Venky1024

• Venky1024 28 Nov 2024 7:59 UTC

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  on: Mean­ingfully re­duc­ing meat con­sump­tion is an un­solved prob­lem: meta-analysis

  Thanks for sharing the details of this research - it is very valuable towards arriving at an accurate assessment of various interventions.

  One question with regard to the methodology of these RCTs is when and for how long did they record the consumption pattern of the participants following the intervention? Specifically, do we have any insights on short-term vs long-term impact of such interventions focused on behavioral change?

  Also, I understand that you report the results as SMD. However, it is quite likely that there is a small minority in the treatment group in these interventions that probably contribute to most of the difference that is observed. Do we know anything about the percentage of individuals who are likely to make considerable changes to their dietary patterns based on these interventions?

• Venky1024 12 May 2024 5:58 UTC

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  in reply to: Richard Y Chappell🔸’s comment on: Vague jus­tifi­ca­tions for longter­mist as­sump­tions?

  Thanks for the comment. It is true the positive ENEs are part of the Tarsney model but there is no value assigned to the counterfactual scenario there (implicitly the value is 0). In fact, ENEs are relevant to the model insofar as they represent events that that nullify the extinction risk mitigation effort. There is no consideration of the future possibility of such scenarios and how that might diverge from the one where humanity’s existence continues.

  It is quite possible that human survival “improves the odds” of better outcomes as you say, but I am curious if there has been a more comprehensive exploration of this question. Has there been an analysis examining the likelihood of post-extinction life forms and consideration of the various evolution scenarios? In the absence of that, this seems rather hand-wavy claim and while that is not in and of itself a reason to reject something, the case for longtermism needs either (a) a less rigorous argument that the overall probability distribution for intervention is favorable and not just expected value or (b) a fairly robust argument that at least the expected value is higher.

• Venky1024 12 May 2024 5:17 UTC

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  in reply to: Ryan Greenblatt’s comment on: Vague jus­tifi­ca­tions for longter­mist as­sump­tions?

  I’ve heard this point being made elsewhere too but I am not sure I fully understand that. What exactly are the values on reflection you are referring to here? Is it values that is typically shared by those with a utilitarian bent or other philosophical schools that focus roughly on the well-being of all beings that are capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. A value system that is not narrowly focused on maximization for a minority at the exclusion of others?

  Now even in the real world the systems are setup in clear violation of such principles which is part of the reason for inequality, exploitation, marginalization etc. And while one may argue that over centuries we would become more enlightened to collectively recognize these evils, it is not entirely obvious we would eliminate them.

  In any event, why do we assume that a different advanced civilization (especially one arising post-extinction from some of our common ancestors) would not converge to something like it especially since we recognize that our source of empathy and cooperation that form the basis for more sophisticated altruistic goals have played a role in our survival as a species?

  Maybe I am missing something but even probabilistically speaking why assume one is more likely than the other?

• Venky1024 12 May 2024 5:06 UTC

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  in reply to: Ryan Greenblatt’s comment on: Vague jus­tifi­ca­tions for longter­mist as­sump­tions?

  Interesting considerations and if one accepts that these developments will happen within about 500 years from now, then that sets the upper bound for when the entire extinction risk events will occur in the future?

Vague jus­tifi­ca­tions for longter­mist as­sump­tions?

• Venky1024 27 Apr 2024 14:33 UTC

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  in reply to: Bella’s comment on: What is ve­g­anism any­way?

  Is there any empirical evidence to back up the claim that following the conventional definition of veganism leads to greater overall harm reduction rather than thinking in more consequential terms ? Also, unless I am mistaken, the utilitarian argument for rule-of-thumb applies in a context where we are either faced with an inability to determine the right course of action (owing to uncertainties in estimates of potential outcomes, say) or when the decision that emerges from such a calculation runs strongly counter to common sense.

  I don’t believe either is the case with the definition of veganism. It is not common-sensical to avoid products with trace elements of animal ingredients for example.

• Venky1024 27 Apr 2024 3:13 UTC

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  in reply to: Bella’s comment on: What is ve­g­anism any­way?

  Thanks for the comment. I suspect there are a couple of distinct elements that have been conflated in your arguments that I will try to disentangle.

  As far as practical considerations in the context of personal changes to limit harm towards animals go, I not only agree with you that first-order veganism is sensible, it is also one of the key reasons why I am a 99% first-order vegan. Forget animals, I am just being kind to myself and eliminating decision fatigue by following a simple rule that says : animal products, no go. It just makes things so much more convenient and I would certainly recommend that to others too.

  However, practical strategies, mental tricks and hacks should not be mistaken for ethical principles. I am sure you will agree that the latter requires reasoning and justification not subjected to the whims of mental hacks. If the community reifies those practical steps as a core component of the ethical baseline to be considered an adequate supporter/​defender of animal welfare, then it is clearly drifting away from the primary considerations that brought it together in the first place.

• Venky1024 26 Apr 2024 13:55 UTC

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  in reply to: Alexander David’s comment on: What is ve­g­anism any­way?

  Thanks for the response. You’ve summarised the post very well except that, more than limiting intellectual freedom, the convention definition leads to excessive focus on purity at the first-order at the expense of broad utilitarian considerations (think of all the vitriol that vegans throw at deserters which is so irrational).

  As for your view that without the solidarity, the veganism would not be what it is today, I am not entirely convinced. To be clear, the community of interest in this discussion is the animal advocacy one and not vegans per se (notwithstanding the fact the two of them intersect almost completely). Here are some counter-arguments to consider:

  1. Animal advocates are likely to be first-order vegans or very close to it anyway. If one voluntarily chooses to make lifestyle changes based on concern for animal suffering, then one is likely to go to significant lengths to avoid animal products. Not everyone may go the same distance but that’s okay (or so I think).

  2. Peter Singer the philosopher who arguably has the greatest claim to influencing people on animal rights and liberation is not a strict vegan and in fact describes himself as being “flexible”. Yuval Harari is another person who is passionate about ending industrial agriculture of animals but describes himself as “vegan-ish”. If important thinkers who undoubtedly have a great influence on people refrain from using the word “vegan”, then why do you think that as a community animal advocates should not shed that label or loosen its definition?

  3. Conversely, taking vegan purity to the extreme, we have people like Gary Francione who are so opposed to any welfarist progress (regardless of its consequential value) and who insist that we should avoid meat alternatives because that normalizes the idea of consuming animals. I hope we can agree that that position is counterproductive.

  4. I may be extrapolating from personal experience but first-order veganism being as clearly defined (very arbitrary but very well-defined) gives adherents the sense that they are doing enough already and dilutes thinking along utilitarian lines (what if a vegan purist compares herself to someone who is 95% plant-based but convinces 3 people every month to reduce animal products by 50%).

  5. While on the one hand, vegans could be admired for being very committed to the cause, and inspire others to do the same, they may seen too distant which could work against people making changes that they otherwise may have been open to. Again, this is speculative and in general I think it cuts both ways.

• Venky1024 26 Apr 2024 13:00 UTC

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  in reply to: emre kaplan🔸’s comment on: What is ve­g­anism any­way?

  You may be slightly mistaken about what I am stating: the ambiguity is in the official definition even if it a sensible sounding one whereas the conventional definition is well-defined (‘no first-order consumption’) but arbitrary. The problem arises not so much from arbitrariness in and of itself, but rather demanding strict adherence to (and unwarranted focus on) something that isn’t well-justified to begin with. That leads to all sorts of contradictions.

  On the second point, I agree that the distinctions between the two examples are somewhat arbitrary. One may argue that perhaps animal-testing in many instances is unnecessary (turns out several are based on methods and assumptions that have been around for a century and have persisted more out of inertia despite no clear evaluation of their effectiveness) but conventional agriculture depends on pesticides but I wouldn’t find that argument very convincing.

• Venky1024 26 Apr 2024 0:35 UTC

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  in reply to: emre kaplan🔸’s comment on: What is ve­g­anism any­way?

  I am NOT disputing the harm to animals from eating or consuming animal products in any-way nor do I believe that the harm itself in some sense vague or poorly defined (on the contrary, there are very few things that stand out as clearly as that).

  The distinction I am trying to draw is between first-order or direct harm from a given action and the multiple indirect—second-order and beyond—ways in which that action can lead to suffering. In the conventional definition of veganism, the focus is almost entirely on the first-order effects especially when it relates to personal identification with the term “vegan”. This asymmetric focus happens at the expense of consequentialist considerations of our actions.

What is ve­g­anism any­way?

• Venky1024 1 Nov 2023 9:24 UTC

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  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: The Risks and Re­wards of Pri­ori­tiz­ing An­i­mals of Uncer­tain Sentience

  Not sure I follow this but doesn’t the very notion of stochastic dominance arise only when we have two distinct probability distributions? In this scenario the distribution of the outcomes is held fixed but the net expected utility is determined by weighing the outcomes based on other critera (such as risk aversion or aversion to no-difference).

• Venky1024 1 Nov 2023 9:19 UTC

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  in reply to: Lukas Finnveden’s comment on: The Risks and Re­wards of Pri­ori­tiz­ing An­i­mals of Uncer­tain Sentience

  Not sure I agree. Brian Tomasik’s post is less a general argument against the approach of EV maximization but more a demonstration of its misapplication in a context where expectation is computed across two distinct distributions of utility functions. As an aside, I also don’t see the relation between the primary argument being made there and the two-envelopes problem because the latter can be resolved by identifying a very clear mathematical flaw in the claim (that switching is better).

• Venky1024 27 Dec 2022 11:02 UTC

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  on: Rad­i­cal tac­tics can in­crease sup­port for more mod­er­ate groups

  This is a very interesting study and analysis.

  I was wondering what its implication would be for an area like animal rights/​welfare where the baseline support is likely to be considerably lower than that of climate change.

  If we assume that the polarization effect of radical activism holds true across other issues as well, then the fraction of people who become less supportive may be higher than those who have been persuaded to become more concerned (for the simple reason that to start with the the odds of people supporting even the more moderate animal rights positions would be rather low) .

  I reckon though that such simple extrapolation is fraught and there are other factors that will come into the picture when it comes to animal advocacy.

• Venky1024 27 Dec 2022 11:01 UTC

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  on: Rad­i­cal tac­tics can in­crease sup­port for more mod­er­ate groups

  This is a very interesting study and analysis!

  I was wondering what its implication would be for an area like animal rights/​welfare where the baseline support is likely to be considerably lower than that of climate change.

  If we assume that the polarization effect of radical activism holds true across other issues as well, then the fraction of people who become less supportive may be higher than those who have been persuaded to become more concerned (for the simple reason that to start with the the odds of people supporting even the more moderate animal rights positions would be rather low) .

  I reckon though that such simple extrapolation is fraught and there are other factors that will come into the picture when it comes to animal advocacy.

• Venky1024 14 Sep 2021 12:08 UTC

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  on: Am­bi­guity aver­sion and re­duc­tion of X-risks: A mod­el­ling situation

  I didn’t get the intuition behind the initial formulation:

  $EU\left(f\right)=\alpha {min}_{p\in C}{E}_{p}U\left(f\right)+(1-\alpha ){max}_{p\in C}{E}_{p}U\left(f\right)$

  What exactly is that supposed to represent? And what was the basis for assigning numbers to the contingency matrix in the two example cases you’ve considered?

• Venky1024 14 Sep 2021 3:54 UTC

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  in reply to: Marcel D’s comment on: Mag­ni­tude of un­cer­tainty with longtermism

  ...it seems like your argument is saying “(A) and (B) are both really hard to estimate, and they’re both really low likelihood—but neither is negligible. Thus, we can’t really know whether our interventions are helping. (With the implicit conclusion being: thus, we should be more skeptical about attempts to improve the long-term future)”

  Thanks, that is fairly accurate summary of one of the crucial points I am making except I would also add that the difficulty of estimation increases with time. And this is a major concern here because the case of longtermism rests precisely on there being greater and greater number of humans (and other sentient independent agents) as the horizon of time expands.

  Sometimes we can’t know the probability distribution of (A) vs. (B), but sometimes we can do better-than-nothing estimates, and for some things (e.g., some aspects of X-risk reduction) it seems reasonable to try.

  Fully agree that we should try but the case of longtermism remains rather weak until we have some estimates and bounds that can be reasonably justified.

• Venky1024 14 Sep 2021 3:48 UTC

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  in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: AI timelines and the­o­ret­i­cal un­der­stand­ing of deep learn­ing

  Great points again!
  I have only cursorily examined the links you’ve shared (bookmarked them for later) but I hope the central thrust of what I am saying does not depend too strongly on being closely familiar with the contents of those.

  A few clarifications are in order. I am really not sure about AGI timelines and that’s why I am reluctant to attach any probability to it. For instance, the only reason I believe that there is less than 50% chance that we will have AGI in the next 50 years is because we have not seen it yet and IMO it seems rather unlikely to me that the current directions will lead us there. But that is a very weak justification. What I do know is that there has to be some radical qualitative change for artificial agents to go from excelling in narrow tasks to developing general intelligence.

  That said, it may seem like nit-picking but I do want to draw the distinction between “not significant progress” and “no progress at all” towards AGI. Not only am I stating the former, I have no doubt that we have made incredible progress with algorithms in general. I am less convinced about how much those algorithms help us get closer towards an AGI. (In hindsight, it may turn out that our current deep learning approaches such as GANs contain path-breaking proto-AGI ideas /​principles, but I am unable to see it that way).

  If we consider a scale of 0-100 where 100 represents AGI attainment and 0 is some starting point in the 1950s, I have no clear idea whether the progress we’ve made thus far is close to 5 or 0.5 or even 0.05. I have no strong arguments to justify one or the other because I am way too uncertain about how far the final stage is.

  
  There can also be no question with respect to the other categories of progress that you have highlighted such as compute power and infrastructure and large datasets -indeed I see these as central to the remarkable performance we have come to witness with deep learning models.

  The perspective I have is that while acknowledging plenty of progress in understanding several processes in the brain such as signal propagation, mapping of specific sensory stimuli to neuronal activity, theories of how brain wiring at birth may have encoded several learning algorithms, they constitute piece-meal knowledge and they still seem quite a few strides removed the bigger question—how do we attain high level cognition, develop abstract thinking, be able to reason and solve complex mathematical problems ?

  Sorry if I’m misunderstanding.

  “isn’t there an infinite degree of freedom associated with a continuous function?”

  I’m a bit confused by this; are you saying that the only possible AGI algorithm is “the exact algorithm that the human brain runs”? The brain is wired up by a finite number of genes, right?

  I agree that we don’t necessarily have to reproduce the exact wiring or the functional relation in order to create a general intelligence (which is why I mentioned the equivalence classes).

  Finite number of genes implies finite steps/​information/​computation (and that is not disputable of course) but the number of potential wiring options in the brain and functional forms between input and output is exponentially large. (It is in principle, infinite, if we want to reproduce the exact function, but we both agree that that may not be necessary). Pure exploratory search may not be feasible and one may make the case that with appropriate priors and assuming some modular structure of the brain, the search space will reduce considerably, but still how much of a quantitative grip do we have on this? And how much rests on speculation?

• Venky1024 13 Sep 2021 16:27 UTC

  7 points

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  in reply to: alex lawsen’s comment on: Mag­ni­tude of un­cer­tainty with longtermism

  This is a very interesting paper and while it covers a lot of ground that I have described in the introduction, the actual cubic growth model used has a number of limitations, perhaps the most significant of which is the assumption that it considers the causal effect of an intervention to diminish over time and converge towards some inevitable state: more precisely it assumes $|P\left(S_t|A\right)-P\left(S_t|B\right)|\to 0$ as $t\to \infty$, where $S_t$ is some desirable future state and A and B are some distinct interventions at present.

  Please correct me if I am wrong about this.

  However, the introduction considers not just interventions fading out in terms of their ability to influence future events but often the sheer unpredictability of them. In fact, much like I did, the idea from chaos theory is cited:

  .… we know
  on theoretical grounds that complex systems can be extremely sensitive to initial
  conditions, such that very small changes produce very large differences in later con-
  ditions (Lorenz, 1963; Schuster and Just, 2006). If human societies exhibit this sort
  of “chaotic” behavior with respect to features that determine the long-term effects
  of our actions (to put it very roughly), then attempts to predictably influence the
  far future may be insuperably stymied by our inability to measure the present state
  of the world with arbitrary precision.

  But the model does not consider any of these cases.

  In any case, by the author’s own analysis ( which is based on a large number of assumptions), there are several scenarios where the outcome is not favorable to the longtermist.

  Again, interesting work, but this modeling framework is not very persuasive to begin with (regardless of which way the final results point to).

• Venky1024 13 Sep 2021 4:35 UTC

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  on: AI timelines and the­o­ret­i­cal un­der­stand­ing of deep learn­ing

  Several good points made by Linch, Aryeh and steve2512.

  As for making my skepticism more precise in terms of probability, it’s less about me having a clear sense of timeline predictions that are radically different from those who believe that AGI will explode upon us in the next few decades, and more about the fact that I find most justifications and arguments made in favor of a timeline of less than 50 years to be rather unconvincing.

  For instance, having studied and used state-of-the-art deep learning models, I am simply not able to understand why we are significantly closer to AGI today than we were in 1950s. General intelligence requires something qualitatively different from GPT-3 or Alpha Go, and I have seen literally zero evidence that any AI systems comprehend things even remotely close how humans operate.

  Note that the last point is not a requirement (namely that AI should understand objects, events and relations like humans do) as such for AGI but it does make me skeptical of people who cite these examples as evidence of progress we’ve made towards such a general intelligence.

  I have looked at Holden’s post and there are several things that are not clear to me. Here is one: there appears to be a lot of focus on the number of computations, especially in comparison to the human brain, and while I have little doubt that artificial systems would surpass those limitations (if it has already not done so), the real question is decoding the nature of wiring and the functional form of the relation between the inputs and outputs. Perhaps there is something I am not getting here but (at least in principle) isn’t there an infinite degree of freedom associated with a continuous function? Even if one argued that we can define equivalence class of similar functions (made rigorous), does that still not leave us with an extremely large number of possibilities?