the evolution towards something complex [after human extinction] is not a certainty but since so much of longtermism rests on tiny probabilities, shouldnāt we be factoring in the probability associated with this too
Note that this is one of the āexogenous nullifying eventsā that Tarsneyās model incorporates. The mere possibility that human survival isnāt needed to secure a far-future flourishing civilization does not by itself undermine the claim that human survival improves the odds of better longterm outcomes. (But itās generally true that the higher the chances you place on such positive ānullificationā, the less expected value you should assign to existential risk mitigation.)
Thanks for the comment. It is true the positive ENEs are part of the Tarsney model but there is no value assigned to the counterfactual scenario there (implicitly the value is 0). In fact, ENEs are relevant to the model insofar as they represent events that that nullify the extinction risk mitigation effort. There is no consideration of the future possibility of such scenarios and how that might diverge from the one where humanityās existence continues.
It is quite possible that human survival āimproves the oddsā of better outcomes as you say, but I am curious if there has been a more comprehensive exploration of this question. Has there been an analysis examining the likelihood of post-extinction life forms and consideration of the various evolution scenarios? In the absence of that, this seems rather hand-wavy claim and while that is not in and of itself a reason to reject something, the case for longtermism needs either (a) a less rigorous argument that the overall probability distribution for intervention is favorable and not just expected value or (b) a fairly robust argument that at least the expected value is higher.
Note that this is one of the āexogenous nullifying eventsā that Tarsneyās model incorporates. The mere possibility that human survival isnāt needed to secure a far-future flourishing civilization does not by itself undermine the claim that human survival improves the odds of better longterm outcomes. (But itās generally true that the higher the chances you place on such positive ānullificationā, the less expected value you should assign to existential risk mitigation.)
Thanks for the comment. It is true the positive ENEs are part of the Tarsney model but there is no value assigned to the counterfactual scenario there (implicitly the value is 0). In fact, ENEs are relevant to the model insofar as they represent events that that nullify the extinction risk mitigation effort. There is no consideration of the future possibility of such scenarios and how that might diverge from the one where humanityās existence continues.
It is quite possible that human survival āimproves the oddsā of better outcomes as you say, but I am curious if there has been a more comprehensive exploration of this question. Has there been an analysis examining the likelihood of post-extinction life forms and consideration of the various evolution scenarios? In the absence of that, this seems rather hand-wavy claim and while that is not in and of itself a reason to reject something, the case for longtermism needs either (a) a less rigorous argument that the overall probability distribution for intervention is favorable and not just expected value or (b) a fairly robust argument that at least the expected value is higher.