On some definitions of “qualia” yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/Byrne way where “qualia” turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means “property of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenology”. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of “qualia”.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get what’s going on now. Frankish is (I think, didn’t read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of “phenomenally conscious”, so if there’s nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.
Well, that’s the whole issue, isn’t it? Qualia are the things that can’t be fully characterized by their relations.
On some definitions of “qualia” yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/Byrne way where “qualia” turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means “property of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenology”. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of “qualia”.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get what’s going on now. Frankish is (I think, didn’t read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of “phenomenally conscious”, so if there’s nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.