I would very much prefer it if one didn’t appeal to the consequences of the belief about animal moral patienthood, and instead argue whether animals in fact are moral patients or not, or whether the question is well-posed.
For this reason, I have strong-downvoted your comment.
Thanks for describing your reasons. My criterion for moral patienthood is described by this Brian Tomasik quote:
When I realize that an organism feels happiness and suffering, at that point I realize that the organism matters and deserves care and kindness. In this sense, you could say the only “condition” of my love is sentience.
Many other criteria for moral patienthood which exclude animals have been proposed. These criteria always suffer from some combination of the following:
Arbitrariness. For example, “human DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood” is just as arbitrary as “European DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood”.
Exclusion of some humans. For example, “high intelligence is the criterion for moral patienthood” excludes people who have severe mental disabilities.
Exclusion of hypothetical beings. For example, “human DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood” would exclude superintelligent aliens and intelligent conscious AI. Also, if some people you know were unknowingly members of a species which looked/acted much like humans but had very different DNA, they would suddenly become morally valueless.
Collapsing to sociopathy or nihilism. For example, “animals don’t have moral patienthood because we have power over them” is just nihilism, and if a person used that justification to act the way we do towards farmed animals towards other humans, they’d be locked up.
The most parsimonious definition of moral patient I’ve seen proposed is just “a sentient being”. I don’t see any reason why I should add complexity to that definition in order to exclude nonhuman animals. The only motivation I can think of for doing this would be to compromise on my moral principles for the sake of the pleasure associated with eating meat, which is untenable to a mind wired the way mine is.
I think the objection comes from the seeming asymmetry between over-attributing and under-attributing consciousness. It’s fine to discuss our independent impressions about some topic, but when one’s view is a minority position and the consequences of false beliefs are high, isn’t there some obligation of epistemic humility?
Disagreed, animal moral patienthood competes with all the other possible interventions effective altruists could be doing, and does so symmetrically (the opportunity cost cuts in both directions!).
I would very much prefer it if one didn’t appeal to the consequences of the belief about animal moral patienthood, and instead argue whether animals in fact are moral patients or not, or whether the question is well-posed.
For this reason, I have strong-downvoted your comment.
Thanks for describing your reasons. My criterion for moral patienthood is described by this Brian Tomasik quote:
Many other criteria for moral patienthood which exclude animals have been proposed. These criteria always suffer from some combination of the following:
Arbitrariness. For example, “human DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood” is just as arbitrary as “European DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood”.
Exclusion of some humans. For example, “high intelligence is the criterion for moral patienthood” excludes people who have severe mental disabilities.
Exclusion of hypothetical beings. For example, “human DNA is the criterion for moral patienthood” would exclude superintelligent aliens and intelligent conscious AI. Also, if some people you know were unknowingly members of a species which looked/acted much like humans but had very different DNA, they would suddenly become morally valueless.
Collapsing to sociopathy or nihilism. For example, “animals don’t have moral patienthood because we have power over them” is just nihilism, and if a person used that justification to act the way we do towards farmed animals towards other humans, they’d be locked up.
The most parsimonious definition of moral patient I’ve seen proposed is just “a sentient being”. I don’t see any reason why I should add complexity to that definition in order to exclude nonhuman animals. The only motivation I can think of for doing this would be to compromise on my moral principles for the sake of the pleasure associated with eating meat, which is untenable to a mind wired the way mine is.
I think the objection comes from the seeming asymmetry between over-attributing and under-attributing consciousness. It’s fine to discuss our independent impressions about some topic, but when one’s view is a minority position and the consequences of false beliefs are high, isn’t there some obligation of epistemic humility?
Disagreed, animal moral patienthood competes with all the other possible interventions effective altruists could be doing, and does so symmetrically (the opportunity cost cuts in both directions!).