A) peak oil → energy scarcity → humanitarian crisis from ?
If not A), then:
B) emissions → climate change → agricultural loss → humanitarian crisis from famine
(with land grabbing exacerbating the crisis)
Let’s jump to the crux of Rander’s update to the LTG model, since that is the most recent work most closely attached to the concept. The fundamental collapse prediction comes from the pollution—death rate linkage that I mention in the previous comment. What basis is there to assume the overall death rate will increase? And how does the model explain the decreasing death rates in that part of the world?
Is it based on a presumed energy scarcity? “when we can assume with relative safety that in 20 years we can only extract half the oil relative to now and that the current pace of global energy transition would need to be multiple times faster to rectify the shortages thereby created”
Where do you derive the assumption that oil production will be cut in half in 20 years for reasons of scarcity? U.S. EIA forecasts relatively flat curves. And how do you distinguish good substitutions from shortages?
Concerns about peak oil presume a fixed consumption per person, meaning no fuel substitution or demand elasticity. I think this is incorrect. Oil consumption is responsive to price, and even in the least elastic sector where it is used (transportation), there is still a tradeoff in size vs. efficiency for cars people buy. You can go on Gapminder and see how the trend in oil consumption per person can vary quite a bit over several years. Electricity consumption per person (what Turner used as his proxy for “services per person”) has actually been decreasing in the U.S. because of large-scale efficiency. I expect we’ll see more of that in other sectors including transportation, with lower energy use but greater energy services overall.
Given the substitution and efficiency arguments, and how none of the climate-economic models in IPCC’s modeling exercises show an energy scarcity or pollution induced collapse, I don’t think causal chain A you propose is a reality we can expect.
So that leaves causal chain B. The World Bank report is for a 4-degree temperature rise, and is by no means a fait accompli. I think what we do now looks a lot like what EAs are currently funding in the region—improving health and encouraging inclusive development. When people have greater incomes and are less dependent on agriculture, climate change effects are less severe. This is the assessment of a follow-up report the World Bank did to the 4-degree report which is worth reading: Shock Waves Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty.
The causal chain you propose is:
A) peak oil → energy scarcity → humanitarian crisis from ?
If not A), then:
B) emissions → climate change → agricultural loss → humanitarian crisis from famine (with land grabbing exacerbating the crisis)
Let’s jump to the crux of Rander’s update to the LTG model, since that is the most recent work most closely attached to the concept. The fundamental collapse prediction comes from the pollution—death rate linkage that I mention in the previous comment. What basis is there to assume the overall death rate will increase? And how does the model explain the decreasing death rates in that part of the world? Is it based on a presumed energy scarcity? “when we can assume with relative safety that in 20 years we can only extract half the oil relative to now and that the current pace of global energy transition would need to be multiple times faster to rectify the shortages thereby created” Where do you derive the assumption that oil production will be cut in half in 20 years for reasons of scarcity? U.S. EIA forecasts relatively flat curves. And how do you distinguish good substitutions from shortages? Concerns about peak oil presume a fixed consumption per person, meaning no fuel substitution or demand elasticity. I think this is incorrect. Oil consumption is responsive to price, and even in the least elastic sector where it is used (transportation), there is still a tradeoff in size vs. efficiency for cars people buy. You can go on Gapminder and see how the trend in oil consumption per person can vary quite a bit over several years. Electricity consumption per person (what Turner used as his proxy for “services per person”) has actually been decreasing in the U.S. because of large-scale efficiency. I expect we’ll see more of that in other sectors including transportation, with lower energy use but greater energy services overall.
Given the substitution and efficiency arguments, and how none of the climate-economic models in IPCC’s modeling exercises show an energy scarcity or pollution induced collapse, I don’t think causal chain A you propose is a reality we can expect.
So that leaves causal chain B. The World Bank report is for a 4-degree temperature rise, and is by no means a fait accompli. I think what we do now looks a lot like what EAs are currently funding in the region—improving health and encouraging inclusive development. When people have greater incomes and are less dependent on agriculture, climate change effects are less severe. This is the assessment of a follow-up report the World Bank did to the 4-degree report which is worth reading: Shock Waves Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty.