But there is a difference between “we, current humans, can’t justifiably prefer any action over another” and “no one, in any hypothetical situation, is justified in c-preferring any action over any other”. Didn’t he mean that we, specifically, are in such a situation, but it’s not impossible, at least in theory, for some impartial altruistic minds to avoid this kind of ubiquitous cluelessness? (See related comment.)
In theory, yes. I don’t believe that he is hopeless that someone, someday, could figure out a way out of this problem (in fact I have my own reasons for thinking we already can), but DiGiovanni seems to believe that assuming someone else will figure it out is “punting to the future,” and an unfounded assumption. We may hope that someone will, but do we have a justified, outcome-based reason for assuming that someone else will? The argument says no.
One could also assume that no one ever will, but that they would if they were in an implausibly simple decision situation. Unconditional cluelessness is more radical than “no one will ever have a justified c-pref in the real world” (which is itself more radical than expansive cluelessness).
You’re right, they could assume that no one will figure it out. Do you have an implausibly simple decision situation in mind? I’m not convinced by the one in the story.
Hence the problem of unconditional cluelessness. And, yes it’s possible that it’s an unanswerable problem. DiGiovanni and the other judges are hoping it’s not.
But there is a difference between “we, current humans, can’t justifiably prefer any action over another” and “no one, in any hypothetical situation, is justified in c-preferring any action over any other”. Didn’t he mean that we, specifically, are in such a situation, but it’s not impossible, at least in theory, for some impartial altruistic minds to avoid this kind of ubiquitous cluelessness? (See related comment.)
In theory, yes. I don’t believe that he is hopeless that someone, someday, could figure out a way out of this problem (in fact I have my own reasons for thinking we already can), but DiGiovanni seems to believe that assuming someone else will figure it out is “punting to the future,” and an unfounded assumption. We may hope that someone will, but do we have a justified, outcome-based reason for assuming that someone else will? The argument says no.
One could also assume that no one ever will, but that they would if they were in an implausibly simple decision situation. Unconditional cluelessness is more radical than “no one will ever have a justified c-pref in the real world” (which is itself more radical than expansive cluelessness).
You’re right, they could assume that no one will figure it out. Do you have an implausibly simple decision situation in mind? I’m not convinced by the one in the story.
Hence the problem of unconditional cluelessness. And, yes it’s possible that it’s an unanswerable problem. DiGiovanni and the other judges are hoping it’s not.
I think that’s why they’re having the contest.