Pretty wild discussion in this podcast about how aggressively the USSR cut corners on safety in their space program in order to stay ahead of the US. In the author’s telling of the history, this was in large part because Khrushchev wanted to rack up as many “firsts” (e.g., first satellite, first woman in space) as possible. This seems like it was most proximately for prestige and propaganda rather than any immediate strategic or technological benefit (though of course the space program did eventually produce such bigger benefits).
Evidence of the following claim for AI: people may not need a reason to cut corners on safety because the material benefits are so high. They may do so just because of the prestige and glory of being first.
I’d find anecdotes about cutting corners in bioweapons or nuclear (both weapons development and power) more convincing, partially because it’s more directly analogous and partially because I don’t think Khrushchev is completely heartless.
I might be mistaken about this, but I thought there was a possibility that Khrushchev and others anticipated that leaders and influential people in the US/USSR and elsewhere in the world would interpret space race victories as a costly signal of strategic space superiority (while simultaneously being less aggressive and less disruptive to diplomacy than developing and testing more directly military-related technology such as Starfish Prime), and separately there was a possibility that this anticipation was a correct prediction about what stakeholders around the world would conclude about the relative power of the US and USSR (including the third world and “allied” countries which often contained hawk and dove factions and regime change etc).
Momentum behind the space race itself had died out by 1975, possibly as part of the trend described in the 2003 paper “The Nuclear Taboo” which argued that a strong norm against nuclear weapon use developed over time; during the Korean War in 1950, American generals were friendly towards the idea of using nuclear weapons to break the stalemate and ultimately decided not to, but were substantially less friendly towards nuclear weapon use by the time the Vietnam War started and since then have only considered it progressively more unthinkable (the early phases of the Ukraine War in 2022, particularly the period leading up to the invasion, might have been an example of backsliding).
Example: They crammed three cosmonauts into a capsule initially designed for one person. But due to the size constraints, the cosmonauts couldn’t wear proper spacesuits; they had to wear leisure suits!
Pretty wild discussion in this podcast about how aggressively the USSR cut corners on safety in their space program in order to stay ahead of the US. In the author’s telling of the history, this was in large part because Khrushchev wanted to rack up as many “firsts” (e.g., first satellite, first woman in space) as possible. This seems like it was most proximately for prestige and propaganda rather than any immediate strategic or technological benefit (though of course the space program did eventually produce such bigger benefits).
Evidence of the following claim for AI: people may not need a reason to cut corners on safety because the material benefits are so high. They may do so just because of the prestige and glory of being first.
https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/chatter—the-harrowing-history-of-the-soviet-space-program-with-john-strausbaugh
Though the costs are also low, from the perspective of Khrushchev. (A few cosmonauts’ lives is presumably not that important to him)
Yeah fair, should have considered that more duh
I’m glad I was helpful! :P
I’d find anecdotes about cutting corners in bioweapons or nuclear (both weapons development and power) more convincing, partially because it’s more directly analogous and partially because I don’t think Khrushchev is completely heartless.
I might be mistaken about this, but I thought there was a possibility that Khrushchev and others anticipated that leaders and influential people in the US/USSR and elsewhere in the world would interpret space race victories as a costly signal of strategic space superiority (while simultaneously being less aggressive and less disruptive to diplomacy than developing and testing more directly military-related technology such as Starfish Prime), and separately there was a possibility that this anticipation was a correct prediction about what stakeholders around the world would conclude about the relative power of the US and USSR (including the third world and “allied” countries which often contained hawk and dove factions and regime change etc).
Momentum behind the space race itself had died out by 1975, possibly as part of the trend described in the 2003 paper “The Nuclear Taboo” which argued that a strong norm against nuclear weapon use developed over time; during the Korean War in 1950, American generals were friendly towards the idea of using nuclear weapons to break the stalemate and ultimately decided not to, but were substantially less friendly towards nuclear weapon use by the time the Vietnam War started and since then have only considered it progressively more unthinkable (the early phases of the Ukraine War in 2022, particularly the period leading up to the invasion, might have been an example of backsliding).
Example: They crammed three cosmonauts into a capsule initially designed for one person. But due to the size constraints, the cosmonauts couldn’t wear proper spacesuits; they had to wear leisure suits!