P: consequentialism leads people to believing predictably wrong things or undertake predictably harmful actions
I think if it were the case that we received evidence for P, it would be reasonable to conclude that consequentialism is more likely to be wrong as a decision procedure[1] than if we received evidence for not-P.
Do you disagree? If not, we should examine the distinction between “(heightened) rhetorical abusability” and P. My best guess is something that I often tritely summarize as “anything is possible when you lie”:
Anybody could make up arguments about whether X decision procedure or ethical framework justifies or permits Y. What matters isn’t the sophistication (sophistry) of the arguments, but what adherents actually believe. As I have seen little evidence that consequentialists in history have done predictably worse actions than non-consequentialists, I’m not particularly bothered by the hypothetical claimed harms of consequentialism.
Notably, unlike your post, my argument is contingent upon a specific scaffolding of empirical facts. Strong and representative evidence that consequentialist beliefs are predictably harmful in history, or conceptual, empirically informed, arguments that consequentialist beliefs will lead people to predictably do harm in the future, will cause me to update against consequentialism as a decision procedure.
Though it was unclear to me from this post whether you were considering consequentialism as a criterion of rightness vs a decision procedure. If the former, I think the question is less interesting under moral antirealism or nihilism (which I suspect most critics of consequentialism subscribe to).
Consider proposition P:
I think if it were the case that we received evidence for P, it would be reasonable to conclude that consequentialism is more likely to be wrong as a decision procedure[1] than if we received evidence for not-P.
Do you disagree? If not, we should examine the distinction between “(heightened) rhetorical abusability” and P. My best guess is something that I often tritely summarize as “anything is possible when you lie”:
Notably, unlike your post, my argument is contingent upon a specific scaffolding of empirical facts. Strong and representative evidence that consequentialist beliefs are predictably harmful in history, or conceptual, empirically informed, arguments that consequentialist beliefs will lead people to predictably do harm in the future, will cause me to update against consequentialism as a decision procedure.
Though it was unclear to me from this post whether you were considering consequentialism as a criterion of rightness vs a decision procedure. If the former, I think the question is less interesting under moral antirealism or nihilism (which I suspect most critics of consequentialism subscribe to).