If this argument concluded that belief in consequentialism had bad consequences on net, it would be a more serious problem for consequentialism.
Another different and perhaps more relevant question is whether popularizing belief in consequentialism has net bad consequences on the margin.
(Just flagging that this is very related to the discussion in the first part of Reasons and Persons, and for the reasons presented therein I don’t think it’s a decisive argument against consequentialism as criterion of rightness.)
If this argument concluded that belief in consequentialism had bad consequences on net, it would be a more serious problem for consequentialism.
Another different and perhaps more relevant question is whether popularizing belief in consequentialism has net bad consequences on the margin.
(Just flagging that this is very related to the discussion in the first part of Reasons and Persons, and for the reasons presented therein I don’t think it’s a decisive argument against consequentialism as criterion of rightness.)