animal consciousness is especially frustrating because of the real harm itâs caused to rationalistsâ openness to caring about animal welfare.
I think you might be greatly overestimating Eliezerâs influence on this.
According to Wikipedia: âIn a 2014 survey of 406 US philosophy professors, approximately 60% of ethicists and 45% of non-ethicist philosophers said it was at least somewhat âmorally badâ to eat meat from mammals. A 2020 survey of 1812 published English-language philosophers found that 48% said it was permissible to eat animals in ordinary circumstances, while 45% said it was not.â
It really does not surprise me that people who give great importance to rationality value animals much less than the median EA, given that non-human animals probably lack most kinds of advanced meta-level thinking and might plausibly not be âaware of their own awarenessâ.
Even in EA, there are many great independent thinkers who are uncertain about whether animals should be members of the âmoral communityâ
I think that sometimes in EA we risk forgetting how fringe veganism is, and I donât think Yudkowskyâs arguments on the importance of animal suffering influence a lot of the views in the rationalist community on the subject. Especially considering people at leading AI labs that might steer TAI, they seem to be very independent thinkers and often critical of Yudkowskyâs arguments (otherwise they wouldnât be working at leading AI labs in the first place)
For what itâs worth, both Holden and Jeff express considerable moral uncertainty regarding animals, while Eliezer does not. Continuing Holdenâs quote:
My own reflections and reasoning about philosophy of mind have, so far, seemed to indicate against the idea that e.g. chickens merit moral concern. And my intuitions value humans astronomically more. However, I donât think either my reflections or my intuitions are highly reliable, especially given that many thoughtful people disagree. And if chickens do indeed merit moral concern, the amount and extent of their mistreatment is staggering. With worldview diversification in mind, I donât want us to pass up the potentially considerable opportunities to improve their welfare.
I think the uncertainty we have on this point warrants putting significant resources into farm animal welfare, as well as working to generally avoid language that implies that only humans are morally relevant.
I agree with you that itâs quite difficult to quantify how much Eliezerâs views on animals have influenced the rationalist community and those who could steer TAI. However, I think itâs significantâif Eliezer were a staunch animal activist, I think the discourse surrounding animal welfare in the rationalist community would be different. I elaborate upon why I think this in my reply to Max H.
I think you might be greatly overestimating Eliezerâs influence on this.
According to Wikipedia: âIn a 2014 survey of 406 US philosophy professors, approximately 60% of ethicists and 45% of non-ethicist philosophers said it was at least somewhat âmorally badâ to eat meat from mammals. A 2020 survey of 1812 published English-language philosophers found that 48% said it was permissible to eat animals in ordinary circumstances, while 45% said it was not.â
It really does not surprise me that people who give great importance to rationality value animals much less than the median EA, given that non-human animals probably lack most kinds of advanced meta-level thinking and might plausibly not be âaware of their own awarenessâ.
Even in EA, there are many great independent thinkers who are uncertain about whether animals should be members of the âmoral communityâ
I think that sometimes in EA we risk forgetting how fringe veganism is, and I donât think Yudkowskyâs arguments on the importance of animal suffering influence a lot of the views in the rationalist community on the subject. Especially considering people at leading AI labs that might steer TAI, they seem to be very independent thinkers and often critical of Yudkowskyâs arguments (otherwise they wouldnât be working at leading AI labs in the first place)
For what itâs worth, both Holden and Jeff express considerable moral uncertainty regarding animals, while Eliezer does not. Continuing Holdenâs quote:
I agree with you that itâs quite difficult to quantify how much Eliezerâs views on animals have influenced the rationalist community and those who could steer TAI. However, I think itâs significantâif Eliezer were a staunch animal activist, I think the discourse surrounding animal welfare in the rationalist community would be different. I elaborate upon why I think this in my reply to Max H.