Thanks for your response Michael (and your one below to prisonpent). Iâll try to keep it to the point and pre-commit to not responding further as I donât think this is the right place to have a debate about illusionism,[1] but since you presented somewhat of a case for the illusionist I thought I might present the other side.
To me, phenomenal consciousness refers to the first-person perspective, which obviously exists. That first person perspective can make mistakes about the nature of the world, as in the MĂźller-Lyer case, but I have the experience nonetheless. In the Kammerer(a) piece, he argues that the argument from the anomalousness of phenomenal consciousness is a piece of evidence in favour of illusionism, but I take it one as in favour of non (reductive) physicalism. One manâs modus ponens and all that.
I often find (strong) illusionist writings utterly baffling. I actually re-skimmed Quining Qualia before writing this, and it was really difficult for me to understand[2] even when consulting with GPT-4 in philosopher mode. In Kammerer(a) he refers to a âquasi-phenomenal stateâ, which I have no idea what that is. Again, viewing phenomenal consciousness as the first-person perspective, that just sounds like saying I have âa fake first-person perspectiveâ. To me thatâs the same as saying the first-person perspective doesnât exist, and since it clearly does, there is evidence that illusionist theories do not explain and therefore they are bad theories both philosophically and scientifically.
This is partly a me problem, but is also a philosophy problem. Sometimes technical language is needed, but the language of a lot of academic philosophy on all sides often seems to be needlessly obscurantist to me.
Also, the commentary here on Nicholas Humphreyâs views may be illustrative of definitional issues. Humphrey denies the label illusionism for his theory, but Frankish responds that his theory really is illusionist. Also, Schwitzgebel and Nida-RĂźmelin attempted to define phenomenality as common features of multiple example mental states (and/âor by contrast with unconscious states), but Frankish argues that this doesnât work to define phenomenality (at least not in a way incompatible with illusionism):
For, precisely because his definition is so innocent, it is not incompatible with illusionism. As I stressed in the target article, illusionists do not deny the existence of the mental states we describe as phenomenally conscious, nor do they deny that we can introspectively recognize these states when they occur in us. Moreover, they can accept that these states share some unifying feature. But they add that this feature is not possession of phenomenal properties (qualia, what-itâs-like-ness, etc.) in the substantive sense created by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is possession of introspectable properties that dispose us to judge that the states possess phenomenal properties in that substantive sense (of course, we could call this feature âphenomenalityâ if we want, but I take it that phenomenal realists will not want to do that). Now, the challenge of the target article was to articulate a concept of phenomenality that is recognizably substantive (and so not compatible with illusionism) yet stripped of all commitments incompatible with physicalism. Schwitzgebel hasnât done this, since his conception is not substantive.
Nevertheless, Schwitzgebel has succeeded in something perhaps more important. He has defined a neutral explanandum for theories of consciousness, which both realists and illusionists can adopt. (I have referred to this as consciousness in an inclusive sense. We might call it simply consciousness, or, if we need to distinguish it from other forms, putative phenomenal consciousness.) In doing this, Schwitzgebel has performed a valuable service.
However, I deny that it is the sort of feature realists think it is. It is not some intrinsic quality, akin to the property characterized by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is (roughly) the property of having a cluster of introspective representational states and dispositions that create the illusion that one is acquainted with some intrinsic quality. I am sure that this is not what Nida-RĂźmelin thinks the procedure picks out, but I donât see how she can rule out the possibility.
Iâm not sure exactly what you mean by âfirst-person perspectiveâ, but strong illusionists might not deny that it exists, if understood in functionalist terms, say.
Frankish says it is like something to be a bat, in terms of a batâs first-order responses or reactive patterns to things, but a bat canât know what itâs like to be a bat, because they donât have (sufficiently sophisticated) introspection on those first-order responses. Dennett says even bacteria have a kind of âuser-illusionâ, because they can discriminate, but only âparticularly reflectiveâ humans are subject to the theoristsâ illusion and worry about things like the hard problem of consciousness. So, we could define first-person perspective in terms of responses or discriminations, and in a way compatible with strong illusionism. This would attribute first-person perspectives extremely widely, e.g. even to bacteria.
If by first-person perspective, you mean introspection, then illusionists wouldnât deny that humans have it.
If by first-person perspective, you mean classic qualia (private, ineffable, intrinsic, etc.), then an illusionist would deny that this exists.
Strong illusionists would also deny phenomenality, of course, in case thatâs different from classic qualia, but some attempted definitions of phenomenality (including what specific physicalist theories define consciousness as, e.g. broadcasting to a global workspace) actually could be understood as defining quasi-phenomenal states, and so compatible with illusionism.
A theory-neutral defintion of quasi-phenomenal states could be that theyâre real things, processes or responses (physical or otherwise) on which introspection (of the right kind) leads to beliefs in phenomenal properties, e.g. these quasi-phenomenal states appear epistemically to us as to be phenomenal. If introspection is reliable and can access phenomenal states, then these accessed phenomenal states would be quasi-phenomenal states under this definition. Illusionists would claim that introspection is not reliable, no phenomenal states actually exist, and so the beliefs in phenomenality are mistaken, hence illusions.
I think it would be wrong to take phenomenal properties as evidence that must be explained, and doing so begs the question against illusionism. What we have evidence of is the appearance of (our beliefs in) phenomenal properties, and illusionism tries to explain that without requiring the actual existence of phenomenal properties. Sometimes (maybe usually) appearances and beliefs are accurate instead of illusions, and the best explanation is based on what they represent actually existing.
Thanks for your response Michael (and your one below to prisonpent). Iâll try to keep it to the point and pre-commit to not responding further as I donât think this is the right place to have a debate about illusionism,[1] but since you presented somewhat of a case for the illusionist I thought I might present the other side.
To me, phenomenal consciousness refers to the first-person perspective, which obviously exists. That first person perspective can make mistakes about the nature of the world, as in the MĂźller-Lyer case, but I have the experience nonetheless. In the Kammerer(a) piece, he argues that the argument from the anomalousness of phenomenal consciousness is a piece of evidence in favour of illusionism, but I take it one as in favour of non (reductive) physicalism. One manâs modus ponens and all that.
I often find (strong) illusionist writings utterly baffling. I actually re-skimmed Quining Qualia before writing this, and it was really difficult for me to understand[2] even when consulting with GPT-4 in philosopher mode. In Kammerer(a) he refers to a âquasi-phenomenal stateâ, which I have no idea what that is. Again, viewing phenomenal consciousness as the first-person perspective, that just sounds like saying I have âa fake first-person perspectiveâ. To me thatâs the same as saying the first-person perspective doesnât exist, and since it clearly does, there is evidence that illusionist theories do not explain and therefore they are bad theories both philosophically and scientifically.
Iâd be happy to pick this up in an alternate forum though :)
This is partly a me problem, but is also a philosophy problem. Sometimes technical language is needed, but the language of a lot of academic philosophy on all sides often seems to be needlessly obscurantist to me.
Also, the commentary here on Nicholas Humphreyâs views may be illustrative of definitional issues. Humphrey denies the label illusionism for his theory, but Frankish responds that his theory really is illusionist. Also, Schwitzgebel and Nida-RĂźmelin attempted to define phenomenality as common features of multiple example mental states (and/âor by contrast with unconscious states), but Frankish argues that this doesnât work to define phenomenality (at least not in a way incompatible with illusionism):
Iâm not sure exactly what you mean by âfirst-person perspectiveâ, but strong illusionists might not deny that it exists, if understood in functionalist terms, say.
Frankish says it is like something to be a bat, in terms of a batâs first-order responses or reactive patterns to things, but a bat canât know what itâs like to be a bat, because they donât have (sufficiently sophisticated) introspection on those first-order responses. Dennett says even bacteria have a kind of âuser-illusionâ, because they can discriminate, but only âparticularly reflectiveâ humans are subject to the theoristsâ illusion and worry about things like the hard problem of consciousness. So, we could define first-person perspective in terms of responses or discriminations, and in a way compatible with strong illusionism. This would attribute first-person perspectives extremely widely, e.g. even to bacteria.
If by first-person perspective, you mean introspection, then illusionists wouldnât deny that humans have it.
If by first-person perspective, you mean classic qualia (private, ineffable, intrinsic, etc.), then an illusionist would deny that this exists.
Strong illusionists would also deny phenomenality, of course, in case thatâs different from classic qualia, but some attempted definitions of phenomenality (including what specific physicalist theories define consciousness as, e.g. broadcasting to a global workspace) actually could be understood as defining quasi-phenomenal states, and so compatible with illusionism.
A theory-neutral defintion of quasi-phenomenal states could be that theyâre real things, processes or responses (physical or otherwise) on which introspection (of the right kind) leads to beliefs in phenomenal properties, e.g. these quasi-phenomenal states appear epistemically to us as to be phenomenal. If introspection is reliable and can access phenomenal states, then these accessed phenomenal states would be quasi-phenomenal states under this definition. Illusionists would claim that introspection is not reliable, no phenomenal states actually exist, and so the beliefs in phenomenality are mistaken, hence illusions.
I think it would be wrong to take phenomenal properties as evidence that must be explained, and doing so begs the question against illusionism. What we have evidence of is the appearance of (our beliefs in) phenomenal properties, and illusionism tries to explain that without requiring the actual existence of phenomenal properties. Sometimes (maybe usually) appearances and beliefs are accurate instead of illusions, and the best explanation is based on what they represent actually existing.