First, remind me why weāre looking at 1500 countervalue weapons? Do we really expect them to just ignore the ICBM silos?
My understanding is that the warning systems are generally designed such that the ICBMs could launch before the attacking warheads reach the silos. I do have significant probability on counterforce scenarios, but I canāt rule out counter value scenarios, so I think itās an important question to estimate what would happen in these counter value scenarios.
Possibly the single most important goal of the deployed warheads is to stop the other side from deploying their warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. Holding to deployed only is probably a reasonable assumption given that some of the deployed will not make it, and most of the non-deployed definitely wonāt.
I would think the non-deployed warheads could just be stored deep underground so they would nearly all survive.
Second, note that thereās a difference between āa lot of the area hit would be suburbsā and āa lot of the suburbs would be hitā. The US has a vast amount of suburbs, and the areas damaged by nuclear weapons would be surprisingly small.
Other people have probably done more rigorous analyses now, but my rough estimate in 2015 was that 1500 nukes to the US would destroy nearly all the suburb area of 100,000+ population metro areas. If they were spread over NATO, of course it would be a lower percentage, but I would estimate still the majority of wood in suburbs would be hit.
Let me repeat. I am not interested in anything Turco, Toon et al have to say. They butchered the stuff I can check badly. As such, I do not think it is good reasoning to believe them on the stuff I canāt. The errors outlined in the OP are not the sort of thing you can make in good faith. They are the sort of thing youād do if you were trying to keep your soot number up in the face of falling arsenals.
I think we should try to evaluate this argument on its merits. If there is a fire 8 km wide, I would argue that it is intuitive that it could rise ~16 km to the stratosphere. It turns out itās a little more complicated than this, because it depends on the potential temperature. The potential temperature is the temperature of a parcel of air would have to be at sea level in order to become neutrally buoyant at the particular altitude. A typical value for the potential temperature at the tropopause is about 100Ā°C. Because combustion temperatures are more like 1000Ā°C, if you donāt have dilution, it would rise high in the stratosphere. And if the fire is very wide, there is not that much dilution. In reality, there is significant dilution, but another fire model generally found the smoke going to the upper troposphere (the Lawrence Livermore National Lab study).
Re firestorms more broadly, I donāt see any reason to assume those would routinely form.
Some argue that Hiroshima was exceptional that it did firestorm, and some argue that Nagasaki was exceptional that it did not, but I just went with around 50ā50 for my model.
Itās been a while since I looked into this, but those are harder to generate than you might think when thatās the goal, and I donāt think itās likely to be a goal of any modern targeting plan. The only sophisticated model Iāve seen is the one by the Los Alamos team, which got about 70% of the soot production that Robock et al did, and only 12% of that reached the stratosphere.
As noted above, the Livermore model does generally support Robockās estimates of lofting of particles. However, the Livermore model did have a shorter particle lifetime in the stratosphere (~4 years vs 8-15 for Robock), partly because the Livermore particles were not mostly soot (black carbon). So I think this is a potentially important possibility. However, inclusion of the non-soot smoke may actually make the sunlight reduction greater than Robockās estimate (for the same amount burned).
My understanding is that the warning systems are generally designed such that the ICBMs could launch before the attacking warheads reach the silos. I do have significant probability on counterforce scenarios, but I canāt rule out counter value scenarios, so I think itās an important question to estimate what would happen in these counter value scenarios.
Even leaving aside the ICBMs, ācountervalueā was one of McNamaraās weird theories, and definitely wouldnāt be implemented as a pure thing. If nothing else, a lot of those warheads are going after military targets, not cities.
Other people have probably done more rigorous analyses now, but my rough estimate in 2015 was that 1500 nukes to the US would destroy nearly all the suburb area of 100,000+ population metro areas.
Maybe if they were targeted specifically with that goal in mind, but again, that seems unlikely, particularly with modern guidance systems. Youāll do better for yourself shooting at specific things rather than asking āhow many civilians can we killā? A lot of those will be far away from cities, or will have overlap with something else nearby that is reasonably hard and also needs to die.
In reality, there is significant dilution, but another fire model generally found the smoke going to the upper troposphere (the Lawrence Livermore National Lab study).
I might be misreading it, but that paper seems to bury a lot of the same assumptions that Iām objecting to. They assume a firestorm will form as part of the basis of how the fire is modeled, and then explicitly take the 5 Tg of stratospheric soot per 100 fires number and use that as the basis for further modeling. For other fuel loadings, the amount of soot in the stratosphere is linear with fuel loading, which is really hard to take seriously in the face of the āwildfires are differentā assertion. Sure, they accurately note that there are a lot of assumptions in the usual Turco/āToon/āRobock model and talk a good game about trying to deal with all four parts of the problem, then go and smuggle in the same assumptions. Points for halving the smoke duration, I guess.
Edit:
I would think the non-deployed warheads could just be stored deep underground so they would nearly all survive.
Deep bunkers like that are expensive and rare, and even if the bunker itself survived, ground bursts are messy and would likely leave it inaccessible. Also, thereās the problem of delivering the warheads to the target in an environment where a lot of infrastructure is gone. Missile warheads are only of use as a source of raw materials, and while you might be able to get gravity bombs to bombers, you wouldnāt get many, and probably couldnāt fly all that many sorties anyway. Itās a rounding error, and Iām probably being generous in using that to cancel out the loss of deployed warheads. (Why do we keep them, then, you ask? Good question. Some of it is in case we need to up deployed warheads quickly. A lot is that various politicians donāt want to be seen as soft on defense.)
Deep bunkers like that are expensive and rare, and even if the bunker itself survived, ground bursts are messy and would likely leave it inaccessible.
There are thousands of underground mines in the US (14000 active mines, but many are surface mines), and I think it would only require 1 or a few to store thousands of nuclear weapons. Maybe the weapons would be spread out over many mines. It would not be feasible to make thousands of mines inaccessible.
Missile warheads are only of use as a source of raw materials, and while you might be able to get gravity bombs to bombers, you wouldnāt get many, and probably couldnāt fly all that many sorties anyway.
Are you saying that missile warheads could not be quickly configured to be used as a gravity bomb? Iām not claiming that most of the non-deployed nuclear weapons could be used in a few days, but I would think it would be feasible in a few months (it would only take a few surviving bombers if the warheads could be used as gravity bombs).
OK, remember that weāre dealing with nuclear weapons, which inspire governments to levels of paranoia you maybe see when dealing with crypto. Dropping a dozen nukes down a mine somewhere is not going to happen without a lot of paperwork and armed guards and a bunch of security systems. And those costs donāt really scale with number of warheads. Sure, if you were trying to disperse the stockpile during a period of rising tension, you could take a few infantry companies and say āhang the paperworkā. But that requires thinking about the weapons in a very different way from how they actually do, and frankly they wouldnāt be all that useful even if you did do that, because of the other problems with this plan.
Are you saying that missile warheads could not be quickly configured to be used as a gravity bomb?
Yes, I am. The first commandment of nuclear weapons design since 1960 or so has been āit must not go off by accidentā. So a modern missile warhead has an accelerometer which will not arm it unless it is pretty sure it has been fired by the relevant type of missile. And trying to bypass it is probably a no-go. The design standard is that one of the national labs couldnāt set a US warhead off without the codes, so I doubt you can easily bypass that.
it would only take a few surviving bombers if the warheads could be used as gravity bombs
A modern bomber is a very complex machine, and the US hasnāt set ours up to keep working out of what could survive a nuclear exchange. (This is possible, but would require mobile servicing facilities and drills, which we do not have.) Not to mention that they canāt make a round-trip unrefueled from CONUS to any plausible enemy, and the odds of having forward tankers left are slim to none.
I might be misreading it, but that paper seems to bury a lot of the same assumptions that Iām objecting to. They assume a firestorm will form as part of the basis of how the fire is modeled, and then explicitly take the 5 Tg of stratospheric soot per 100 fires number and use that as the basis for further modeling.
For reference, here is what they say about their fire modelling:
The goal of the fire simulations in this work is to better characterize the spatial and temporal distribution of smoke from a mass urban fire resulting from a 15ākt nuclear detonation. Therefore, our modeling is informed by the Hiroshima firestorm, and the Hamburg firestorm, due to its rough similarity to the Hiroshima firestorm in size and duration. The assumption that all 100 detonations cause fires, and that these fires are more like the Hiroshima firestorm than Nagasaki, is a worst-case scenario. The studies of Penner et al. (1986) and Toon et al. (2007) also use fire parameters based on these historical cases (Hiroshima and Hamburg), so our fire parameters have the additional benefit of being similar to these previous studies. To produce simulations of fires similar to Hiroshima and Hamburg, it is assumed that the terrain is flat (i.e., topography does not provide shielding of thermal radiation) and there is uniform fuel loading over the area where thermal radiation is sufficient to ignite standard construction materials, such as wood. The WRF model source code is modified to allow for specification of surface fluxes of heat, water vapor and smoke (or black carbon), requiring quantification of these three fluxes, as well as the fire shape, size and duration.
The Hiroshima firestorm burned an area of about 11 to 13 km2 in 4 to 9āh, taking 20 to 30āmin to develop into a firestorm (Glasstone, 1962; Rodden et al., 1965). The Hamburg firestorm burned a comparable 12 km2 in about 6āh (Carrier et al., 1985). Therefore, we specify a circular area with a 2 km radius (12.57 km2) for our fires. Each fire has a 30āmin ramp-up period as surface fluxes increase linearly from zero, followed by a 4āh fire duration where surface fluxes are constant. The 4āh duration is chosen because it is the shortest time estimate for the fire in Hiroshima, and releasing a given mass of emissions and burning a given fuel amount over the shorter time period will result in higher smoke concentrations and heat fluxes, thus providing a worst-case estimate.
My understanding is that the warning systems are generally designed such that the ICBMs could launch before the attacking warheads reach the silos. I do have significant probability on counterforce scenarios, but I canāt rule out counter value scenarios, so I think itās an important question to estimate what would happen in these counter value scenarios.
I would think the non-deployed warheads could just be stored deep underground so they would nearly all survive.
Other people have probably done more rigorous analyses now, but my rough estimate in 2015 was that 1500 nukes to the US would destroy nearly all the suburb area of 100,000+ population metro areas. If they were spread over NATO, of course it would be a lower percentage, but I would estimate still the majority of wood in suburbs would be hit.
I think we should try to evaluate this argument on its merits. If there is a fire 8 km wide, I would argue that it is intuitive that it could rise ~16 km to the stratosphere. It turns out itās a little more complicated than this, because it depends on the potential temperature. The potential temperature is the temperature of a parcel of air would have to be at sea level in order to become neutrally buoyant at the particular altitude. A typical value for the potential temperature at the tropopause is about 100Ā°C. Because combustion temperatures are more like 1000Ā°C, if you donāt have dilution, it would rise high in the stratosphere. And if the fire is very wide, there is not that much dilution. In reality, there is significant dilution, but another fire model generally found the smoke going to the upper troposphere (the Lawrence Livermore National Lab study).
Some argue that Hiroshima was exceptional that it did firestorm, and some argue that Nagasaki was exceptional that it did not, but I just went with around 50ā50 for my model.
As noted above, the Livermore model does generally support Robockās estimates of lofting of particles. However, the Livermore model did have a shorter particle lifetime in the stratosphere (~4 years vs 8-15 for Robock), partly because the Livermore particles were not mostly soot (black carbon). So I think this is a potentially important possibility. However, inclusion of the non-soot smoke may actually make the sunlight reduction greater than Robockās estimate (for the same amount burned).
Even leaving aside the ICBMs, ācountervalueā was one of McNamaraās weird theories, and definitely wouldnāt be implemented as a pure thing. If nothing else, a lot of those warheads are going after military targets, not cities.
Maybe if they were targeted specifically with that goal in mind, but again, that seems unlikely, particularly with modern guidance systems. Youāll do better for yourself shooting at specific things rather than asking āhow many civilians can we killā? A lot of those will be far away from cities, or will have overlap with something else nearby that is reasonably hard and also needs to die.
I might be misreading it, but that paper seems to bury a lot of the same assumptions that Iām objecting to. They assume a firestorm will form as part of the basis of how the fire is modeled, and then explicitly take the 5 Tg of stratospheric soot per 100 fires number and use that as the basis for further modeling. For other fuel loadings, the amount of soot in the stratosphere is linear with fuel loading, which is really hard to take seriously in the face of the āwildfires are differentā assertion. Sure, they accurately note that there are a lot of assumptions in the usual Turco/āToon/āRobock model and talk a good game about trying to deal with all four parts of the problem, then go and smuggle in the same assumptions. Points for halving the smoke duration, I guess.
Edit:
Deep bunkers like that are expensive and rare, and even if the bunker itself survived, ground bursts are messy and would likely leave it inaccessible. Also, thereās the problem of delivering the warheads to the target in an environment where a lot of infrastructure is gone. Missile warheads are only of use as a source of raw materials, and while you might be able to get gravity bombs to bombers, you wouldnāt get many, and probably couldnāt fly all that many sorties anyway. Itās a rounding error, and Iām probably being generous in using that to cancel out the loss of deployed warheads. (Why do we keep them, then, you ask? Good question. Some of it is in case we need to up deployed warheads quickly. A lot is that various politicians donāt want to be seen as soft on defense.)
There are thousands of underground mines in the US (14000 active mines, but many are surface mines), and I think it would only require 1 or a few to store thousands of nuclear weapons. Maybe the weapons would be spread out over many mines. It would not be feasible to make thousands of mines inaccessible.
Are you saying that missile warheads could not be quickly configured to be used as a gravity bomb? Iām not claiming that most of the non-deployed nuclear weapons could be used in a few days, but I would think it would be feasible in a few months (it would only take a few surviving bombers if the warheads could be used as gravity bombs).
OK, remember that weāre dealing with nuclear weapons, which inspire governments to levels of paranoia you maybe see when dealing with crypto. Dropping a dozen nukes down a mine somewhere is not going to happen without a lot of paperwork and armed guards and a bunch of security systems. And those costs donāt really scale with number of warheads. Sure, if you were trying to disperse the stockpile during a period of rising tension, you could take a few infantry companies and say āhang the paperworkā. But that requires thinking about the weapons in a very different way from how they actually do, and frankly they wouldnāt be all that useful even if you did do that, because of the other problems with this plan.
Yes, I am. The first commandment of nuclear weapons design since 1960 or so has been āit must not go off by accidentā. So a modern missile warhead has an accelerometer which will not arm it unless it is pretty sure it has been fired by the relevant type of missile. And trying to bypass it is probably a no-go. The design standard is that one of the national labs couldnāt set a US warhead off without the codes, so I doubt you can easily bypass that.
A modern bomber is a very complex machine, and the US hasnāt set ours up to keep working out of what could survive a nuclear exchange. (This is possible, but would require mobile servicing facilities and drills, which we do not have.) Not to mention that they canāt make a round-trip unrefueled from CONUS to any plausible enemy, and the odds of having forward tankers left are slim to none.
Thanks for the engagement, David and Bean!
For reference, here is what they say about their fire modelling: