“Exactly,” Tony says. “I like to call this conclusion unconditional cluelessness: the view according to which no one, in any hypothetical situation, is justified in c-preferring any action over any other. No one buys this view, except perhaps some Pyrrhonian skeptics who suspend judgment on everything.[3] And this is clearly not the conclusion DiGiovanni meant to defend.”
It may surprise you to hear that I myself stopped reading before the train left the first station, because I do think, in part, that this is the conclusion which DiGiovanni is defending. The unawareness argument does clearly state that no two actions can be c-preferred based on a framework of outcomes alone.
For everyone who stayed on the train, there is a hidden assumption, value, or belief which caused you to stay on board, something other than “outcomes,” alone. DiGiovanni is not necessarily saying that we should hold this view, but his goal is to present the unawareness problem as a justification on behalf of the Pyrrhonian skeptics.
DiGiovanni is not saying, “be a Pyrrhonian skeptic,” but he’s asking us to examine why we think that we shouldn’t be. And it’s a genuine question—I think that they are hosting this competition because he does not want to be a skeptic, he does not want to get off at the first station—but the logic of the unawareness argument compels him to believe that he must. DiGiovanni is the man who hesitated, and then stepped off at that first station—and now he’s asking you why you stayed on.
(P.S. I did end up reading the whole story, and it was very well written and a great read. My previous belief stands, though.)
Fwiw, I think DiGiovanni would happily press a button that, with certainty, removes all unwanted suffering from the universe forever and keeps all else equal. (This could be a first station on another train.)
Do you think it’s conceptually realistic to remove all suffering and keep everything else the same? And if so, how would you define suffering?
The only way I can see things as being all-identical save for the elimination of suffering, is to remove the conscious experience of suffering—to remove consciousness. Do you think that that would be ideal?
Conceptually, yes. In practice, of course not. Surely you can conceptually imagine removing the conscious experience of suffering without removing the rest. I’ve encountered many thought experiments that are hard to imagine, but that’s really not one of them.
I suppose I don’t see that as a better world, then. We feel pain because it gives meaning to the things that we’ve lost. When I lose a loved one, I feel pain, I suffer that loss, but that’s because I wish they were still here. I think it would be a shame to lose that feeling. Or are you suggesting that there would be no death? Because that sounds like a very different world, to me.
Unwanted by you, I guess. Whatever makes you accept the thought experiment and agree that the button should be pushed. This was the point of this discussion.
But there is a difference between “we, current humans, can’t justifiably prefer any action over another” and “no one, in any hypothetical situation, is justified in c-preferring any action over any other”. Didn’t he mean that we, specifically, are in such a situation, but it’s not impossible, at least in theory, for some impartial altruistic minds to avoid this kind of ubiquitous cluelessness? (See related comment.)
In theory, yes. I don’t believe that he is hopeless that someone, someday, could figure out a way out of this problem (in fact I have my own reasons for thinking we already can), but DiGiovanni seems to believe that assuming someone else will figure it out is “punting to the future,” and an unfounded assumption. We may hope that someone will, but do we have a justified, outcome-based reason for assuming that someone else will? The argument says no.
One could also assume that no one ever will, but that they would if they were in an implausibly simple decision situation. Unconditional cluelessness is more radical than “no one will ever have a justified c-pref in the real world” (which is itself more radical than expansive cluelessness).
You’re right, they could assume that no one will figure it out. Do you have an implausibly simple decision situation in mind? I’m not convinced by the one in the story.
Hence the problem of unconditional cluelessness. And, yes it’s possible that it’s an unanswerable problem. DiGiovanni and the other judges are hoping it’s not.
It may surprise you to hear that I myself stopped reading before the train left the first station, because I do think, in part, that this is the conclusion which DiGiovanni is defending. The unawareness argument does clearly state that no two actions can be c-preferred based on a framework of outcomes alone.
For everyone who stayed on the train, there is a hidden assumption, value, or belief which caused you to stay on board, something other than “outcomes,” alone. DiGiovanni is not necessarily saying that we should hold this view, but his goal is to present the unawareness problem as a justification on behalf of the Pyrrhonian skeptics.
DiGiovanni is not saying, “be a Pyrrhonian skeptic,” but he’s asking us to examine why we think that we shouldn’t be. And it’s a genuine question—I think that they are hosting this competition because he does not want to be a skeptic, he does not want to get off at the first station—but the logic of the unawareness argument compels him to believe that he must. DiGiovanni is the man who hesitated, and then stepped off at that first station—and now he’s asking you why you stayed on.
(P.S. I did end up reading the whole story, and it was very well written and a great read. My previous belief stands, though.)
Fwiw, I think DiGiovanni would happily press a button that, with certainty, removes all unwanted suffering from the universe forever and keeps all else equal. (This could be a first station on another train.)
(P.S. Thanks!)
Do you think it’s conceptually realistic to remove all suffering and keep everything else the same? And if so, how would you define suffering?
The only way I can see things as being all-identical save for the elimination of suffering, is to remove the conscious experience of suffering—to remove consciousness. Do you think that that would be ideal?
Conceptually, yes. In practice, of course not. Surely you can conceptually imagine removing the conscious experience of suffering without removing the rest. I’ve encountered many thought experiments that are hard to imagine, but that’s really not one of them.
I suppose I don’t see that as a better world, then. We feel pain because it gives meaning to the things that we’ve lost. When I lose a loved one, I feel pain, I suffer that loss, but that’s because I wish they were still here. I think it would be a shame to lose that feeling. Or are you suggesting that there would be no death? Because that sounds like a very different world, to me.
I wrote “unwanted suffering” to precisely avoid this kind of reply. 😆
Unwanted by whom? Does everyone get to decide for themselves when they feel suffering, and when they don’t?
Unwanted by you, I guess. Whatever makes you accept the thought experiment and agree that the button should be pushed. This was the point of this discussion.
But there is a difference between “we, current humans, can’t justifiably prefer any action over another” and “no one, in any hypothetical situation, is justified in c-preferring any action over any other”. Didn’t he mean that we, specifically, are in such a situation, but it’s not impossible, at least in theory, for some impartial altruistic minds to avoid this kind of ubiquitous cluelessness? (See related comment.)
In theory, yes. I don’t believe that he is hopeless that someone, someday, could figure out a way out of this problem (in fact I have my own reasons for thinking we already can), but DiGiovanni seems to believe that assuming someone else will figure it out is “punting to the future,” and an unfounded assumption. We may hope that someone will, but do we have a justified, outcome-based reason for assuming that someone else will? The argument says no.
One could also assume that no one ever will, but that they would if they were in an implausibly simple decision situation. Unconditional cluelessness is more radical than “no one will ever have a justified c-pref in the real world” (which is itself more radical than expansive cluelessness).
You’re right, they could assume that no one will figure it out. Do you have an implausibly simple decision situation in mind? I’m not convinced by the one in the story.
Hence the problem of unconditional cluelessness. And, yes it’s possible that it’s an unanswerable problem. DiGiovanni and the other judges are hoping it’s not.
I think that’s why they’re having the contest.