There’s definitely a way of reducing it to economics. At the most zoomed out level, seems likely to me that without industrialisation you don’t get colonial presence and without colonial presence the anti-footbinding campaign doesn’t take off.
I don’t think the moral campaigners were interested purely in the empowerment of women, or thought about empowerment in the way we think about it. Seems like there was prejudice and misogyny and national interest, as well as concern for young girls going through pain and suffering.
Responding to the quote from the paper (which I haven’t read):
I do think it’s interesting and important that some footbound women resisted the decline of the practice.
It’s also worth noting that many girls resisted being footbound in the first place.
Also, while the decline in footbinding did involve the unbinding of adult women’s feet, I think the bigger deal in terms of numbers of women affected longterm was that young girls stopped being footbound in the first place. I would expect that some women who had already had their feet bound would be attached to what had happened to them and resist unbinding.
I’m unsure what the author means by “the end of footbinding was by no means achieved in the interest of foot-bound women whose voices and wants have since been marginalized in Chinese history.” If they mean that the reason that moral campaigners pushed against footbinding for reasons other than the welfare of women—sure, I expect that is at least somewhat the case. If they mean that the end of footbinding was net bad for women, I think that’s a tougher case to make. I don’t buy that because the end of footbinding was imposed top down means that it was bad for little girls not to have their feet broken. Brown notes that female infanticide rates seem to go up when footbinding declines, and Bossen and Gates also guess that the status of women declined at this time. All of those scholars attribute the decline in women’s status to underlying economic conditions though, rather than claiming that the end of footbinding was the causal factor.
Thanks for the response. I don’t disagree with anything you say here, and to be clear, I have a lot of both empirical and moral uncertainty about this topic.
It’s also worth noting that many girls resisted being footbound in the first place.
This makes me think of another parallel: parents forcing kids to practice musical instruments, which a lot of kids also resist, and arguably causes real suffering among the kids who hate doing it. (I’m thinking of places like China where this phenomenon is much more widespread than in the US.) How likely is a “moral campaign” for stopping this likely to succeed, without some economic force behind it?
Another parallel might be forcing kids to go to school and to do homework.
I think this is interesting.
On whether the moral campaign was about morality:
There’s definitely a way of reducing it to economics. At the most zoomed out level, seems likely to me that without industrialisation you don’t get colonial presence and without colonial presence the anti-footbinding campaign doesn’t take off.
I don’t think the moral campaigners were interested purely in the empowerment of women, or thought about empowerment in the way we think about it. Seems like there was prejudice and misogyny and national interest, as well as concern for young girls going through pain and suffering.
Responding to the quote from the paper (which I haven’t read):
I do think it’s interesting and important that some footbound women resisted the decline of the practice.
It’s also worth noting that many girls resisted being footbound in the first place.
Also, while the decline in footbinding did involve the unbinding of adult women’s feet, I think the bigger deal in terms of numbers of women affected longterm was that young girls stopped being footbound in the first place. I would expect that some women who had already had their feet bound would be attached to what had happened to them and resist unbinding.
I’m unsure what the author means by “the end of footbinding was by no means achieved in the interest of foot-bound women whose voices and wants have since been marginalized in Chinese history.” If they mean that the reason that moral campaigners pushed against footbinding for reasons other than the welfare of women—sure, I expect that is at least somewhat the case. If they mean that the end of footbinding was net bad for women, I think that’s a tougher case to make. I don’t buy that because the end of footbinding was imposed top down means that it was bad for little girls not to have their feet broken. Brown notes that female infanticide rates seem to go up when footbinding declines, and Bossen and Gates also guess that the status of women declined at this time. All of those scholars attribute the decline in women’s status to underlying economic conditions though, rather than claiming that the end of footbinding was the causal factor.
Thanks for the response. I don’t disagree with anything you say here, and to be clear, I have a lot of both empirical and moral uncertainty about this topic.
This makes me think of another parallel: parents forcing kids to practice musical instruments, which a lot of kids also resist, and arguably causes real suffering among the kids who hate doing it. (I’m thinking of places like China where this phenomenon is much more widespread than in the US.) How likely is a “moral campaign” for stopping this likely to succeed, without some economic force behind it?
Another parallel might be forcing kids to go to school and to do homework.