Thanks for reading and commenting. I agree with some of your takes, some of which are in the post but some points of disagreement or at least partial disagreement.
”Less cost-effective”- this could operate at a profit and avoid taking philanthropic funds. So it wouldn’t compete with other interventions. So even if it was less impactful in terms of welfare, I think it would be more cost-effective.
Existing local producers- I would be happy if they entered this market or if new producers did-I don’t think my proposal of export-oriented humane chicken would affect current local producers in any negative way- mexico currently exports almost no chicken to the united states.
Elasticity- you cite the same sources in my post. the big questions are do you feel bad about chickens raised in “humane farms” being born or not? and what is the humane chicken own-price elasticity- I extrapolated from poultry in general but it could be higher or lower.
My apologies, and thanks for clarifying. I’m thinking in terms of impact-per-animal relative to alternatives like corporate campaigns. From your side, the emphasis seems to be that this could operate as a profit-making business and avoid relying on philanthropy.
In real-world execution terms, here are the barriers your proposal would face:
Industry incentives
Mexico is a net importer, not exporter, of poultry. USDA FAS (2023) states that Mexico imports ~20% of its poultry consumption, mainly from the U.S.
Mexican producers make more money domestically. Firms like Bachoco and Pilgrim’s Mexico face strong domestic demand, where consumers eat ~70 lbs of chicken per capita per year. There’s no surplus incentive to export north.
Politics and lobbying
U.S. producers (Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue) lobby heavily to protect domestic market share. Tyson alone spends about $2 million per year on lobbying. This is modest compared to tech or pharma but enormous relative to the rest of the poultry industry, giving it disproportionate influence over USDA trade and labeling rules (OpenSecrets). Even if Mexican poultry were eligible, U.S. trade policy has historically limited poultry imports (see anti-dumping disputes with China, Russia, etc.).
As mentioned before, Bachoco dominates poultry production in Mexico across Sonora and Sinaloa. It has been sanctioned for price-fixing collusion (COFECE, 2015) and maintains deep ties through government contracts and social programs (COFECE ruling, DIF Sonora)
That’s why I’ve kept my focus on the practical barriers. Big poultry on both sides shapes the rules.
Thanks for reading and commenting. I agree with some of your takes, some of which are in the post but some points of disagreement or at least partial disagreement.
”Less cost-effective”- this could operate at a profit and avoid taking philanthropic funds. So it wouldn’t compete with other interventions. So even if it was less impactful in terms of welfare, I think it would be more cost-effective.
Existing local producers- I would be happy if they entered this market or if new producers did-I don’t think my proposal of export-oriented humane chicken would affect current local producers in any negative way- mexico currently exports almost no chicken to the united states.
Elasticity- you cite the same sources in my post. the big questions are do you feel bad about chickens raised in “humane farms” being born or not? and what is the humane chicken own-price elasticity- I extrapolated from poultry in general but it could be higher or lower.
My apologies, and thanks for clarifying. I’m thinking in terms of impact-per-animal relative to alternatives like corporate campaigns. From your side, the emphasis seems to be that this could operate as a profit-making business and avoid relying on philanthropy.
In real-world execution terms, here are the barriers your proposal would face:
Industry incentives
Mexico is a net importer, not exporter, of poultry. USDA FAS (2023) states that Mexico imports ~20% of its poultry consumption, mainly from the U.S.
Mexican producers make more money domestically. Firms like Bachoco and Pilgrim’s Mexico face strong domestic demand, where consumers eat ~70 lbs of chicken per capita per year. There’s no surplus incentive to export north.
Politics and lobbying
U.S. producers (Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue) lobby heavily to protect domestic market share. Tyson alone spends about $2 million per year on lobbying. This is modest compared to tech or pharma but enormous relative to the rest of the poultry industry, giving it disproportionate influence over USDA trade and labeling rules (OpenSecrets). Even if Mexican poultry were eligible, U.S. trade policy has historically limited poultry imports (see anti-dumping disputes with China, Russia, etc.).
As mentioned before, Bachoco dominates poultry production in Mexico across Sonora and Sinaloa. It has been sanctioned for price-fixing collusion (COFECE, 2015) and maintains deep ties through government contracts and social programs (COFECE ruling, DIF Sonora)
That’s why I’ve kept my focus on the practical barriers. Big poultry on both sides shapes the rules.