Longtermist EA seems relatively strong at thinking about how to do good, and raising funds for doing so, but relatively weak in affector organs, that tell us what’s going on in the world, and effector organs that influence the world. Three examples of ways that EAs can actually influence behaviour are:
- working in & advising US nat sec
- working in UK & EU governments, in regulation
- working in & advising AI companies
But I expect this is not enough, and our (a/e)ffector organs are bottlenecking our impact. To be clear, it’s not that these roles aren’t mentally stimulating—they are. It’s just that their impact lies primarily in implementing ideas, and uncovering practical considerations, rather than in an Ivory tower’s pure, deep thinking.
The world is quickly becoming polarised between US and China, and this means that certain (a/e)ffector organs may be even more neglected than the others. We may want to promote: i) work as a diplomat ii) working at diplomat-adjacent think tanks, such as the Asia Society, iii) working at relevant UN bodies, relating to disarmament and bioweapon control, iv) working at UN-adjacent bodies that seek to pressure disarmament etc. These roles often reside in large entities that can accept hundreds or thousands of new staff at a wide range of skill levels, and so perhaps many people who are currently “earning to give” should move into these “affector” or “effector” roles (as well as those mentioned above, in other relevant parts of national governments). I’m also curious whether 80,000 Hours has considered diplomatic roles—I couldn’t find much on a cursory search.
This framing is not quite right, because it implies that there’s a clean division of labour between thinkers and doers. A better claim would be: “we have a bunch of thinkers, now we need a bunch of thinker-doers”.
There’s a new center in the Department of State, dedicated to the diplomacy surrounding new and emerging tech. This seems like great place for Americans to go and work, if they’re interested in arms control in relation to AI and emerging technology.
Confusingly, it’s called the “Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies (CSET)”. So we now have to distinguish the State CSET from the Georgetown one—the “Centre for Security and Emerging Technology”.
I’ve also been thinking about similar things—e.g. about how there might be a lot of useful things EAs could do in diplomatic roles, and how an 80k career profile on diplomatic roles could be useful. This has partly been sparked by thinking about nuclear risk.
Hopefully in the coming months I’ll write up some relevant thoughts of my own on this and talk to some people. And this shortform post has given me a little extra boost of inclination to do so.
A key priority for the Biden administration should be to rebuild the State Department’s arms control workforce, as its current workforce is ageing and there have been struggles with recruiting and retaining younger talent
Another key priority should be “responding to the growing anti-satellite threat to U.S. and allies’ space systems”. This should be tackled by, among other things:
“tak[ing] steps to revitalize America’s space security diplomacy”
“consider[ing] ways to expand space security consultations with allies and partners, and promote norms of behavior that can advance the security and sustainability of the outer space environment”
(Note: It’s not totally clear to me whether this part of the article is solely about anti-satellite threats or about a broader range of space-related issues.)
This updated me a little bit further towards thinking it might be useful:
for more EAs to go into diplomacy and/or arms control
for EAs to do more to support other efforts to improve diplomacy and/or arms control (e.g., via directing funding to good existing work on these fronts)
Here’s the part of the article which is most relevant to point 1:
The State Department’s arms control workforce has been under stress for some time due to problems associated with an aging staff and the inability to effectively recruit and retain younger talent. For example, a 2014 State Department Inspector General report on the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance states: “Forty-eight percent of the bureau’s Civil Service employees will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years, the second-highest percentage in the Department of State … Absent a plan to improve professional development and succession planning for the next generation of arms control experts, the bureau is at risk of losing national security expertise vital to its mission.”
Though many of the challenges associated with the arms control workforce pre-date the Trump administration, according to press reports, these trends have accelerated under its watch. As a result, the Biden administration will inherit an arms control workforce that has been hollowed out. A key priority for the incoming team must be to rebuild this workforce. Luckily, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security has the authority under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to hire technical arms control experts through an expedited process. In the near-term, the State Department should take advantage of this and other existing hiring authorities to help rebuild the arms control workforce. Over the longer term, it should work with Congress to determine whether new hiring authorities would help grow and maintain the arms control workforce.
Affector & Effector Roles as Task Y?
Longtermist EA seems relatively strong at thinking about how to do good, and raising funds for doing so, but relatively weak in affector organs, that tell us what’s going on in the world, and effector organs that influence the world. Three examples of ways that EAs can actually influence behaviour are:
- working in & advising US nat sec
- working in UK & EU governments, in regulation
- working in & advising AI companies
But I expect this is not enough, and our (a/e)ffector organs are bottlenecking our impact. To be clear, it’s not that these roles aren’t mentally stimulating—they are. It’s just that their impact lies primarily in implementing ideas, and uncovering practical considerations, rather than in an Ivory tower’s pure, deep thinking.
The world is quickly becoming polarised between US and China, and this means that certain (a/e)ffector organs may be even more neglected than the others. We may want to promote: i) work as a diplomat ii) working at diplomat-adjacent think tanks, such as the Asia Society, iii) working at relevant UN bodies, relating to disarmament and bioweapon control, iv) working at UN-adjacent bodies that seek to pressure disarmament etc. These roles often reside in large entities that can accept hundreds or thousands of new staff at a wide range of skill levels, and so perhaps many people who are currently “earning to give” should move into these “affector” or “effector” roles (as well as those mentioned above, in other relevant parts of national governments). I’m also curious whether 80,000 Hours has considered diplomatic roles—I couldn’t find much on a cursory search.
See also: Teaching as Task Y?
This framing is not quite right, because it implies that there’s a clean division of labour between thinkers and doers. A better claim would be: “we have a bunch of thinkers, now we need a bunch of thinker-doers”.
There’s a new center in the Department of State, dedicated to the diplomacy surrounding new and emerging tech. This seems like great place for Americans to go and work, if they’re interested in arms control in relation to AI and emerging technology.
Confusingly, it’s called the “Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies (CSET)”. So we now have to distinguish the State CSET from the Georgetown one—the “Centre for Security and Emerging Technology”.
Thanks for this.
I’ve also been thinking about similar things—e.g. about how there might be a lot of useful things EAs could do in diplomatic roles, and how an 80k career profile on diplomatic roles could be useful. This has partly been sparked by thinking about nuclear risk.
Hopefully in the coming months I’ll write up some relevant thoughts of my own on this and talk to some people. And this shortform post has given me a little extra boost of inclination to do so.
[Maybe a bit of a tangent]
A Brookings article argues that (among other things):
A key priority for the Biden administration should be to rebuild the State Department’s arms control workforce, as its current workforce is ageing and there have been struggles with recruiting and retaining younger talent
Another key priority should be “responding to the growing anti-satellite threat to U.S. and allies’ space systems”. This should be tackled by, among other things:
“tak[ing] steps to revitalize America’s space security diplomacy”
“consider[ing] ways to expand space security consultations with allies and partners, and promote norms of behavior that can advance the security and sustainability of the outer space environment”
(Note: It’s not totally clear to me whether this part of the article is solely about anti-satellite threats or about a broader range of space-related issues.)
This updated me a little bit further towards thinking it might be useful:
for more EAs to go into diplomacy and/or arms control
for EAs to do more to support other efforts to improve diplomacy and/or arms control (e.g., via directing funding to good existing work on these fronts)
Here’s the part of the article which is most relevant to point 1:
Another relevant one in the US Dept of State.