Also, the commentary here on Nicholas Humphrey’s views may be illustrative of definitional issues. Humphrey denies the label illusionism for his theory, but Frankish responds that his theory really is illusionist. Also, Schwitzgebel and Nida-Rümelin attempted to define phenomenality as common features of multiple example mental states (and/or by contrast with unconscious states), but Frankish argues that this doesn’t work to define phenomenality (at least not in a way incompatible with illusionism):
For, precisely because his definition is so innocent, it is not incompatible with illusionism. As I stressed in the target article, illusionists do not deny the existence of the mental states we describe as phenomenally conscious, nor do they deny that we can introspectively recognize these states when they occur in us. Moreover, they can accept that these states share some unifying feature. But they add that this feature is not possession of phenomenal properties (qualia, what-it’s-like-ness, etc.) in the substantive sense created by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is possession of introspectable properties that dispose us to judge that the states possess phenomenal properties in that substantive sense (of course, we could call this feature ‘phenomenality’ if we want, but I take it that phenomenal realists will not want to do that). Now, the challenge of the target article was to articulate a concept of phenomenality that is recognizably substantive (and so not compatible with illusionism) yet stripped of all commitments incompatible with physicalism. Schwitzgebel hasn’t done this, since his conception is not substantive.
Nevertheless, Schwitzgebel has succeeded in something perhaps more important. He has defined a neutral explanandum for theories of consciousness, which both realists and illusionists can adopt. (I have referred to this as consciousness in an inclusive sense. We might call it simply consciousness, or, if we need to distinguish it from other forms, putative phenomenal consciousness.) In doing this, Schwitzgebel has performed a valuable service.
However, I deny that it is the sort of feature realists think it is. It is not some intrinsic quality, akin to the property characterized by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is (roughly) the property of having a cluster of introspective representational states and dispositions that create the illusion that one is acquainted with some intrinsic quality. I am sure that this is not what Nida-Rümelin thinks the procedure picks out, but I don’t see how she can rule out the possibility.
Also, the commentary here on Nicholas Humphrey’s views may be illustrative of definitional issues. Humphrey denies the label illusionism for his theory, but Frankish responds that his theory really is illusionist. Also, Schwitzgebel and Nida-Rümelin attempted to define phenomenality as common features of multiple example mental states (and/or by contrast with unconscious states), but Frankish argues that this doesn’t work to define phenomenality (at least not in a way incompatible with illusionism):