explanations like this:
Which to me is dangerously close to saying âif someone talks about status, itâs evidence itâs real. If they donât talk about it, then theyâre self-deceiving in a Hansion sense, and this is evidence for statusâ which sets off a lot of epistemological red-flags for me
In fact, one of the most cited works about it isnât a piece of anthropology or sociology, but a book about Improv acting???
Two citations that come to mind are Geoffrey Millerâs Virtue Signaling and Will Storrâs The Status Game (maybe also Robin Hansonâs book although its contents are not as fresh in my mind), but I agree that itâs not very scientific or well studied (unless thereâs a body of literature on it that Iâm unfamiliar with), which is something Iâd like to see change.
Well sure, I agree with this. I probably wouldnât have made my suggestion if EAs talked about status roughly as much as ideas, values, or beliefs.
It seems right that youâre wary about this, but on reflection I think the main reason I think status is real is not because people talk or donât talk about it, but because I see human behavior that seems hard to explain without invoking such a concept. For example, why are humans moral but our moralities vary so much across different communities? Why do people sometimes abandon or fail to act according to their beliefs/âvalues without epistemic or philosophical reasons to do so? Why do communities sometimes collectively become very extreme in their beliefs/âvalues, again without apparent epistemic or philosophical justification?
I think âstatusâ plays some part in the answers to these, but only a fairly small one.
Why do moralities vary across different communities? Primarily because they are raised in different cultures with different prevalent beliefs. We then modify those beliefs from the baseline as we encounter new ideas and new events, and often end up seeking out other people with shared values to be friends with. But the majority of people arenât just pretending to hold those beliefs to fit in (although that does happen), the majority legitimately believe what they say.
Why do communities get extreme? Well, consult the literature on radicalisation, there are a ton of factors. A vivid or horrible event or ongoing trauma sometimes triggers an extreme response. Less radical members of groups might leave, making the average more radical, so even more moderates leave or split, until the group is just radicals.
As to why we fail to act according to their values, people generally have competing values, including self-preservation and instincts, and are not perfectly rational. Sometimes the primal urge to eat a juicy burger overcomes the calculated belief that eating meat is wrong.
These are all amateur takes, a sociologist could probably answer better.