I develop software tools for the building energy efficiency industry. My background is in architectural and mechanical engineering (MS Penn State, PhD University of Maryland). I know quite a bit about indoor air quality and indoor infectious disease transfer, and closely follow all things related to climate change and the energy transition. I co-organize the local EA group in Denver, Colorado.
MatthewDahlhausen
Karma: 1,069
The salient question for me is how much does reducing extinction risk change the long run experience of moral patients? One argument is that meaningfully reducing risk would require substantial coordination, and that coordination is likely to result in better worlds. I think it is as or more likely that reducing extinction risk can result in some worlds where most moral patients are used as means without regard to their suffering.
I think an AI aligned to roughly to the output of all current human coordination would be net-negative. I would shift to thinking addressing extinction risk is more important if factory farming stopped, humanity was taking serious steps to address wild animal suffering, all sustainable development goals were met within 5 years of the initial timeline, and global inequality was reduced to something like <0.25 GINI coefficient.
MatthewDahlhausen’s Quick takes
The USDA secretary released a strategy yesterday on lowering egg prices. Explained originally as a WSJ opinion (paywall). Summarized here without the paywall.
Five points to the strategy:
$500 million for a biosecurity program to limit transmission of avian flu
$400 million to farmers to recover after an outbreak
$100 million for vaccines
Look to ease regulations, especially overriding California Proposition 12 that banned the sale of eggs from caged hens.
Look to allow temporary imports of eggs
Key concerns:
Enacting a key-goal of the EATS act to override state humane treatment regulations without legislation
Imports from lower-welfare countries
All companies that have committed to going cage-free this year using the USDA response as an excuse to delayed or revoke their commitment.
I’m curious where the non-cage free eggs are going. From my naive position, it seems like the grocery stores and restaurant chains listed here should cover a majority of egg use, and are well above 40% cage-free in aggregate. Do non-chain restaurants explain the difference? Hotels? Food manufacturers? Schools and other public places with cafeterias?
“The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding ‘yes’”
Offsetting bad moral actions depends on 1) the action being off-settable, 2) the two actions are inseparable, and 3) presuming a rather extreme form of utilitarianism is morally correct.
In the case you provide, I think it fails on all three parts. The action isn’t off-settable. Most moral frameworks would look at the two actions separately. Donating to an animal welfare charity doesn’t first require you eat meat, and there is no forced decision to donate or not donate if you eat an animal. And if you accept moral offsetting is better in this case, you are upon to all sorts of the standard utilitarian critiques.
There are also separate justice concerns and whether you are benefiting the appropriate reference class (if you eat cow and donate to shrimp welfare in another country, is that appropriate offsetting?).
I think it’s fine to promote the endeavor (or at least its morally permissible). But saying it is morally better isn’t well-supported. It’s similar to the somewhat non-intuitive finding in moral philosophy that if choosing between A) not donating to charity, B) donating to an ineffective charity, and C) donating to an effective charity, choosing A over B may be morally permissible, but choosing B over C is not.
Do you agree with Susan Wolf’s claim in Moral Saints that we ought to consider non-moral values in deciding what we do, and those may be a valid reason to not given more to the worst off? I presume you’ve written about it before on your blog or in a paper.
A related question is: do you think the gap is greater between our actions and what we think we ought to do, or between what we think ought to do and what we ought to do in some realist meta-normative sense? Is the bigger issue that we lack moral knowledge, or that we don’t live up to moral standards?
It’s difficult to pinpoint a definition of conservatism. Modern politics tends to follow in the Burkean conservatism tradition. One of the animating forces is the belief that hierarchy is necessary for a just an prosperous society. It is to varying degrees a “might makes right” value system, summed up in this quote by Plato: ” …nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.”
Another style is Christian conservatism with dominionism, that believe animals are biblically placed on earth for humans to do with as we please. Many still believe in Descartes Cartesian dualism that humans are distinct from animals in that animals do not have consciousness and even cannot “experience” pain.
These belief systems are unlikely to yield concern for animals, and are usually ambivalent to them. There may be some appeal to a “with great power comes great responsibility” mindset that animals are weak and need our protection.
Another angle is to realize many wear the label of conservative loosely, and can be persuaded to adopt or appreciate other value systems that are much more concerned with the well-being of animals.
I think it is more likely than not that failure to pass this bill as is was net harmful.
Ozone air cleaners are a significant source of indoor air pollution, producing indoor particulate levels just slightly less than second hand smoke. Particulates account for 85%+ of morbidity from indoor air pollution in residences. There is a serious harm in keeping these air cleaners on the market. All major health and air quality organizations oppose them. But there is no ban on their sale, so they remain available to uninformed customers. Killing this bill keeps a major harm on the market.
There are many pollution control technologies besides Far-UVC that can reduce infection risk, including UV technologies at longer wavelengths that do not produce ozone. Far-UVC is not a far superior technology, and it’s not clear to me that a setback in the Far-UVC industry meaningfully delays adoption of infection control technologies generally.
Scrubbers are likely going to be necessary on Far-UVC devices because of how much pollution they produce. As HVAC engineers, we have a duty of care that will likely prohibit using control technologies that worsen indoor air quality. There isn’t an easy solution to the problem beyond scrubbers; if you use ventilation or filtration to control it, you could have just gone with a ventilation or filtration solution from the start.
The majority of CA buildings are in a mild climate and energy recovery and or economizing is likely going to be a cheaper solution overall compared to room air cleaners in new facilities.
Overall, I’m discouraged at the broad EA obsession with Far-UVC instead of coordinating with leading organizations like ASHRAE to promote the uptake of infectious disease control standards and design generally. In this case, that obsession did cause clear harm, with unclear benefit.
You can buy whey made from precision fermentation (PerfectDay). That changes several elements of your post, particularly the claim that whey is necessarily not vegan.
“we are biologically programmed to not care when eating animal flesh” this isn’t obvious or intuitive to me. It seems like our attitudes toward eating animals are largely culturally conditioned. Regardless, even if it is “innate”, a personal insensitivity to animals is not a moral reason to treat them as interchangeable, expendable, or offsetable.
It seems your justifications for offsets are bit of fanatic consequentialism and a belief that animals do not deserve similar moral status as humans.
Two points in response. First, many vegans were similarly callous towards animals before they became vegan. Cognitive dissonance is incredibly powerful. It’s why many vegans first went vegan for health reasons, then were able to earnestly consider animal moral status, and then stayed vegan for the animals. Second, I think you should be horrified at how some animals are treated as if they were human. Pigs for example are similar enough in biology that they are used for organ transplants and to test painkiller efficacy. There don’t seem to be good reasons to think the experience of pain to a pig is all that different from that of a human infant.
A useful test when moral theorizing about animals is to swap “animals” with “humans” and see if your answer changes substantially. In this example, if the answer changes, the relevant difference for you isn’t about pure expected value consequentialism, it’s about some salient difference between the rights or moral status of animals vs. humans. Vegans tend to give significant, even equivalent, moral status to some animals used for food. If you give near-equal moral status to animals, “offsetting meat eating by donating to animal welfare orgs” is similar to “donating to global health charities to offset hiring a hitman to target a group of humans”. There are a series of rebuttals, counter-rebuttals, etc. to this line of reasoning. Not going to get into all of them. But suffice to say that in the animal welfare space, an animal welfarist carnivore is hesitantly trusted—it signals either a lack of commitment or discipline, a diet/health struggle, a discordant belief that animals deserve far less rights and moral status as humans, or (much rarer) a fanatic consequentialist ideology that thinks offsetting human killing is morally coherent and acceptable. A earnest carnivore that cares a lot about animal welfare is incredibly rare.
Maximization is not as simple as choosing the single action the produces the most benefit; actions are not necessary exclusive. If I go to the grocery store, I don’t only by beans because I think they have the highest nutritional value per dollar. I buy other things too, and need to be because beans alone are insufficient. One can donate to animal welfare charities and be vegan; those aren’t exclusive.
Can you elaborate on why you think we will never eradicate factory farming? You point to near-term trends that suggest it will get worse over the coming decades. What about on a century long time scale or longer? Factory farming has only been around for a few generations, and food habits have changed tremendously over that time.
I think it’s important to consider how some strategies may make future work difficult. For example, Martha Nussbaum highlights how much of the legal theory in the animal rights movement has relied on showing similarities between human and animal intelligence. Such a “like us” comparison limits consideration to a small subset of vertebrates. They are impotent at helping animals like chickens, were much legal work is happening now. Other legal theories are much more robust to expansion and consideration of other animals as the science improves to understand their needs and behavior.
Using your line of argument applied to the analogy you provided would suggest that efforts like developing a malaria vaccine are misguided, because malaria will always be with us, and we should just focus on reducing infection rates and treatment.
ASHRAE has long had standards and working groups on UVC, and recently published standard 241 on Control of Infectious Aerosols. The goal is to reduce transmission risk, not to support any one particular technology. Filtration is usually cheaper than Far-UVC and easier to maintain for the same level of infection control. Far-UVC/UVC is better in some niches, particularly in healthcare settings that require high air flow rates.
I suggest getting involved in ASHRAE and the research community that has been working on and developing standards for infection control for over a century.
From an EA perspective, I think it is more effective to promote adoption of ASHRAE Std 241 than the adoption of Far-UVC specifically.
-perspective of a Ph.D. mechanical engineer and ASHRAE member with experience in IAQ
Academic freedom is not and has never been meant to protect professors on topics that have no relevance to their discipline: “Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.”
If, say, a philosophy professor wants to express opinions on infanticide, that is covered under academic freedom. If they want to encourage students to drink bleach, saying it is good for their health, that is not covered.
We can and should have a strong standard of academic freedom for relevant, on-topic contributions. But race science is off topic and irrelevant to EA. It’s closer to spam. Should the forum have no spam filter and rely on community members to downvote posts as the method of spam control?
A clear example of a post that would be banned under the rules: why-ea-will-be-anti-woke-or-die.
Reducing chronic health risks from indoor air pollution (mostly PM 2.5) generally entails different strategies than reducing infection risk from aerosols. Filtration can address both, but the airflow rates and costs can be quite different. UVC won’t do anything about PM 2.5, and may contribute to it with ozone formation.
I recommend reading the supporting literature and history behind ASHRAE Std 62.1 and Std 241, which cover ventilation and control for infectious diseases in buildings. There are also several recent studies by the National Academies on air pollution and infectious aerosols. The indoor air and infectious disease communities are quite large—with their own funding sources and conferences. It seems a lot of the “gaps” presented here are not unknown to experts, but just to the EA community and amateur researchers.
Meta level question:
How does Manifest have anything to do with Effective Altruism, and why is this on the EA forum?
Shouldn’t this post be on some other other channel internal to Manifest and the forecasting community?
It get there are some people that went to Manifest that are also in the EA movement, but it seems like the communities are quite distinct and have different goals. From comments and conversations, it seems pretty clear to me that this Manifest community has a strong hostility towards even considering the reputational risks platforming racist speakers has on the rest of the EA movement. Part of being a big tent movement means caring about not stinking up the tent for everyone else.
Let’s please firewall the Manifest community from EA?
I think that longtermism relies on more popular, evidenced-based causes like global health and animal welfare to do its reputational laundering through the EA label. I don’t see any benefit to global health and animal welfare causes from longtermism. And for that reason I think it would be better for the movement to split into “effective altruism” and “speculative altruism” so the more robust global health and animal welfare causes areas don’t have to suffer the reputational risk and criticism that is almost entirely directed at the longtermism wing.
Given the movement is essentially driven by Open Philanthropy, and they aren’t going to split, I don’t see such a large movement split happening. So I may be inclined towards some version of, as you say, “Stop doing stuff that looks weird, even if it is perfectly defensible by longtermist lights, simply because I have neartermist values and disagree with it.” The longtermist stuff is maybe like 20% of funding and 80% of reputational risk, and the most important longtermist concerns can be handled without the really weird speculative stuff.
But that’s irrelevant, because I think this ought to be a pretty clear case of the grant not being defensible by longtermist standards. Paying bay area software development salaries to develop a video game (why not a cheap developer literally anywhere else?) that didn’t even get published is hardly defensible. I get that the whole purpose of the fund is to do “hits based giving”. But it’s created an environment where nothing can be a mistake, because it is expected most things would fail. And if nothing is a mistake, how can the fund learn from mistakes?
It seems like a fundamental problem is the lack of a moral realist foundation, as “human intentions toward sentient beings” and “what is moral” are different things. Can someone recommend some reading on whether alignment is even a coherent ask, either from a moral realist or moral anti-realist perspective?