Also, I expect to see small engineered pandemics, but only after effective genetic engineering is widespread. So the fact that we havenāt seen any so far is not much evidence.
Yes, that was broadly the response I had in mind as well. Same goes for most of the āunforeseenā/āāotherā anthropogenic risks; those categories are in the chapter on āFuture risksā, and are mostly things Ord appears to think either will or may get riskier as certain technologies are developed/āadvanced.
Sleepy reply to Tobiasā āOrdās estimates seem too high to meā: An important idea in the book is that āthe per-century extinction risks from ānaturalā causes must be very low, based in part on our long history of surviving such risksā (as I phrase it in this post). The flipside of that is roughly the argument that we havenāt got strong evidence of our ability to survive (uncollapsed and sans dystopia) a long period with various technologies that will be developed later, but havenāt been yet.
Of course, that doesnāt seem sufficient by itself as a reason for a high level of concern, as some version of that couldāve been said at every point in history when āthings were changingā. But if you couple that general argument with specific reasons to believe upcoming technologies could be notably risky, you could perhaps reasonably arrive at Ordās estimates. (And there are obviously a lot of specific details and arguments and caveats that Iām omitting here.)
Yes, that was broadly the response I had in mind as well. Same goes for most of the āunforeseenā/āāotherā anthropogenic risks; those categories are in the chapter on āFuture risksā, and are mostly things Ord appears to think either will or may get riskier as certain technologies are developed/āadvanced.
Sleepy reply to Tobiasā āOrdās estimates seem too high to meā: An important idea in the book is that āthe per-century extinction risks from ānaturalā causes must be very low, based in part on our long history of surviving such risksā (as I phrase it in this post). The flipside of that is roughly the argument that we havenāt got strong evidence of our ability to survive (uncollapsed and sans dystopia) a long period with various technologies that will be developed later, but havenāt been yet.
Of course, that doesnāt seem sufficient by itself as a reason for a high level of concern, as some version of that couldāve been said at every point in history when āthings were changingā. But if you couple that general argument with specific reasons to believe upcoming technologies could be notably risky, you could perhaps reasonably arrive at Ordās estimates. (And there are obviously a lot of specific details and arguments and caveats that Iām omitting here.)