On some definitions of âqualiaâ yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/âByrne way where âqualiaâ turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means âproperty of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenologyâ. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of âqualiaâ.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get whatâs going on now. Frankish is (I think, didnât read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of âphenomenally consciousâ, so if thereâs nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.
On some definitions of âqualiaâ yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/âByrne way where âqualiaâ turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means âproperty of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenologyâ. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of âqualiaâ.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get whatâs going on now. Frankish is (I think, didnât read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of âphenomenally consciousâ, so if thereâs nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.