For what it’s worth, both Holden and Jeff express considerable moral uncertainty regarding animals, while Eliezer does not. Continuing Holden’s quote:
My own reflections and reasoning about philosophy of mind have, so far, seemed to indicate against the idea that e.g. chickens merit moral concern. And my intuitions value humans astronomically more. However, I don’t think either my reflections or my intuitions are highly reliable, especially given that many thoughtful people disagree. And if chickens do indeed merit moral concern, the amount and extent of their mistreatment is staggering. With worldview diversification in mind, I don’t want us to pass up the potentially considerable opportunities to improve their welfare.
I think the uncertainty we have on this point warrants putting significant resources into farm animal welfare, as well as working to generally avoid language that implies that only humans are morally relevant.
I agree with you that it’s quite difficult to quantify how much Eliezer’s views on animals have influenced the rationalist community and those who could steer TAI. However, I think it’s significant—if Eliezer were a staunch animal activist, I think the discourse surrounding animal welfare in the rationalist community would be different. I elaborate upon why I think this in my reply to Max H.
For what it’s worth, both Holden and Jeff express considerable moral uncertainty regarding animals, while Eliezer does not. Continuing Holden’s quote:
I agree with you that it’s quite difficult to quantify how much Eliezer’s views on animals have influenced the rationalist community and those who could steer TAI. However, I think it’s significant—if Eliezer were a staunch animal activist, I think the discourse surrounding animal welfare in the rationalist community would be different. I elaborate upon why I think this in my reply to Max H.