My apologies, and thanks for clarifying. I’m thinking in terms of impact-per-animal relative to alternatives like corporate campaigns. From your side, the emphasis seems to be that this could operate as a profit-making business and avoid relying on philanthropy.
In real-world execution terms, here are the barriers your proposal would face:
Industry incentives
Mexico is a net importer, not exporter, of poultry. USDA FAS (2023) states that Mexico imports ~20% of its poultry consumption, mainly from the U.S.
Mexican producers make more money domestically. Firms like Bachoco and Pilgrim’s Mexico face strong domestic demand, where consumers eat ~70 lbs of chicken per capita per year. There’s no surplus incentive to export north.
Politics and lobbying
U.S. producers (Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue) lobby heavily to protect domestic market share. Tyson alone spends about $2 million per year on lobbying. This is modest compared to tech or pharma but enormous relative to the rest of the poultry industry, giving it disproportionate influence over USDA trade and labeling rules (OpenSecrets). Even if Mexican poultry were eligible, U.S. trade policy has historically limited poultry imports (see anti-dumping disputes with China, Russia, etc.).
As mentioned before, Bachoco dominates poultry production in Mexico across Sonora and Sinaloa. It has been sanctioned for price-fixing collusion (COFECE, 2015) and maintains deep ties through government contracts and social programs (COFECE ruling, DIF Sonora)
That’s why I’ve kept my focus on the practical barriers. Big poultry on both sides shapes the rules.
My apologies, and thanks for clarifying. I’m thinking in terms of impact-per-animal relative to alternatives like corporate campaigns. From your side, the emphasis seems to be that this could operate as a profit-making business and avoid relying on philanthropy.
In real-world execution terms, here are the barriers your proposal would face:
Industry incentives
Mexico is a net importer, not exporter, of poultry. USDA FAS (2023) states that Mexico imports ~20% of its poultry consumption, mainly from the U.S.
Mexican producers make more money domestically. Firms like Bachoco and Pilgrim’s Mexico face strong domestic demand, where consumers eat ~70 lbs of chicken per capita per year. There’s no surplus incentive to export north.
Politics and lobbying
U.S. producers (Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue) lobby heavily to protect domestic market share. Tyson alone spends about $2 million per year on lobbying. This is modest compared to tech or pharma but enormous relative to the rest of the poultry industry, giving it disproportionate influence over USDA trade and labeling rules (OpenSecrets). Even if Mexican poultry were eligible, U.S. trade policy has historically limited poultry imports (see anti-dumping disputes with China, Russia, etc.).
As mentioned before, Bachoco dominates poultry production in Mexico across Sonora and Sinaloa. It has been sanctioned for price-fixing collusion (COFECE, 2015) and maintains deep ties through government contracts and social programs (COFECE ruling, DIF Sonora)
That’s why I’ve kept my focus on the practical barriers. Big poultry on both sides shapes the rules.