in that some of the foundational values embedded in Peter Singer’s writings (e.g. The Life You Can Save) strike me as redistributive commitments.
One thing to note is that redistributive commitments flow from impartial utilitarianism as well as the weaker normative commitments that Singer espouses as a largely empirical claim about a) human psychology and b) the world we live in.
Singer’s strong principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”
Singer’s weak principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.”
I understood the outer framing of the drowning child etc as making not only normative claims about what’s right to do in the abstract but also empirical claims about the best way to apply those normative principles in the world we live in. I think the idea that existential risk is very bad and that we are morally compelled to stop it if we aren’t sacrificing things of comparable moral significance[1] is fully consistent with Singerian notions.
[1] or that both existential risk and present suffering is morally significant, so choosing one over the other is superergoatory under Singer’s principles, but not necessarily under classical utilitarianism.
One thing to note is that redistributive commitments flow from impartial utilitarianism as well as the weaker normative commitments that Singer espouses as a largely empirical claim about a) human psychology and b) the world we live in.
I understood the outer framing of the drowning child etc as making not only normative claims about what’s right to do in the abstract but also empirical claims about the best way to apply those normative principles in the world we live in. I think the idea that existential risk is very bad and that we are morally compelled to stop it if we aren’t sacrificing things of comparable moral significance[1] is fully consistent with Singerian notions.
[1] or that both existential risk and present suffering is morally significant, so choosing one over the other is superergoatory under Singer’s principles, but not necessarily under classical utilitarianism.