Call me naive but your argument doesnât go through for me. You write...
As in mathematics and logic, rational intuition is ultimately my yardstick for determining the truth of a proposition. I think it self-evident that the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other and that a greater good should be preferred to a lesser good. As for what that good is, everything comes down to pleasure on reflection.
So your standard for adjudicating the âtruthâ of propositions is your ârational intuitionâ. You think your position âself-evidentâ but what about others? How do you view their objections? Are they simply feeble attempts to pull you to the dark side or may they also be interpreted as evidence against the âself-evidenceâ of your intuition? Later you writeâŠ
Most of these people are under the pernicious influence of âcommon-sense moralityâ, which tells them that they have few positive duties toward others.
How is your claim to âcorrectnessâ different from theirs? Is it not conceivable that you may also be âunder the pernicious influence of a utilitarian moralityâ? How do you ground your theory in a way that precludes this possibility? If you claim to have the ârightâ definition and the ârightâ standard for judging ethical behavior, you better continue to challenge and evaluate it so as to continuously produce evidence that maintains its warranted assertibility beyond a reasonable doubt, wouldnât you agree? Otherwise, what makes your belief âtruerâ than, for example, catholic dogma?
P.S.: I have nothing against considering utilitarianism as an informative theory for guiding ethical behavior, I just think we should remain reasonable about the claims we make and curious and humble about the positions we advocate for. I donât know you personally or your positions in detail but based on the thrust of your comments, I felt it important to raise this point.
I donât consider the intuitions of adherents to competing moral theories to be strong evidence against the detailed, painstaking process of reflection that I and other utilitarians have been through. I also think that utilitarianism best accommodates and explains our common-sense moral intuitions, as Sidgwick argued in detail. Therefore, there is not as much disagreement between the broad mass of people and utilitarians as there might seem to be at first glance. Those who have invented ârightsâ and âvirtuesâ out of thin air have much more serious disagreements with common-sense morality, which is a problem for them.
If most people thought that an object can simultaneously be red and green all over, their intuitions here wouldnât be strong evidence against the fact that this is self-evidently absurd. For many centuries, Europeans rejected the idea that you could work with negative numbers. In cultures where negative numbers were being used, I donât think this disagreement would have been good evidence against the self-evidence of negative numbers being useful in mathematics.
I fully accept that others can say similar things to me. That is fine. To use the example from your other post, you can say that itâs self-evident that Alice should take the morphine; I will say that it would be self-evidently wrong of Alice to deprive Bob of such a special experience. All utilitarians can do is trust that, in time, reason will prevail. Pinker and Singer have both written about this. This is why we have been ahead of our time, while Kantâs views, for example, on various object-level issues are recognised as having been horribly wrong.
It is certainly conceivable that I am âunder the pernicious influence of utilitarianismâ, in which case I would by default become a nihilist and abandon any attempt to reduce the suffering of sentient beings.
It is certainly conceivable that I am âunder the pernicious influence of utilitarianismâ, in which case I would by default become a nihilist and abandon any attempt to reduce the suffering of sentient beings.
You certainly lost me here. All I am asking for is humility regarding our ability to âknowâ things, in particular regarding ethics. Every part of your argument could have been made by catholic dogmatists, who have likely engaged for much longer and deeper in painstaking reflection. For me that would be a worrying sign but I certainly did not intend for this contemplation of our own fallibility to drive you into not caring about other sentient beings. I think the parent post makes a good case for caring about lots of things we value.
Catholics make empirical claims about the natural world. Logical and moral truths do not fit into that category, so I disagree with the comparison.
The parent post makes no case whatsoever for caring about the things we value! All it does is assert that we ought to value everything that we already care emotionally about. Why should we act on everything we care emotionally about? How do we know that everything we care about is worth acting on? More humility may be required in all quarters!
Donât worry, I still aim to maximise the well-being of all sentient beings because I think the very nature of pleasure gives me strong reason to want to increase it and that there are no other facts about the universe which give me similar reasons for action. The table in front of me certainly doesnât. âVirtuesâ and ârightsâ are man-made fictions, not facts. Conscious experiences in general seem like a better bet, but the ârednessâ of an object also doesnât give me reason to act. It is only valenced experiences which do. Hypothetically, though, were I to reject utilitarianism, I would by default become a nihilist precisely because I am humble about our ability to know things! I might still care about the suffering of sentient beings, but my caring about something is not a reason to act on it. Parfit is very good on this.
I think you are misrepresenting a few things here.
First, Catholics talk a lot about ethics. Please come up with a better excuse to brush away the critique I made. I am almost offended by the laziness of your argument.
Second, you are misrepresenting the post. It does not assert that we should âvalue everything that we already care emotionally aboutâ. It argues for reflecting about what values we actually hold dear and have good reason to hold dear. This stands in contrast to your position, which amounts to arguing for a premature closing of this process of reflection by deferring to the supremacy of welfare under all circumstances and for all time.
Besides those misrepresentations, I think there is value in discussing reasons for actions and reflecting about values and my hope is you will stay open to this in the future. I personally feel drawn to a critical pragmatist perspective and I believe that at some point we could have a nice discussion about it. There are certainly other perspectives besides utilitarianism that are worth discussing. All I want to do, is to encourage you to keep an open mind.
It wasnât clear which aspect of Catholic dogma you were referring to. Catholic claims about ethics seem to crucially depend on a bunch of empirical claims that they make. Even so, I view such claims as just a subset of claims about ethics that depend on our intuitions.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
I am always very happy to examine the plural goods that some say they value, but which I do not, and see whether convergence is possible.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
I am only disappointed if you stop reflecting and questioning your position based on the situations you find yourself in and start to pursue it as dogma that cannot be questioned. I donât face the same concern as I am committed to continue on my open-minded and open-ended quest to better understand what it means to do good in particular situations and to act accordingly. In that sense, I am not âjustâ value pluralist nor a monist but agnostic as to what any particular situation may demand of me.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
Just because one is moral anti-realist doesnât mean one is automatically a nihilist. The post argues for Valuism and suggests there can be more than moral reasons for acting such as biological or psychological reasons. One may even argue that these are primary. But I guess thatâs bound to become too long of a conversation for this thread. I tried to make my case and I hope we both got something out of it.
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
I do not think biological and psychological âreasonsâ are actually reasons, but youâre right that this gets us into a separate meta-ethical discussion. Thank you for the discussion!
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
If you read what I have written, you will see that I am not taking a dogmatic position but simply advocate for staying open-minded when approaching a situation. I tried to describe that as trying to be âagnosticâ about the outcome of engaging with a situation. Itâs not my goal to predict the outcome in advance but to work towards a satisfying resolution of the situation at hand. I would argue that this is the opposite of a dogmatic position but I acknowledge that my use of the term âagnosticâ may have been confusing here.
Thank you as well, it was thought provoking and helped me reflect my own positions.
Call me naive but your argument doesnât go through for me. You write...
So your standard for adjudicating the âtruthâ of propositions is your ârational intuitionâ. You think your position âself-evidentâ but what about others? How do you view their objections? Are they simply feeble attempts to pull you to the dark side or may they also be interpreted as evidence against the âself-evidenceâ of your intuition? Later you writeâŠ
How is your claim to âcorrectnessâ different from theirs? Is it not conceivable that you may also be âunder the pernicious influence of a utilitarian moralityâ? How do you ground your theory in a way that precludes this possibility? If you claim to have the ârightâ definition and the ârightâ standard for judging ethical behavior, you better continue to challenge and evaluate it so as to continuously produce evidence that maintains its warranted assertibility beyond a reasonable doubt, wouldnât you agree? Otherwise, what makes your belief âtruerâ than, for example, catholic dogma?
P.S.: I have nothing against considering utilitarianism as an informative theory for guiding ethical behavior, I just think we should remain reasonable about the claims we make and curious and humble about the positions we advocate for. I donât know you personally or your positions in detail but based on the thrust of your comments, I felt it important to raise this point.
I donât consider the intuitions of adherents to competing moral theories to be strong evidence against the detailed, painstaking process of reflection that I and other utilitarians have been through. I also think that utilitarianism best accommodates and explains our common-sense moral intuitions, as Sidgwick argued in detail. Therefore, there is not as much disagreement between the broad mass of people and utilitarians as there might seem to be at first glance. Those who have invented ârightsâ and âvirtuesâ out of thin air have much more serious disagreements with common-sense morality, which is a problem for them.
If most people thought that an object can simultaneously be red and green all over, their intuitions here wouldnât be strong evidence against the fact that this is self-evidently absurd. For many centuries, Europeans rejected the idea that you could work with negative numbers. In cultures where negative numbers were being used, I donât think this disagreement would have been good evidence against the self-evidence of negative numbers being useful in mathematics.
I fully accept that others can say similar things to me. That is fine. To use the example from your other post, you can say that itâs self-evident that Alice should take the morphine; I will say that it would be self-evidently wrong of Alice to deprive Bob of such a special experience. All utilitarians can do is trust that, in time, reason will prevail. Pinker and Singer have both written about this. This is why we have been ahead of our time, while Kantâs views, for example, on various object-level issues are recognised as having been horribly wrong.
It is certainly conceivable that I am âunder the pernicious influence of utilitarianismâ, in which case I would by default become a nihilist and abandon any attempt to reduce the suffering of sentient beings.
You certainly lost me here. All I am asking for is humility regarding our ability to âknowâ things, in particular regarding ethics. Every part of your argument could have been made by catholic dogmatists, who have likely engaged for much longer and deeper in painstaking reflection. For me that would be a worrying sign but I certainly did not intend for this contemplation of our own fallibility to drive you into not caring about other sentient beings. I think the parent post makes a good case for caring about lots of things we value.
Catholics make empirical claims about the natural world. Logical and moral truths do not fit into that category, so I disagree with the comparison.
The parent post makes no case whatsoever for caring about the things we value! All it does is assert that we ought to value everything that we already care emotionally about. Why should we act on everything we care emotionally about? How do we know that everything we care about is worth acting on? More humility may be required in all quarters!
Donât worry, I still aim to maximise the well-being of all sentient beings because I think the very nature of pleasure gives me strong reason to want to increase it and that there are no other facts about the universe which give me similar reasons for action. The table in front of me certainly doesnât. âVirtuesâ and ârightsâ are man-made fictions, not facts. Conscious experiences in general seem like a better bet, but the ârednessâ of an object also doesnât give me reason to act. It is only valenced experiences which do. Hypothetically, though, were I to reject utilitarianism, I would by default become a nihilist precisely because I am humble about our ability to know things! I might still care about the suffering of sentient beings, but my caring about something is not a reason to act on it. Parfit is very good on this.
I think you are misrepresenting a few things here.
First, Catholics talk a lot about ethics. Please come up with a better excuse to brush away the critique I made. I am almost offended by the laziness of your argument.
Second, you are misrepresenting the post. It does not assert that we should âvalue everything that we already care emotionally aboutâ. It argues for reflecting about what values we actually hold dear and have good reason to hold dear. This stands in contrast to your position, which amounts to arguing for a premature closing of this process of reflection by deferring to the supremacy of welfare under all circumstances and for all time.
Besides those misrepresentations, I think there is value in discussing reasons for actions and reflecting about values and my hope is you will stay open to this in the future. I personally feel drawn to a critical pragmatist perspective and I believe that at some point we could have a nice discussion about it. There are certainly other perspectives besides utilitarianism that are worth discussing. All I want to do, is to encourage you to keep an open mind.
It wasnât clear which aspect of Catholic dogma you were referring to. Catholic claims about ethics seem to crucially depend on a bunch of empirical claims that they make. Even so, I view such claims as just a subset of claims about ethics that depend on our intuitions.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
I am always very happy to examine the plural goods that some say they value, but which I do not, and see whether convergence is possible.
I am only disappointed if you stop reflecting and questioning your position based on the situations you find yourself in and start to pursue it as dogma that cannot be questioned. I donât face the same concern as I am committed to continue on my open-minded and open-ended quest to better understand what it means to do good in particular situations and to act accordingly. In that sense, I am not âjustâ value pluralist nor a monist but agnostic as to what any particular situation may demand of me.
Just because one is moral anti-realist doesnât mean one is automatically a nihilist. The post argues for Valuism and suggests there can be more than moral reasons for acting such as biological or psychological reasons. One may even argue that these are primary. But I guess thatâs bound to become too long of a conversation for this thread. I tried to make my case and I hope we both got something out of it.
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
I do not think biological and psychological âreasonsâ are actually reasons, but youâre right that this gets us into a separate meta-ethical discussion. Thank you for the discussion!
If you read what I have written, you will see that I am not taking a dogmatic position but simply advocate for staying open-minded when approaching a situation. I tried to describe that as trying to be âagnosticâ about the outcome of engaging with a situation. Itâs not my goal to predict the outcome in advance but to work towards a satisfying resolution of the situation at hand. I would argue that this is the opposite of a dogmatic position but I acknowledge that my use of the term âagnosticâ may have been confusing here.
Thank you as well, it was thought provoking and helped me reflect my own positions.