Error
Unrecognized LW server error:
Field "fmCrosspost" of type "CrosspostOutput" must have a selection of subfields. Did you mean "fmCrosspost { ... }"?
Unrecognized LW server error:
Field "fmCrosspost" of type "CrosspostOutput" must have a selection of subfields. Did you mean "fmCrosspost { ... }"?
I want to applaud this effort. While I don’t really think of myself as a China expert, I do think of myself as a guy who knows a good deal about China, including Chinese history from around 1840s or so up the present. I think that for someone with no background in Chinese history you did a great job here, and I think that this is a nice demonstration of how someone without a relevant background can still manage to grasp and issue with a short burst of dedicated effort. I also like how well structures this post is, being very clear about what could be wrong, conclusions, etc.
When I think of cultural changes, I generally think of how slowly cultural practices change. Thus, instances of rapid[1] cultural change (like the decline of footbinding, MADD changed the culture around drunk driving in the USA, or the acceptance of homosexuality in the USA) fascinate me. I’m sure there are lessons to be learned from these.
Rapid on a historical scale, so 10 or 20 years counts as rapid.
Thanks for this! It wouldn’t have occurred to me to consider the decline of footbinding as a case study of moral progress,
I think you’ve probably noted this and perhaps didn’t mention it because it’s not directly relevant to the main questions you’re investigating, but I think it’s important to note for someone who only reads this post that having bound feet was a status symbol—it began among the social elite and spread over time to lower social classes, remained a status symbol because families who needed girls to conduct agricultural labor could not partake in the practice, and in practice an incentive to do it was to increase marriage prospects.
Thanks for this point.
I’m actually a bit unsure how true it is that the status element of footbinding was important. Certainly that’s an established narrative in the literature (e.g. Shepherd buys it).
Brown, Bossen and Hill have an article I’ve only skimmed called ‘Marriage Mobility and Footbinding in Pre-1949 Rural China: A Reconsideration of Gender, Economics, and Meaning in Social Causation’ (link here: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/marriage-mobility-and-footbinding-in-pre1949-rural-china-a-reconsideration-of-gender-economics-and-meaning-in-social-causation/CF5C5F1E441C5E2BF56BBA8B56F55835), which argues as follows:
“In our sample of 7,314 rural women living in Sichuan, Northern, Central, and Southwestern China in the first half of the twentieth century, two-thirds of women did not marry up. In fact, 22 percent of all women, across regions, married down. In most regions, more women married up than down, but in all regions, the majority did not marry hypergamously. Moreover, for most regions, we found no statistically significant difference between the chances of a footbound girl versus a not-bound girl in marrying into a wealthier household, despite a common cultural belief that footbinding would improve girls’ marital prospects.”
There’s an article I haven’t read called ‘Footbinding, Hypergamy, and Handicraft Labor: Evaluating the Labor Market Explanation of Footbinding’, which sounds like it pushes back on these arguments. Link here: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-020-00271-9
Also, I think it’s not clear how true it is that “families who needed girls to conduct agricultural labor could not partake”:
Many scholars note anecdotal evidence of footbound women working in fields
In Brown and Satterthwaite-Phillips’ model, performing agricultural labour is not significant, although girls who did agricultural labour were less likely to be footbound. I can’t immediately find a figure for % of footbound girls who did agricultural labour in their dataset unfortunately Brown in their review article puts forward several arguments against Shepherd’s view:
Bossen and Gates note “Given the wide distribution of binding we found among poor rural populations, it seems unlikely that elite emulation was the main consideration.”
Some other related things I’ve pulled from my notes are arguments in Brown’s review article against Shepherd’s view:
“99 percent of women married regardless of how many had ever bound. So bound feet were clearly not needed to be able to marry. The BBG data show regional variation in whether being footbound at marriage age led to hypergamy, with significant correlations only for Sichuan (primarily from two counties) and not for North, Central, and Southwest China.17 Nevertheless, about 47 percent of women—even in Sichuan—married to households at the same wealth level as their natal households.”
Shepherd’s Taiwan data shows earlier marriage for footbound girls, but later marriage could also indicate more economic value to the parental household, so this isn’t a clear signal
“most ever-bound women had released their feet before marriage”
I liked this as a clear and concise breakdown of an interesting and relevant topic that I had heard of, but not known about.
It occurs to me that footbinding shares similarities with wearing high heels. Looks like I’m not the only one who noticed.
Was the “moral campaign” against footbinding itself actually about morality, or was it also mainly about economics and/or status? (Or maybe all these things are inextricably linked in our minds at a deep level.) At least one paper takes the latter perspective (albeit expressed in the language of “postcolonial feminism”). From its conclusions section:
I think this is interesting.
On whether the moral campaign was about morality:
There’s definitely a way of reducing it to economics. At the most zoomed out level, seems likely to me that without industrialisation you don’t get colonial presence and without colonial presence the anti-footbinding campaign doesn’t take off.
I don’t think the moral campaigners were interested purely in the empowerment of women, or thought about empowerment in the way we think about it. Seems like there was prejudice and misogyny and national interest, as well as concern for young girls going through pain and suffering.
Responding to the quote from the paper (which I haven’t read):
I do think it’s interesting and important that some footbound women resisted the decline of the practice.
It’s also worth noting that many girls resisted being footbound in the first place.
Also, while the decline in footbinding did involve the unbinding of adult women’s feet, I think the bigger deal in terms of numbers of women affected longterm was that young girls stopped being footbound in the first place. I would expect that some women who had already had their feet bound would be attached to what had happened to them and resist unbinding.
I’m unsure what the author means by “the end of footbinding was by no means achieved in the interest of foot-bound women whose voices and wants have since been marginalized in Chinese history.” If they mean that the reason that moral campaigners pushed against footbinding for reasons other than the welfare of women—sure, I expect that is at least somewhat the case. If they mean that the end of footbinding was net bad for women, I think that’s a tougher case to make. I don’t buy that because the end of footbinding was imposed top down means that it was bad for little girls not to have their feet broken. Brown notes that female infanticide rates seem to go up when footbinding declines, and Bossen and Gates also guess that the status of women declined at this time. All of those scholars attribute the decline in women’s status to underlying economic conditions though, rather than claiming that the end of footbinding was the causal factor.
Thanks for the response. I don’t disagree with anything you say here, and to be clear, I have a lot of both empirical and moral uncertainty about this topic.
This makes me think of another parallel: parents forcing kids to practice musical instruments, which a lot of kids also resist, and arguably causes real suffering among the kids who hate doing it. (I’m thinking of places like China where this phenomenon is much more widespread than in the US.) How likely is a “moral campaign” for stopping this likely to succeed, without some economic force behind it?
Another parallel might be forcing kids to go to school and to do homework.
Nice analysis!
This episode of The 80,000 Hours Podcast discusses the influence of economics on moral values. For example, energy extraction technology as a key driver of human values.