This will be controversial, but I think that another consideration for this question has to be to interrogate why we consider our future selves deserving of current sacrifice. If you accept the reductionist account of self-hood as being merely psychological continuity, not as a constant, the case for actions that affect your future self being justified on self-interested grounds becomes less tenable. Instead, something like saving for retirement becomes more and more like saving for someone else’s retirement, the greater the gap.
I think the instinctive, common sense case for retirement savings is something like “prudence”, which isn’t a moral concept really. It’s more “you’ll regret it if you don’t”. So, sure, maybe save if you are retiring in 5-10 years. But beyond that? No.
This will be controversial, but I think that another consideration for this question has to be to interrogate why we consider our future selves deserving of current sacrifice. If you accept the reductionist account of self-hood as being merely psychological continuity, not as a constant, the case for actions that affect your future self being justified on self-interested grounds becomes less tenable. Instead, something like saving for retirement becomes more and more like saving for someone else’s retirement, the greater the gap.
I think the instinctive, common sense case for retirement savings is something like “prudence”, which isn’t a moral concept really. It’s more “you’ll regret it if you don’t”. So, sure, maybe save if you are retiring in 5-10 years. But beyond that? No.
Just something to consider in addition to TAI.
Love this Dylan and completely agree